Felix R.F. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. Washington
• Decided: December 16, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-03068
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Dec 16, 2025 1 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

7 FELIX R.F., 8 No. 2:25-CV-03068-ACE Plaintiff, 9 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 10 v. MOTION IN PART 11 FRANK BISIGNANO, ECF Nos. 12 & 17 12 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 13 SECURITY,

14 Defendant. 15 16 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Opening Brief and Defendant’s Brief 17 in response. ECF No. 12, 17. Attorney D. James Tree represents Plaintiff; Special 18 Assistant United States Attorney David J. Burdett represents Defendant. After 19 reviewing the administrative record and the briefs filed by the parties, the Court 20 GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion in Part; DENIES Defendant’s Motion; and 21 REMANDS the matter to the Commissioner for an immediate calculation of 22 benefits with respect to Plaintiff’s childhood disability claim and REMANDS 23 Plaintiff’s adult disability claim to the Commissioner for additional proceedings. 24 JURISDICTION 25 Plaintiff protectively filed an application for child disability benefits on May 26 24, 2019, alleging onset of disability on October 21, 2016. Tr. 177. The 27 application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Administrative Law 28 Judge (ALJ) Joseph A. Rose held a hearing on April 12, 2021, and issued an 1 unfavorable decision on May 20, 2021. A civil action was then filed in this Court 2 which resulted in a remand for additional proceedings on September 20, 2023. Tr. 3 936-951. A new ALJ, David Johnson, held an administrative hearing on February 4 20, 2025, Tr. 872-911, and issued an unfavorable decision on March 10, 2025, Tr. 5 838-860. Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on May 20, 2025. ECF No. 6 1. 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 The ALJ is tasked with “determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 9 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 10 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 11 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 12 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 13 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 14 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is 15 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 16 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence “is such relevant evidence as a 17 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 18 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 19 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 20 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 21 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Morgan v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 22 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or 23 if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either disability or non-disability, the 24 ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th 25 Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will be set 26 aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and 27 making the decision. Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 28 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 1 SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 2 Childhood Disability 3 The Social Security Act provides that a child under 18 is “disabled” for 4 purposes of SSI eligibility if he “has a medically determinable physical or mental 5 impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which 6 can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 7 a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). 8 The Commissioner follows a three-step sequential process in determining 9 childhood disability: (1) whether the child is engaged in substantial gainful 10 activity; (2) if not, whether the child has a medically determinable severe 11 impairment; (3) and, if so, whether the child’s severe impairment meets, medically 12 equals, or functionally equals the severity of a set of criteria for an impairment 13 listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. 14 If the Commissioner determines at step three that the claimant has an 15 impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 16 severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 17 Appendix 1, the analysis ends there. If not, the Commissioner decides whether the 18 child’s impairment results in limitations that functionally equal a listing. 20 C.F.R. 19 § 416.926a(a). In determining whether an impairment or combination of 20 impairments functionally equal a listing, the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s 21 functioning in terms of six domains: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) 22 attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving 23 about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for yourself; and (6) health and physical 24 well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). 25 When evaluating the ability to function in each domain, the ALJ considers 26 information that will help answer the following questions “about whether your 27 impairment(s) affect your functioning and whether your activities are typical of 28 o

ther c

hildren your age who do not have impairments”: 1 (i) What activities are you able to perform? 2 (ii) What activities are you not able to perform? 3

4 (iii) Which of your activities are limited or restricted compared to other 5 c hildren your age who do not have impairments? 6 (iv) Where do you have difficulty with your activities – at home, in 7 c hildcare, at school, or in the community? 8 (v) Do you have difficulty independently initiating, sustaining, or 9

c ompleting activities? 10 (vi) What kind of help do you need to do your activities, how much help do 11 you need, and how often do you need it? 12 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(2)(i)-(vi). 13 The evaluation of functional equivalence begins “by considering the child’s 14 functioning without considering the domains or individual impairments.” Title 15 XVI: Determining Childhood Disability Under the Functional Equivalence Rule – 16 The “Whole Child” Approach, SSR 08-1p, 2009 WL 396031 (Feb. 17, 2009). The 17 rules provide that “[w]hen we evaluate your functioning and decide which domains 18 may be affected by your impairment(s), we will look first at your activities and 19 limitations and restrictions.” Id. citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(c). The rules instruct 20 the Commissioner to:

