Certiorari to the District Court Boulder County District
Court Case No. 22CV30158 Honorable J. Keith Collins, Judge
Attorneys for Petitioner:
The
Law Offices of Gary Merenstein, P.C.
Gary
Merenstein
Lafayette, Colorado
Anne
Whalen Gill, L.L.C.
Anne
Whalen Gill
Castle
Rock, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:
Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell LLP
Frederick R. Yarger
Meghan
Frei Berglind
William P. Sowers Jr.
Denver, Colorado
2
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae ACA International:
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP
Sarah
J. Auchterlonie
Courtney E. Bartkus
Attorney for Amici Curiae Center for Responsible Lending,
National Association of Consumer Advocates, National Consumer
Law Center, Public Justice, and Towards Justice:
Rachel
Dempsey
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Legal Services:
Jose
Vasquez
Alexa
Child
Joel
Minor
Karin
Troendle
Fort
Collins, Colorado
Craig
Carmean
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae National Creditors Bar
Association: Barron &Newburger, P.C. Kevin T. Crocker
Littleton, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Receivables Management
Association International, Inc.:
Bowlin
& Schall, LLC
John
M. Bowlin
Greenwood Village, Colorado
Maurice Wutscher, LLP
Donald
S. Maurice, Jr.
Flemington, New Jersey Maurice Wutscher, LLP
3
Erin
McCampbell Paris
Buffalo, New York
JUSTICE BLANCO delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD,
JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER
joined.
4
OPINION
BLANCO, JUSTICE.
¶1
The General Assembly enacted the Colorado Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (the "Act"), §§
5-16-101 to -135, C.R.S. (2025), to protect consumers from
abusive debt collection practices. See Flood v.
Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, 176 P.3d 769, 776
(Colo. 2008). As pertinent here, the Act mandates that debt
buyers append certain attachments to each complaint that they
file against alleged debtors. § 5-16-111(2), C.R.S.
(2025). It also allows debtors who prove that a debt buyer
has violated the requirements of the Act to recover damages,
costs, and attorney fees. § 5-16-113, C.R.S. (2025).
¶2
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC ("PRA") is a
debt buyer seeking to recover a debt that Felicia Wright
incurred when using a credit card issued by Comenity Bank.
The complaint that PRA filed against Wright did not comply
with the Act's requirements. Specifically, the complaint
lacked a non-affidavit attachment establishing that PRA owned
Wright's debt from Comenity Bank. Accordingly, we hold
that the district court erred as a matter of law by upholding
the county court's ruling that PRA complied with the Act.
Because PRA violated one of the Act's requirements, we
hold that the district court erred in upholding the county
court's ruling that Wright did not prove her counterclaim
against PRA under the Act.
5
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶3
PRA filed a complaint in county court against Wright seeking
to recover $671.29 in credit card debt. PRA alleged that
Wright originally owed the debt to Comenity Bank and that it
had purchased the debt from Comenity Bank. In support of its
allegations, PRA appended the following attachments to its
complaint: (1) a bill of sale between Comenity Bank and PRA,
with a blank asset schedule attached; (2) two credit card
statements that Comenity Bank had sent to Wright; and (3) an
affidavit from PRA's custodian of records claiming that
Comenity Bank had sold, assigned, and transferred
Wright's debt of $671.29 to PRA.
¶4
In her answer, Wright raised an affirmative defense that PRA
had failed to comply with section 5-16-111(2) of the Act by
failing to attach documents to the complaint establishing
that PRA owned Wright's debt. Wright brought several
counterclaims; the counterclaim at issue here alleged that
because PRA had violated the Act, she was entitled to
damages, costs, and attorney fees under section 5-16-113.
¶5
Following trial, the county court ruled in favor of PRA,
finding that PRA's complaint complied with section
5-16-111(2)(b). The county court reasoned that the bill of
sale satisfied section 5-16-111(2)(b), and the affidavit
functioned as a
6
"supplement to" the other attachments. Thus, the
county court found no violation of the Act and ruled against
Wright on her counterclaim.
¶6
On appeal, the district court affirmed, concluding that the
county court did not clearly err when it determined PRA's
complaint complied with section 5-16-111. The district court
also concluded that the trial court did not err by ruling
against Wright on her counterclaim.
¶7
Wright petitioned this court for certiorari review, which we
granted.[1]
II.
Analysis
¶8
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review
and principles of statutory construction. We next review the
pertinent portions of the Act. We then consider whether
PRA's complaint complied with the Act and, if not,
whether PRA is liable to Wright for violating the Act's
requirements.
7
A.
Standards of Review and Principles of Statutory
Construction
¶9
We review issues of statutory construction de novo.
Flood, 176 P.3d at 772. When we interpret statutes,
our primary responsibility is to give effect to the
legislature's intent. Id. In doing so, we
consider the statute as a whole, giving consistent,
harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts.
Id. We avoid interpretations that lead to illogical
or absurd results. Id.
¶10
When construing a statute, we respect the legislature's
choice of language. Byers Peak Props., LLC v. Byers Peak
Land &Cattle, LLC, 2026 CO 7, ¶ 25, 583 P.3d
97, 103. Accordingly, we apply words and phrases in
accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings, without
adding or subtracting words from a statute. Id. at
¶¶ 24-25, 583 P.3d at 103. If the statutory
language is unambiguous, then we apply it as written and need
not turn to other rules of statutory construction.
Id. at ¶ 25, 583 P.3d at 103.
¶11
When interpreting the Act, we liberally construe it in favor
of the consumer. Flood, 176 P.3d at 772.
B.
The Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
¶12
The Act sets forth requirements for debt buyers and provides
remedies for debtors who are subjected to abusive debt
collection practices. Id. at 772-73. For example,
debt buyers must include certain attachments when they file a
complaint against a debtor. § 5-16-111(2). It also
allows debtors who prove that a debt buyer
8
violated the requirements of the Act to recover damages,
costs, and attorney fees. § 5-16-113.
¶13
Section 5-16-111(2) lists the attachments that debt buyers
must include with a complaint in an action to recover a debt
that they own. As pertinent here, section 5-16-111(2)(b)
("subsection (2)(b)") requires "[a] copy of
the assignment or other writing establishing that the debt
buyer is the owner of the debt." And "[i]f the debt
was assigned more than once, each assignment or other writing
evidencing transfer of ownership must be attached to
establish an unbroken chain of ownership, beginning with the
original creditor to the first debt buyer and each subsequent
sale." Id.
¶14
Importantly, a debt buyer may not use an affidavit to satisfy
the Act's requirements in lieu of the other attachments
required by section 5-16-111(2). § 5-16-111(4) ("In
the absence of evidence required by subsection[] . . . (2)(b)
. . . of this section, an affidavit does not satisfy the
requirements of th[is] subsection[]."). In other words,
if the information required under subsection (2)(b) is not
provided through a non-affidavit attachment, then an
affidavit cannot cure the complaint's noncompliance.
¶15
Finally, if a debt buyer violates the requirements set forth
in the Act, then the debt buyer is liable to the debtor for
damages, costs, and attorney fees. § 5-16-113.
9
C.
Application
¶16
PRA's complaint did not comply with subsection (2)(b)
because it did not include a non-affidavit writing
establishing that PRA was the owner of Wright's debt.
Because the requirements of subsection (2)(b) were not
satisfied, PRA may not use the affidavit to satisfy the
requirements of the Act per section 5-16-111(4).
Consequently, PRA is liable to Wright on her counterclaim for
damages, costs, and attorney fees under section 5-16-113
because PRA violated the requirements of subsection (2)(b).
¶17
Although PRA's complaint included a bill of sale showing
that it purchased some debt from Comenity Bank, it did not
establish that PRA purchased Wright's debt. Thus, there
was insufficient information to give Wright notice that PRA
owns the debt that she originally incurred with Comenity
Bank, undermining the legislative intent clearly stated in
subsection (2)(b).
¶18
In fact, the bill of sale states:
Comenity Bank ("Seller"), for value received and
pursuant to the terms and conditions of Credit Card Account
Purchase Agreement dated June 4, 2018 between Seller and
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC ("Purchaser"),
its successors and assigns ("Credit Card Account
Purchase Agreement"), hereby assigns effective as of the
File Creation Date of November 12, 2018 all rights, title and
interest of Seller in and to those certain receivables,
judgments or evidences of debt described in Schedule I (the
"Asset Schedule") attached hereto and made part
hereof for all purposes.
10
The
attached asset schedule includes blank boxes for the account
number and unpaid balance of the corresponding debt.
Wright's account number and unpaid balance are not
included in this asset schedule.[2]
¶19
PRA contends that this bill of sale satisfies subsection
(2)(b) because it demonstrates that PRA purchased the debt
from Comenity Bank, the same original creditor listed on
Wright's credit card statements. We disagree. Although
the bill of sale establishes that PRA purchased some
debt from Comenity Bank, it does not establish that PRA
purchased Wright's debt. PRA's complaint did
not establish that PRA was the owner of Wright's debt.
Accordingly, PRA's complaint did not comply with
subsection (2)(b).[3]
¶20
PRA further contends that the affidavit supplemented the bill
of sale by confirming that Wright's account was among
those sold to PRA, identifying the last four digits of
Wright's account number, and quantifying the amount that
Wright owed. But the plain language of the Act precludes
affidavits from
11
satisfying subsection (2)(b) when the rest of the complaint
is otherwise noncompliant. § 5-16-111(4). Therefore, we
cannot conclude that PRA's affidavit satisfied subsection
(2)(b) without rendering section 5-16-111(4) meaningless. The
Act requires debt buyers to include attachments that satisfy
subsection (2)(b) independently of any affidavit. Because
PRA's complaint did not first comply with subsection
(2)(b), PRA may not rely on an affidavit to overcome its
noncompliance. Consequently, by violating subsection (2)(b),
PRA is liable to Wright under section 5-16-113.
¶21
For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred as a
matter of law by upholding the county court's ruling that
PRA complied with section 5-16-111(2). Because PRA violated
the Act in its effort to collect Wright's debt, we
further hold that the district court erred by upholding the
county court's ruling that Wright did not prove her
counterclaim under the Act.
III.
Conclusion
¶22
We reverse the district court's judgment and remand the
case to the district court to return it to the county court
for consideration of any damages, costs, and attorney fees
that may be due to Wright under section 5-16-113.
---------
Notes:
[1] We granted certiorari to review the
following issues:
1. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law
in upholding the county court's ruling that respondent
proved it complied with section 5-16-111(2), C.R.S.
(2024).
2. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law
in upholding the county court's ruling that petitioner
did not prove her counterclaims against respondent under the
Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, §§
5-16-101 to -135, C.R.S. (2024).
[2] Two months after oral argument, Wright
filed a motion to correct the record, arguing that PRA's
counsel cited to a spreadsheet and sale letter during oral
argument that were not admitted as evidence at trial. PRA
subsequently filed a response, arguing that the documents it
referenced were in the appellate record. Because our analysis
is limited to the documents that were attached to PRA's
initial complaint, Wright's motion is denied as
moot.
[3] Wright also argues that PRA's
complaint violated section 5-16-111(2)(a). Because we hold
that PRA violated subsection (2)(b), and the Act requires
compliance with both subsections, section 5-16-111(2)(a)
and (b), we need not consider whether PRA also
violated the requirements set forth in section
5-16-111(2)(a).