Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States

2024 CIT 136
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedDecember 12, 2024
Docket23-00117
StatusPublished

This text of 2024 CIT 136 (Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States, 2024 CIT 136 (cit 2024).

Opinion

Slip Op. 24-136

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Court No. 23-00117

FEDMET RESOURCES CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, and MAGNESIA CARBON BRICKS FAIR TRADE COMMITTEE, Defendant-Intervenor.

Before: M. Miller Baker, Judge

OPINION

[The court remands to Commerce for further proceed- ings.]

Dated: December 12, 2024

R. Will Planert, et al., Morris, Manning & Martin LLP, Washington, DC, on the briefs for Plaintiff.

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attor- ney General; Patricia M. McCarthy, Director; Re- ginald T. Blades, Assistant Director; and Antonia R. Soares, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Ct. No. 23-00117 Page 2

Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, on the briefs for Defendant. Of coun- sel on the briefs was K. Garrett Kays, Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compli- ance, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.

J. Michael Taylor and Daniel L. Schneiderman, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC, on the briefs for De- fendant-Intervenor.

Baker, Judge: An importer of refractory bricks— heat-resistant masonry used to line blast furnace walls—challenges the Department of Commerce’s de- termination that certain of its blocks fall within anti- dumping and countervailing duty orders. The court holds that the agency erred as a matter of law and re- mands for reconsideration under the correct legal standard.

I

The Enforce and Protect Act (EAPA), 19 U.S.C. § 1517, directs U.S. Customs and Border Protection to open an investigation after receiving an allegation that “reasonably suggests” an importer has “eva[ded]” an antidumping or countervailing duty order. See id. § 1517(a)(3), (b)(1)–(2). The statute defines “evasion” as the entry of goods through any material false state- ment or omission that reduces or avoids such duties. See id. § 1517(a)(5)(A). Ct. No. 23-00117 Page 3

If Customs “is unable to determine whether the merchandise at issue is covered” by the order, it must refer that question to Commerce. Id. § 1517(b)(4)(A)(i). The latter, in turn, “shall” make such a determination and communicate the results to the former. Id. § 1517(b)(4)(B). As relevant here, the Department may conduct this inquiry by applying the same regime it uses in making a scope ruling. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.227(f).

What is that? “Given the realities in the market- place and everchanging varieties of merchandise, questions frequently arise as to whether a particular product is subject to or falls within the scope” of an an- tidumping or countervailing duty order. Saha Thai Steel Pipe Pub. Co. v. United States, 101 F.4th 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a)). By regulation—the statute provides no such mecha- nism—a producer, importer, or other interested party uncertain whether an order covers a commodity may ask Commerce for a ruling to clarify the decree’s terms. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(c)(1). 1

Upon receiving such a request, the Department will open a “scope inquiry.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a). 2 If it

1 This device is roughly analogous to the procedure by which a party uncertain of its rights or obligations may seek a declaratory judgment in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 2 It may also self-initiate such an inquiry. See id. § 351.225(b). Ct. No. 23-00117 Page 4

finds that the order’s relevant language, “including the descriptions of merchandise expressly excluded . . . , is dispositive,” it “may make its determination” based on that wording alone. Id. § 351.225(k)(1). In the agency’s “discretion,” it “may” also consider four “primary inter- pretive sources.” Id. § 351.225(k)(1)(i). Those are “de- scriptions” of the product in the petition and investi- gation giving rise to the order, see id. § 351.225(k)(1)(i)(A), (B); its “previous or concurrent determinations . . . including prior scope rulings” bear- ing on the order or “other orders with same or similar language,” id. § 351.225(k)(1)(i)(C); and International Trade Commission decisions “pertaining to the order,” id. § 351.225(k)(1)(i)(D). 3

3 In fixing the scope of an order, Commerce “may also con-

sider [certain] secondary interpretive sources”—materials not identified in subparagraph (k)(1)(i) of the regulation. Id. § 351.225(k)(1)(ii). “[I]n the event of a conflict between these secondary interpretive sources and the primary in- terpretive sources under [sub]paragraph (k)(1)(i),” the lat- ter “will normally govern in determining whether a product is covered by the scope of the order at issue.” Id. If the De- partment determines that the sources under paragraph (k)(1) “are not dispositive,” it must consider various enu- merated factors. Id. § 351.225(k)(2)(i)(A)–(E). Those crite- ria are in turn subject to their own hierarchy. See id. § 351.225(k)(2)(ii). Ct. No. 23-00117 Page 5

II

A

In 2009, Resco Products, Inc., a domestic producer, petitioned Commerce to open antidumping and coun- tervailing duty investigations of “imports of certain magnesia carbon bricks” (MCBs) from China and Mex- ico. Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States, 755 F.3d 912, 914 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Fedmet I). In due course, the De- partment imposed such duties. See 75 Fed. Reg. 57,257 (antidumping); 75 Fed. Reg. 57,442 (countervailing) (collectively, the orders).

Fedmet, a “domestic importer of refractory bricks and other products used in the steelmaking industry,” Fedmet I, 755 F.3d at 916, then requested a scope rul- ing that the orders did not cover its magnesia alumina carbon bricks (MAC bricks). The company contended that “significant amounts” of alumina in those prod- ucts—“8 to 15 percent”—“result in ‘distinct proper- ties’୻” that distinguish them from in-scope MCBs. Id. at 916–17.

After agency proceedings and litigation in this court in which Resco participated, the Federal Circuit agreed with Fedmet. See id. at 919–23. The court of appeals held that the sources identified in what is now 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1)(i)4 “unequivocally confirm that [the importer’s] MAC bricks are not within the

4 Commerce amended the regulation in 2021. Ct. No. 23-00117 Page 6

scope of the orders.” Fedmet I, 755 F.3d at 919. It rea- soned that the petitioner repeatedly “disclaim[ed] cov- erage of all MAC bricks in general.” Id. Moreover, both Commerce and the Commission reiterated “that the underlying investigations did not extend to MAC bricks.” Id.

In response to the contention that “the (k)(1)[(i)] sources identify no ‘cut-off point’ at which addition of alumina to an MCB transforms it into a MAC brick,” id. at 921 (emphasis added), the Federal Circuit reck- oned that

[t]he public—including domestic importers like Fedmet—is entitled to rely on the multiple statements in the (k)(1)[(i)] sources disclaiming coverage of MAC bricks.

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Related

Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States
296 F.3d 1087 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Fedmet Resources Corp. v. United States
755 F.3d 912 (Federal Circuit, 2014)
Ramos v. Louisiana
590 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 2020)

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2024 CIT 136, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fedmet-res-corp-v-united-states-cit-2024.