21 Look at information we have in your case record about how your 22 functioning is affected during all your activities when we decide whether your impairment or combination of impairments functionally equals the 23 listings. Your activities are everything you do at home, at school, and in 24 your community. 25 Id. citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b). The severity of limitation in each affected 26 functional domain is then considered. This technique is called the “Whole Child” 27 approach. 28 /// 1 Adult Disability 2 With respect to adults, the Commissioner has established a five-step 3 sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 4 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142 5 (1987). In steps one through four, the claimant bears the burden of establishing a 6 prima facie case of disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-1099. This 7 burden is met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment 8 prevents the claimant from engaging in past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 9 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If a claimant cannot perform past relevant work, 10 the ALJ proceeds to step five, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show 11 (1) that Plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful activity and (2) that a 12 significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff can 13 perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497-1498 (9th Cir. 1984); Beltran v. 14 Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). If a claimant cannot make an adjustment 15 to other work, the claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 16 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 17 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 18 On March 10, 2025, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not 19 disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. Tr. 838-860. 20 With respect to the childhood standard of disability, the ALJ found at step 21 one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 22 application date, May 24, 2019. Tr. 843. At step two, the ALJ determined 23 Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairment: Tourette’s syndrome, 24 anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and ADHD. Tr. 843. The ALJ found at step 25 three that the evidence of record demonstrated Plaintiff’s impairments, although 26 severe, did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal the criteria of any of 27 the listed impairments. Tr. 843-844. As to the six domains (functional 28 equivalence), the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had less than a marked limitation in 1 acquiring and using information, less than a marked limitation in attending and 2 completing tasks, less than a marked limitation interacting and relating with others, 3 less than a marked limitation in moving about and manipulating objects, a marked 4 limitation in caring for himself, and less than a marked limitation in health and 5 physical well-being. Tr. 945. The ALJ thus determined Plaintiff’s impairments 6 resulted in only one marked limitation and no extreme limitations. Because 7 Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or 8 medically or functionally equaled the listings, it was determined that Plaintiff was 9 not disabled prior to attaining age 18. Tr. 854. 10 Plaintiff attained age 18 in December 2024. Tr. 854. With respect to the 11 adult standard of disability, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not develop any new 12 impairment or impairments since attaining age 18; he continued to have a severe 13 impairment or combination of impairments but his impairments did not meet or 14 medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments; he had the residual 15 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels 16 with several nonexertional limitations (including a restriction to work that does not 17 require more than occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors); he had 18 no past relevant work; and, based on the testimony of the vocational expert and 19 considering Plaintiff age, education, work experience and RFC, there are jobs that 20 exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, 21 including the jobs of auto-detailer, groundskeeper, and cleaner, industrial. Tr. 854- 22 859. 23 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability within 24 the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the May 24, 2019 25 disability application date, through the date of the ALJ’s decision, March 10, 2025. 26 Tr. 860. 27 /// 28 /// 1 ISSUES 2 The question presented is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 3 decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper legal 4 standards. 5 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in this case by (1) concluding at step five of 6 the adult sequential evaluation process that he was not disabled despite an RFC 7 restriction to work that does not require more than occasional interaction with 8 coworkers and supervisors; (2) failing to properly assess the functional domains; 9 (3) improperly assessing Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, both before age 18 and 10 after age 18; and (4) improperly assessing the medical and other opinion evidence 11 of record. ECF No. 12 at 2-27. 12 DISCUSSION 13 A. Childhood Disability 14 1. Step Three - - Functional Equivalence 15 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to properly assess the functional 16 domains in this case. ECF No. 12 at 3-11. Defendant concedes that a remand is 17 warranted but argues the testimony of the medical expert (David Peterson, Ph.D.) 18 and the prior administrative medical findings of Michael Brown, Ph.D., Jim 19 Fischer, M.D., Richard Borton, Ph.D., and Charles Wolfe, M.D., present conflicts 20 in the medical opinion evidence that only the ALJ can resolve through additional 21 proceedings. ECF No. 17 at 3-4. 