Federowicz v. Town Board

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Federowicz v. Town Board

143 A.D.2d 519, 533 N.Y.S.2d 159, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10658

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 27, 1988

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 143 A.D.2d 519 (Federowicz v. Town Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Federowicz v. Town Board, 143 A.D.2d 519, 533 N.Y.S.2d 159, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10658 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1988).

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Opinion

Judgment unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: We reject petitioner’s contention that the town should be estopped from enforcing the zoning ordinance because it issued permits for construction of garages on petitioner’s property knowing that petitioner was conducting a business on her property. Estoppel is not available to preclude the town from discharging its governmental duties. Although there are rare exceptions to the rule, petitioner is not entitled to invoke the doctrine of estoppel because she has not shown that she relied in good faith upon the act of the Board in issuing the permits (see, Matter of Parkview Assocs. v City of New York, 71 NY2d 274, 278-279, rearg denied 71 NY2d 995). A good-faith inquiry would have ascertained that the zoning ordinance precluded the use of petitioner’s property for business purposes. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Ricotta, J.— art 78.) Callahan, J. P., Denman, Boomer, Green and Lawton, JJ.

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Judgment unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: We reject petitioner’s contention that the town should be estopped from enforcing the zoning ordinance because it issued permits for construction of garages on petitioner’s property knowing that petitioner was conducting a business on her property. Estoppel is not available to preclude the town from discharging its governmental duties. Although there are rare exceptions to the rule, petitioner is not entitled to invoke the doctrine of estoppel because she has not shown that she relied in good faith upon the act of the Board in issuing the permits (see, Matter of Parkview Assocs. v City of New York, 71 NY2d 274, 278-279, rearg denied 71 NY2d 995). A good-faith inquiry would have ascertained that the zoning ordinance precluded the use of petitioner’s property for business purposes. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Ricotta, J.— art 78.) Callahan, J. P., Denman, Boomer, Green and Lawton, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

143 A.D.2d 519, 533 N.Y.S.2d 159, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10658, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federowicz-v-town-board-nyappdiv-1988.

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