Felicio Abreu v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMay 15, 2024
Docket2023-1319
StatusPublished

This text of Felicio Abreu v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC (Felicio Abreu v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Felicio Abreu v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, (Fla. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed May 15, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________

No. 3D23-1319 Lower Tribunal No. 07-25443 ________________

Felicio Abreu, et al., Appellants,

vs.

Aurora Loan Services, LLC, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria de Jesus Santovenia, Judge.

Legal Save, and Jeffrey H. Papell; Enrique Nieves, P.A., and Enrique Nieves III (West Palm Beach), for appellants.

Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, and Alec P. Hayes (Atlanta, GA), for appellee U.S. Bank, N.A.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ.

LOGUE, C.J. Felicio and Yovana Abreu appeal the trial court’s decision vacating an

order of a prior judge enforcing a settlement agreement.1 The trial court held

that at the time the prior judge entered the order, the trial court had lost

jurisdiction. Finding the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement

agreement, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

U.S. Bank National Association’s predecessor in interest filed a

residential foreclosure action against the Abreus, the Borrowers, in 2007.

The parties thereafter entered into a settlement agreement in which the Bank

would provide the loan documents modifying the loan to the Borrowers by a

certain date and the Borrowers would make their first payment under the

modification by a certain date thereafter. On January 11, 2012, the trial court

entered an agreed order approving the settlement agreement and dismissing

the action. The order “approved and ratified” the settlement agreement and

retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The

Bank never provided the modified loan documents, and the Borrowers never

made payments under the proposed modified loan.

1 The Bank’s motion to vacate was brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4). This Court has jurisdiction to review the order on appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(5).

2 In 2014, the Bank filed a second foreclosure action against the

Borrowers. As a result of this filing, the Borrowers moved to reopen the 2007

foreclosure action and to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement.

They argued the Bank’s failure to provide the modified loan documents as

required by the settlement agreement prevented them from making the

payments under the modification.

On March 23, 2017, the trial court entered an order reopening the 2007

foreclosure action and granting the Borrowers’ motion to enforce the

settlement agreement. The trial court ordered the Bank to provide the

modified loan documents, and tolled the time for the Borrowers’ first

payment, as well as other date-related terms of the loan modification. The

Bank objected to this tolling, which essentially pushed back all the relevant

dates, including the date of the first payment, by several years. But it never

appealed this order.

Three years later, the Bank filed a motion to vacate pursuant to Florida

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4), challenging the 2017 order enforcing the

settlement agreement. The Bank argued the enforcement order should be

vacated as void because the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by changing

the terms of the agreement. The Bank also argued that the Borrowers’ efforts

to enforce the settlement agreement were untimely when brought in 2017

3 because they exceeded the five-year statute of limitations for filing a claim

based on the breach of a written contract.

On May 25, 2023, a successor judge issued an order vacating the

enforcement order on the basis that it was void because the trial court had

lacked jurisdiction to enter it. The successor judge concluded the trial court’s

enforcement order improperly rewrote the settlement agreement and the

statute of limitations had run. The Borrowers timely filed this appeal.

ANALYSIS

It is often said that “the standard of review of an order on a rule 1.540(b)

motion for relief from judgment is whether there has been an abuse of the

trial court's discretion.” Rinconcito Latino Cafeteria, Inc. v. Ocampos, 276 So.

3d 525, 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (quoting Tikhomirov v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon,

223 So. 3d 1112, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)). “Whether an order is void,

though, is a question of law that we review de novo.” Sanchez v. Sanchez,

285 So. 3d 969, 972 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citing Llanso v. Gomez de

Cordova, 263 So. 3d 137, 139 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)).

While the Borrowers raise several arguments on appeal, at its

essence, this appeal presents only one issue—whether the successor judge

properly concluded that the prior judge’s order enforcing the settlement

agreement was void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter it.

4 The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying

foreclosure case. Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 842 So. 2d 797, 801 n.3

(Fla. 2003) (“Subject matter jurisdiction ‘means no more than the power

lawfully existing to hear and determine a cause.’ It ‘concerns the power of

the trial court to deal with a class of cases to which a particular case

belongs.’” (internal citations omitted)). It also had continuing jurisdiction to

enforce the settlement agreement. Id.

Even if the prior judge’s interpretation of the settlement agreement was

error, simple legal error did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to enter

the order. The vehicles for the Bank to challenge such purported error were

rehearing or timely appeal, not a motion to vacate under rule 1.540 filed

years later. Balmoral Condo. Ass'n v. Grimaldi, 107 So. 3d 1149, 1152 (Fla.

3d DCA 2013) (holding “the contention that the order was simply wrong as a

matter of law on the merits is not one of the enumerated grounds for relief

under rule 1.540”). In addition, the statute of limitations of a contract action

does not begin to run until a party breaches the contract. The relevant breach

here was not the Bank’s 2012 failure to provide the new loan documents, but

the Bank’s 2014 filing of a new foreclosure action after it had agreed to

provide new loan documents but failed to do so.

5 In these circumstances, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the

enforcement order. Curbelo v. Ullman, 571 So. 2d 443, 445 (Fla. 1990) (“It

is well settled that where a court is legally organized and has jurisdiction of

the subject matter and the adverse parties are given an opportunity to be

heard, then errors, irregularities or wrongdoing in proceedings, short of illegal

deprivation of opportunity to be heard, will not render the judgment void.”).

Reversed.

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Related

Curbelo v. Ullman
571 So. 2d 443 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1990)
Paulucci v. General Dynamics Corp.
842 So. 2d 797 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2003)
Tikhomirov v. Bank of New York Mellon
223 So. 3d 1112 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2017)
Llanso v. Gomez De Cordova
263 So. 3d 137 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2018)
Balmoral Condominium Ass'n v. Grimaldi
107 So. 3d 1149 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2013)

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Felicio Abreu v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/felicio-abreu-v-aurora-loan-services-llc-fladistctapp-2024.