22 To functionally equal a listing, a claimant’s impairment or combination of 23 impairments must result in “marked” limitations in two domains of functioning or 24 an “extreme” limitation in one domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). A “marked 25 limitation” in a domain results when the child’s impairment “interferes seriously” 26 with the ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. 27 § 416.926a(e)(2). An “extreme limitation” in a domain results when the child’s 28 /// 1 impairment interferes “very seriously” with his ability to independently initiate, 2 sustain or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3). 3 The ALJ concluded Plaintiff (1) had less than a marked limitation in 4 acquiring and using information, (2) less than a marked limitation in attending and 5 completing tasks, (3) less than a marked limitation interacting and relating with 6 others, (4) less than a marked limitation in moving about and manipulating objects, 7 (5) a marked limitation in caring for himself, and (6) less than a marked limitation 8 in health and physical well-being. Tr. 945. Because the ALJ assessed a marked 9 limitation in Domain 5 (caring for oneself), Plaintiff would functionally equal a 10 listing if a marked or greater limitation was found in one of the remaining domains. 11 The undersigned finds that substantial evidence supports a determination that 12 Plaintiff had a marked limitation in at least one additional domain. See infra. 13 At the outset, the undersigned notes the opinions of the medical 14 professionals cited in Defendant’s brief contradict each other and if each opinion 15 was adopted in full, it would support a finding of functional equivalence based on a 16 result of marked limitations in two domains: On September 19, 2019, Drs. Brown 17 and Fischer determined Plaintiff had less than marked impairments in Domains 1 18 and 6, no limitation in Domains 3, 4, and 5, and a marked limitation in Domain 2, 19 Tr. 83-84; on June 5, 2020, Drs. Borton and Wolfe found Plaintiff had less than a 20 marked impairments in Domains 1, 2, 3, and 5 and no limitation in Domains 4 and 21 6, Tr. 94-95; and Dr. Peterson testified at the February 20, 2025 administrative 22 hearing it was his opinion that Plaintiff had less than a marked impairment in 23 Domains 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and a marked limitation in Domain 5, Tr. 884-888. 24 The ALJ’s assessment of the domains combined Domain 1 (acquiring and 25 using information) and Domain 2 (attending and completing tasks), Tr. 852, and, 26 as noted by Plaintiff, discussed only evidence from 2020 forward despite an 27 alleged disability onset date of October 2016, ECF No. 12 at 3-6. Moreover, 28 despite finding persuasive and adopting the state agency psychological consultants’ 1 medical opinions, Tr. 853-854, the ALJ did not account for the September 19, 2 2019, reports of Drs. Brown and Fischer which found a marked impairment in 3 Domain 2. Tr. 83-84. 4 In the domain of acquiring and using information (Domain 1), an ALJ 5 considers “how well you acquire or learn information, and how well you use the 6 information you have learned.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g). A claimant may be 7 limited in acquiring and using information if he (1) does not demonstrate 8 understanding of words about space, size, or time; (2) cannot rhyme words or the 9 sounds in words; (3) has difficulty recalling important things he learned in school 10 yesterday; (4) has difficulty solving mathematics questions or computing 11 arithmetic answers; or (5) talks only in short, simple sentences and has difficulty 12 explaining what he means. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)(3)(i)-(v). In the domain of 13 attending and completing tasks (Domain 2), an ALJ considers “how well you are 14 able to focus and maintain your attention, and how well you begin, carry through, 15 and finish your activities, including the pace at which you perform activities and 16 the ease with which you change them.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h). A claimant may 17 be limited in attending and completing tasks if he (1) is easily startled, distracted, 18 or overreactive to sounds, sights, movements, or touch; (2) is slow to focus on or 19 fails to complete activities of interest to him; (3) repeatedly becomes sidetracked 20 from his activities or frequently interrupts others; (4) is easily frustrated and gives 21 up on tasks, including ones he is capable of completing; or (5) requires extra 22 supervision to keep him engaged in an activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h)(3)(i)-(v). 23 In addition to the findings of a marked impairment of attending and 24 completing tasks by Drs. Brown and Fischer, Tr. 83-84, a marked finding in 25 Domain 1 and Domain 2 is supported by the 2019 report of Plaintiff’s teacher, see 26 Tr. 215 (finding “obvious,” “serious,” and “very serious” problems in every 27 subsection of Domain 1); Tr. 216 (finding numerous “serious” and “very serious” 28 problems and that Plaintiff was easily distracted and would not complete 1 assignments with respect to Domain 2), and the March 2024 report of Inclusion 2 Specialist Robyn Johnson, Tr. 1210-1212 (opining, with explanation, that Plaintiff 3 had a marked impairment in Domain 1 and an extreme impairment in Domain 2). 4 Plaintiff’s briefing provides the following further support for a conclusion 5 that Plaintiff was at least markedly impaired in Domain 1 and Domain 2: 6

