Felipe Clavel Gonzalez v. William Barr

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 20, 2020
Docket16-73979
StatusUnpublished

This text of Felipe Clavel Gonzalez v. William Barr (Felipe Clavel Gonzalez v. William Barr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Felipe Clavel Gonzalez v. William Barr, (9th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FELIPE CLAVEL GONZALEZ, AKA No. 16-73979 Felipe Clauel Gonzalez, Agency No. A200-975-089 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 7, 2020**

Before: TASHIMA, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Felipe Clavel Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of removal

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual

findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We

review de novo questions of law, Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th

Cir. 2008), except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation

of the governing statutes and regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535

(9th Cir. 2004). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that being beaten and

robbed of his wallet at knifepoint, and hearing an unknown party threaten his

brother at his family’s home, do not establish that Clavel Gonzalez suffered past

persecution or that he likely will be subject to future persecution. See Hoxha v.

Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003) (harassment, threats, and a beating

unconnected with any particular threat did not compel finding of past persecution);

see also Mendez-Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“vague and conclusory allegations” regarding threats “are clearly insufficient to

support a finding of a well-founded fear of future persecution”).

The agency did not err in determining that Clavel Gonzalez’s proposed

particular social group is not cognizable. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131

(9th Cir. 2016) (“The applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of

members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with

particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (citation

2 16-73979 omitted)); see also Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2019)

(individuals “returning to Mexico [from] the United States [who] are believed to be

wealthy” do not constitute a particular social group (alterations in original));

Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2008) (proposed group

of “young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence” does not constitute a

cognizable particular social group), abrogated in part by Henriquez-Rivas v.

Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Clavel Gonzalez

otherwise failed to establish that he would be persecuted on account of a protected

ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s

“desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random

violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Thus, Clavel

Gonzalez’s withholding of removal claim fails.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because

Clavel Gonzalez failed to show that it is more likely than not that he will be

tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to

Mexico. See Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835-36 (9th Cir. 2011) (possibility of

torture too speculative).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 16-73979

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Zetino v. Holder
622 F.3d 1007 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Xiao Fei Zheng v. Holder
644 F.3d 829 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Shpetim Hoxha v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
319 F.3d 1179 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Rocio Henriquez-Rivas v. Eric Holder, Jr.
707 F.3d 1081 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey
542 F.3d 738 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Cerezo v. Mukasey
512 F.3d 1163 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Wilfredo Reyes v. Loretta E. Lynch
842 F.3d 1125 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Barbosa v. Barr
926 F.3d 1053 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Felipe Clavel Gonzalez v. William Barr, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/felipe-clavel-gonzalez-v-william-barr-ca9-2020.