[Plaintiff] had modified grading such that 77.5% and up was in the A 7 bracket, 58.8% to 77.4% was in the B bracket, and 40% to 58.7% was in the C bracket. Tr. 763. Even so, in December 2020 he was failing his science 8 class and not turning in assignments because he did not understand, was 9 nervous and frustrated to sign on remotely, and was not asking for help. Tr. 10 719. In January 2021, he was falling behind in school (Tr. 725), and his mother testified in April 2021 it was unclear if he would go to the next grade 11 (Tr. 70) . . . . [Plaintiff’s] initial IEP was for reading and math and he was 12 performing 2 years below level in reading. Tr. 278. In 2019, his team proposed 500 minutes of special education per week within general 13 education (Tr. 313), which is close to a third of the total 1800 minutes (see 14 Tr. 309). Despite modified grading criteria and getting pass/fail for math and reading that year (Tr. 306), he was failing reading in 2019 (Tr. 470) . . . . 15 Later, he was permitted to pass some classes if he had a 40% in 2020 (Tr.

16 552) and 50% in 2023 (Tr. 1152) but was still failing (see Tr. 1149). In 9th 17 grade, his reading passage comprehension was grade equivalent 3.9. Tr. 1165. In 12th grade, his reading comprehension was at grade level 5.6 and in 18 the 4th percentile rank compared to peers. Tr. 1231, 1248. State literacy 19 t esting has always tested “Below” or “Well Below” grade level. Tr. 1232. 2 2 0 1

… [T]he classroom observation found in 2016 he was on-task 53% (Tr. 282) 22 and 22% by 2019 despite redirections, re-explanations, and teacher 23 interactions (Tr. 289). In January 2020, teachers noted he needed work checked every 5 minutes, was easily distracted, and had difficulty staying 24 on-task. Tr. 549. In 2021, he was distracted by YouTube when he should be 25 in class. Tr. 725. In 2023, his history teacher found he was lethargic, uninterested, and lacked emotion and energy. Tr. 1149. Teachers were still 26 reminding him to pay attention in 2024 (Tr. 1668) . . . . Providers also found 27 he was fidgety (e.g., Tr. 414, 434, 450, 464, 479, 652), distracted (e.g., Tr. 434, 450, 472, 706, 1669, 1671), tangential (e.g., Tr. 1653, 1669), and his 28 attention was fair to decreased (e.g., Tr. 472, 692, 723, 1472, 1480, 1490, 1 2 1501, 1520). 3 ECF No. 12 at 4-6. Defendant does not specifically challenge the foregoing 4 evidence/argument presented by Plaintiff. This failure to respond in an opposition 5 brief to an argument put forward in Plaintiff’s opening brief constitutes a waiver or 6 abandonment in regard to the uncontested issue. Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. 7 Country Fin’l Corp., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (collecting 8 cases); see Independent Towers of Wash. v. Wash., 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir.

9 2003). 10 With respect to the domain of interacting and relating with others (Domain 11 3), an ALJ considers how well the plaintiff can “initiate and sustain emotional 12 connections with others, develop and use the language of [Plaintiff’s] community, 13 cooperate with others, comply with rules, respond to criticism, and respect and take 14 care of the possessions of others.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(i). Here, the ALJ found 15 no evidence of continuing serious problems in this domain and noted Plaintiff does 16 activities with family members, has one friend at school, and likes to play 17 basketball with friends in the neighborhood. Tr. 852. However, as asserted in 18 Plaintiff’s briefing, the ALJ failed to mention Plaintiff’s tic disorder (Tr. 292) and 19 use of inappropriate language (e.g. Tr. 597-598). ECF No. 12 at 6-7. Plaintiff 20 described resulting difficulties as follows:

21 In 2018, his sister refused to take him swimming anymore due to his loud and sexualized sounds, and his therapist noted his tics were affecting his 22 daily life. Tr. 418. That year, he got a bus referral for uttering a curse when 23 passing the driver. Tr. 410-12. In 2019, he was crying because other children 24 had been questioning and making fun of him related to his tics. Tr. 461. He was disciplined 5 times at school between October and November 2019 for 25 name-calling, disrespect, insubordination, hitting others, talking back, and 26 b eing rude. Tr. 292. 27 ECF No. 12 at 6-7. Defendant again fails to specifically contest Plaintiff’s 28 assertions. See Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. 1 Furthermore, a greater limitation than “less than marked” in Domain 3 is supported 2 by the 2019 report of Plaintiff’s teacher, see Tr. 217 (finding “obvious” and 3 “serious” problems in subsections of Domain 3), and the March 2024 report of 4 Inclusion Specialist Johnson, Tr. 1211 (opining Plaintiff had a marked to extreme 5 impairment in Domain 3). 6 In the domain of health and physical well-being (Domain 6), an ALJ 7 considers “the cumulative physical effects of physical or mental impairments and 8 their associated treatments or therapies on your functioning.” 20 C.F.R. § 9 416.926a(l). A claimant may be limited in health and physical well-being if he (1) 10 has generalized symptoms, such as weakness, dizziness, agitation, lethargy, or 11 psychomotor retardation because of his impairments; (2) has somatic complaints 12 related to his impairments; (3) has limitations in physical functioning because of 13 treatment; (4) has exacerbations from one impairment or a combination of 14 impairments that interferes with his physical functioning; or (5) is medically fragile 15 and needs intensive medical care to maintain his level of health and physical well- 16 being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(l)(4)(i)-(v). 17 Regarding the domain of health and physical well-being, the ALJ noted only 18 that Plaintiff was obese but remained physically active. Tr. 852. As asserted by 19 Plaintiff, and again ignored in Defendant’s response brief, the ALJ did not consider 20 that Plaintiff’s obesity increased over time (weighing 265 lbs. by February 2024 21 with a BMI over the 99th percentile), Tr. 1382, and was linked to abnormal liver, 22 cholesterol, and Vitamin D findings, Tr. 806-807. He also had a sleep study that 23 revealed significant oxygen desaturations, Tr. 832, and struggled with headaches, 24 Tr. 71 (his mother explained in 2021 that Plaintiff was experiencing nearly daily 25 headaches). Again, a greater limitation in Domain 6 is also supported by the 26 March 2024 report of Inclusion Specialist Johnson, Tr. 1212 (opining Plaintiff had 27 a marked impairment in Domain 6, indicating Plaintiff reported a difference in his 28 emotional regulation and physical well-being when on medication). 1 Substantial evidence does not support that ALJ’s assessment of the

2 functional domains in this case. As indicated above, the undersigned finds 3 Defendant’s failure to specifically contest Plaintiff’s assertions with respect to the 4 domains is a waiver or abandonment of these issues. In any event, the record 5 reflects greater limitations than those assessed by the ALJ with respect to Domain 6 1, Domain 2, Domain 3, and Domain 6. Substantial evidence supports a 7 determination that Plaintiff had a marked limitation in one or more of these 8 domains, in addition to the ALJ’s assessment of a marked limitation in Domain 5 9 (caring for oneself). Therefore, the Court finds the weight of the record evidence 10 supports a conclusion that Plaintiff’s impairments resulted in limitations that 11 functionally equaled a listing. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). 12 2. Lay Witness Evidence 13 Plaintiff contends the ALJ also erred by failing to properly assess the 14 testimony of Plaintiff’s mother and teachers. ECF No. 12 at 21-23. 15 An ALJ must consider the statement of lay witnesses in determining whether 16 a claimant is disabled. Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 17 (9th Cir. 2006). “[F]riends and family members in a position to observe a 18 claimant’s symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify as to her 19 condition.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918-919 (9th Cir. 1993). Such 20 testimony cannot be disregarded without comment, and if a lay witness statement 21 is rejected, the ALJ “‘must give reasons that are germane to each witness.’” 22 Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 23 919). In a childhood disability case, “where the child is unable to adequately 24 describe her symptoms, the Commissioner accepts the testimony of a person most 25 familiar with the child’s condition, such as a parent.” Smith ex rel. Enge v. 26 Massanari, 139 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001) quoting Brown v. Callahan, 27 120 F.3d 1133, 1135 (10th Cir. 1997). In the Ninth Circuit, the testimony of third 28 parties, including parents of child claimants, is evaluated under the standard 1 applicable to lay witnesses. See Merrill ex rel. Merrill v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 1083, 2 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919; Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 3 511 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent 4 evidence that an ALJ must take into account, unless he or she expressly determines 5 to disregard such testimony and gives reasons germane to each witness for doing 6 so.”). 7 The ALJ did not specifically address the statements of Plaintiff’s mother, see 8 Tr. 846-851, and completely fails to address the report of Inclusion Specialist 9 Johnson. Although the ALJ did address the opinion of Plaintiff’s sixth grade 10 teacher, Tr. 854 (finding it unpersuasive), Plaintiff’s briefing challenges this 11 assessment and Defendant did not contest Plaintiff’s assertion in this regard. See 12 Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. 13 The ALJ erred by improperly assessing the opinions of these individuals. 14 3. Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints 15 Plaintiff additionally argues the ALJ erred by failing to provide clear and 16 convincing reasons for discounting his subjective complaints. ECF No. 12 at 11- 17 20. Defendant’s response once again does not contest Plaintiff’s assertion. 18 It is the province of the ALJ to make credibility determinations. Andrews, 19 53 F.3d at 1039. However, the ALJ’s findings must be supported by specific 20 cogent reasons. Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Once 21 the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying medical impairment, the 22 ALJ may not discredit testimony as to the severity of an impairment because it is 23 unsupported by medical evidence. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 24 1998). Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting 25 the claimant’s testimony must be “specific, clear and convincing.” Smolen, 80 26 F.3d at 1281. “General findings are insufficient: rather the ALJ must identify 27 what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s 28 /// 1 complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 2 9, 1996); Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918. 3 The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 4 reasonably be expected to cause some of his alleged symptoms; however, “the 5 weight that can be given to the claimant’s symptom reports is undermined for the 6 reasons discussed throughout this decision.” Tr. 846. The ALJ stated that 7 “[i]nconsistencies undermine the weight that can be given to the claimant’s 8 symptom reports.” Tr. 846. However, with respect to Plaintiff’s credibility 9 analysis, the ALJ merely evaluated the objective evidence and the persuasiveness 10 accorded to certain opinions. Tr. 846-854. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 347 F.2d 341, 11 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that once a claimant produces objective medical 12 evidence of an underlying impairment, an adjudicator may not reject the claimant’s 13 subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully 14 corroborate the alleged severity of pain); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 15 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding an ALJ may not make a negative credibility 16 finding “solely because” the claimant’s symptom testimony “is not substantiated 17 affirmatively by objective medical evidence”). Accordingly, the undersigned finds 18 the ALJ again erred by failing to properly consider Plaintiff’s subjective 19 complaints. 20 B. Adult Disability 21 1. Opinion Evidence 22 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred with regard to his assessment of the opinions 23 of Jenifer Schultz, Ph.D., medical expert Peterson, and Dr. Worley as it pertains to 24 Plaintiff’s adult disability. ECF No. 12 at 25-27. 25 Plaintiff attained age 18 in December 2024, Tr. 838, an administrative 26 hearing was held on February 20, 2025, Tr. 872-911, and the unfavorable decision 27 was issued on March 10, 2025, Tr. 838-860. There is minimal evidence of 28 Plaintiff’s functioning since attaining age 18: only the testimony provided at the 1 administrative hearing and a consultative examination report dated February 12, 2 2025, Tr. 1944-1951. 3 As discussed by the ALJ, medical expert Peterson indicated that, aside from 4 the changes resulting from Plaintiff’s self-cessation of medication, the record 5 indicated Plaintiff’s condition had not significantly changed. Tr. 857. Dr. Schultz 6 examined Plaintiff in February 2025 and found that Plaintiff’s presentation was 7 consistent with previous functioning based on the records provided. Tr. 1951. 8 Neither the testimony of Dr. Peterson, nor the report of Dr. Schultz is particularly 9 helpful in clarifying Plaintiff’s functional abilities as an adult. 10 With respect to Dr. Worley, the ALJ determined that the opinions of Dr. 11 Worley were limitedly informative of Plaintiff’s condition after attaining age 18 12 and only somewhat unpersuasive because they lacked support as well as 13 consistency with other evidence. Tr. 858. The ALJ did not explain how this 14 conclusion was reached. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 15 2015) (the ALJ must set forth the reasoning behind his decisions in a way that 16 allows for meaningful review). 17 Based on the dearth of meaningful evidence regarding Plaintiff’s functioning 18 as an adult, the undersigned finds that additional evidence is necessary for an 19 adequate review of Plaintiff’s adult functioning. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 20 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (an ALJ’s duty to develop the record is triggered 21 when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for 22 proper evaluation of the evidence). The record before the ALJ is ambiguous, at 23 best, and plainly inadequate to allow for a proper evaluation of the evidence 24 pertaining to Plaintiff’s functioning as an adult. Therefore, the ALJ shall be 25 directed to further develop the record by requiring Plaintiff to undergo a new 26 consultative psychological examination prior to a new administrative hearing and, 27 if warranted, by eliciting medical expert testimony to assist the ALJ in formulating 28 a new RFC determination. 1 2. Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints 2 Plaintiff contends the ALJ also erred by failing to provide clear and 3 convincing reasons for discounting his adult symptom testimony. ECF No. 12 at 4 20-21. As before, Defendant does not contest Plaintiff’s adult credibility assertion. 5 With respect to Plaintiff’s adult symptom testimony, the ALJ’s decision is 6 identical: Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 7 expected to cause some of his alleged symptoms; however, “the weight that can be 8 given to the claimant’s symptom reports is undermined for the reasons discussed 9 throughout this decision.” Tr. 857. However, the ALJ erred by failing to provide 10 any reasoning for the rejection of Plaintiff’s adult symptom testimony. 11 Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ shall also reconsider Plaintiff’s statements and 12 testimony and reassess what statements, if any, are not credible and, if deemed not 13 credible, what specific evidence undermines those statements. 14 3. Training-Period Caveat 15 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by failing to conduct an adequate analysis at 16 step five of the sequential evaluation process. ECF No. 12 at 2-3. 17 Plaintiff, citing Leitz v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 4342114 at *2 (9th Cir. July 5, 18 2023),1 argues that the ALJ’s limitation of Plaintiff to occasional interaction with 19 coworkers and supervisors bars all job training and, consequently, precludes 20

21 1In Leitz, the ALJ held that the claimant “can have brief, superficial 22 interaction with co-workers and the public; and can have occasional interaction 23 with supervisors (although additional time for training is acceptable).” Leitz, 2023 24 WL 4342114 at *2. The Ninth Circuit determined that the “training-period caveat” 25 was not supported by the record, and that there was no evidence that the claimant’s 26 mental problems were “somehow alleviated during training periods because they 27 are less likely to include supervisor interactions than other work periods, or that 28 employers would be willing to tolerate her limitations during training periods.” Id. 1 competitive employment. ECF No. 12 at 2-3 (asserting Plaintiff is unlikely to 2 survive the early period after hiring); ECF No. 18 at 2-4 (arguing Plaintiff would 3 not survive training). The undersigned does not agree with the proposition that a 4 limitation to occasional interaction with supervisors is per se disabling. See Justin 5 P. v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 1559545 at *7-8 (E.D. Wash. April 10, 2024) (the Court 6 applied Leitz and determined that the ALJ did not err). Nevertheless, to address 7 Plaintiff’s concern, the ALJ on remand will be instructed to obtain supplemental 8 vocational expert testimony to specifically address whether an RFC limiting 9 Plaintiff to occasional interaction with supervisors during the training period would 10 preclude any identified jobs. 11 CONCLUSION 12 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the 13 ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and not free of harmful 14 error. The Court has the discretion to remand the case for additional evidence and 15 findings or to award benefits. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. The Court may award 16 benefits if the record is fully developed and further administrative proceedings 17 would serve no useful purpose. Id. Remand is appropriate when additional 18 administrative proceedings could remedy defects. Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 19 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989). For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds 20 the record is adequate for a proper determination to be made with respect to 21 Plaintiff’s childhood disability claim but further development is necessary as to 22 Plaintiff’s adult disability claim. 23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 24 1. Plaintiff’s motion to reverse and remand for an immediate award of 25 benefits, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED IN PART. 26 2. Defendant’s motion to reverse and remand for additional proceedings, 27 ECF No. 17, is DENIED. 28 /// 1 3. The matter is REVERSED AND REMANDED to the Commissioner 2|| for an immediate calculation of benefits with respect to Plaintiff's childhood 3|| disability claim. 4 4. The matter is REVERSED AND REMANDED to the Commissioner 5|| for additional proceedings with respect to Plaintiff's adult disability claim. On 6|| remand, the ALJ shall (a) reexamine Plaintiff's statements and testimony; (b) 7\| reassess Plaintiff's RFC, taking into consideration the opinions of Drs. Peterson, Worley and Schulz, and all other medical evidence of record relevant to Plaintiffs 9|| adult disability claim; (c) develop the record further by requiring Plaintiff to 10|| undergo a new consultative psychological examination prior to a new administrative hearing and, if warranted, by eliciting medical expert testimony to 12]| assist the ALJ in formulating a new RFC determination; (d) obtain supplemental testimony from a vocational expert and specifically address with the vocational 14]| expert whether an RFC limiting Plaintiff to occasional interaction with supervisors during the training period would preclude any identified jobs; and (e) take into consideration any other evidence or testimony relevant to Plaintiffs adult disability claim. 18 5. An application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive shall file this Order 20]| and provide copies to counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Plaintiff and the file shall be CLOSED. 22 DATED December 16, 2025.

24 — Clagunbee ( Gadeem C, oy oN ALEXANDER C. EKSTROM _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

27 28