Federal Trade Commission v. American Financial Benefits Center

District Court, N.D. California·Decided June 15, 2021·No. 4:18-cv-00806·Unknown

Opinion

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Case No. 18-cv-00806-SBA (JSC)

Plaintiff, ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR v. DISCHARGE OF RECEIVER AND APPROVAL OF FINAL FEE CENTER, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 247 Defendants.

On November 29, 2018, the district court issued an order granting the motion of Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) for preliminary injunction against Defendants American Financial Benefits Center (“AFBC”), AmeriTech Financial, and Financial Education Benefits Center (“FEBC”) (together, “Corporate Defendants”), and Brandon Frere.1 (Dkt. No. 186.)2 The court’s order (“PI Order”) appointed Thomas W. McNamara as Receiver for the Corporate Defendants, granting him “full powers of an equity receiver.” (Dkt. No. 187 at 5.) The district court subsequently referred all matters arising out of the performance of the Receiver’s duties to the undersigned. (Dkt. No. 190.) On March 29, 2019, the Court granted the Receiver’s first interim application for fees and expenses for the period of November 29, 2018 through January 15, 2019, in the amount of $335,213.88. (Dkt. No. 221.) On February 11, 2020, the Court granted the Receiver’s second interim application for fees and expenses for the period of January 16, 2019

1 On February 4, 2019, the district court granted a nine-month stay of this action as to Defendant Frere based on the parallel criminal action against him pending in this District. (Dkt. No. 214 at 2 (citing United States v. Frere, Case No. 3:18-mj-71724-SK (N.D. Cal.)).) The district court subsequently broadened the stay to include the Corporate Defendants and extended it pending the sentencing of Defendant Frere. (Dkt. Nos. 226, 234, 241.) through November 30, 2019, in the amount of $123,432.95. (Dkt. No. 237.) On November 17, 2020, the district court granted the stipulated order for permanent injunction and monetary judgment, closing the civil case, (Dkt. No. 244), and setting a deadline of May 17, 2021 to complete the receivership, (id. at 12). Now before the Court is the Receiver’s final report and application for discharge of receiver and approval of final fee application, covering the period of December 1, 2019 through April 30, 2021. (Dkt. No. 247.) The application is unopposed. After careful consideration of the Receiver’s application, declaration, and supporting exhibits, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and therefore VACATES the June 17, 2021 hearing. For the reasons explained below, the Court APPROVES the final report, GRANTS the application for discharge, and GRANTS the final fee application. “[A] district court’s power to supervise an equity receivership and to determine the appropriate action to be taken in the administration of the receivership is extremely broad.” SEC v. Cap. Consultants, LLC, 397 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “A district judge simply cannot effectively and successfully supervise a receivership and protect the interests of its beneficiaries absent broad discretionary power.” SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1986). “As a general rule, the expenses and fees of a receivership are a charge upon the property administered.” Gaskill v. Gordon, 27 F.3d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Atl. Trust Co. v. Chapman, 208 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1908)). “These expenses include the fees and expenses incurred by a receiver and professionals retained by a receiver to assist in the performance of the receiver’s duties.” SEC v. Nationwide Automated Sys., Inc., No. CV 14-07249 SJO (FFMx), 2018 WL 1918622, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018). The court that appoints “the receiver has full power to fix the compensation of such receiver and the compensation of the receiver’s attorney or attorneys.” Drilling & Expl. Corp. v. Webster, 69 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1934). Receivers and the professionals who assist them should be “reasonably, but not excessively No. 12-CV-03237 EJD, 2014 WL 3920320, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “‘[I]n receivership situations, lawyers should be awarded moderate fees and not extravagant ones.’” Id. (quoting SEC v. Byers, 590 F. Supp. 2d 637, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). Thus, “[t]he Receiver and any professionals assisting the Receiver should charge a reduced rate to reflect the public interest involved in preserving funds held in the receivership estate.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In determining the amount of a fee award, courts should consider the “‘economy of administration, the burden that the estate may be able to bear, the amount of time required, although not necessarily expended, and the overall value of the services provided to the estate.’” Id. (quoting In re Imperial “400” Nat., Inc., 432 F.2d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 1970)). I. Application for Discharge The Receiver applies for discharge on the basis that the underlying case is resolved as to all Defendants and the Receiver has completed his duties as defined in the PI Order. (Dkt. No. 247 at 12.) The PI Order directed and authorized the Receiver to perform a variety of duties to take control of Corporate Defendants’ business during the litigation. (Id. at 5-8.) The PI Order stated it would expire upon entry of final judgment, (id. at 13), which was entered on November 17, 2020. (Dkt. No. 244.) The application for discharge states that if the final fee application is granted in full and the requested reserve is approved, $221,881.12 net cash will be available for immediate transfer to the FTC. (Dkt. No. 247 at 12.) The Receiver attests that he has completed his duties as defined in the PI Order, including securing Corporate Defendants’ offices, analyzing the business operations, determining that the business could not operate legally and profitably, communicating with consumers, liquidating available assets, recovering assets, and considering clawback actions. (Id. at 4-11.) The Receiver states that resolution of the Corporate Defendants’ employee retirement plan is incomplete because six participants have yet to distribute or rollover their funds. (Id. at 11.) The retirement plan was set to terminate, and the remaining participants to rollover, shortly after the May 17, federal or state returns or other forms relating to the retirement plan after his discharge. (Id.) Notwithstanding the retirement plan rollover, the Court is satisfied that the Receiver has completed the duties contemplated in the PI Order and that discharge is appropriate. II. Final Fee Application The PI Order authorizes the Receiver to “[c]hoose, engage, and employ attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and other independent contractors and technical specialists, as the Receiver deems advisable or necessary in the performance of duties and responsibilities under the authority granted by this Order.” (Dkt. No. 187 at 6.) The PI Order further provides for compensation of the Receiver and those hired by him, stating: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Receiver and all personnel hired by the Receiver as herein authorized, including, but not limited to, counsel to the Receiver and accountants, are entitled to reasonable compensation for the performance of duties pursuant to this Order, and for the cost of actual out-of-pocket expenses incurred by them, from the Assets now held by, in the possession or control of, or which may be received by the Corporate Defendants. The Receiver shall file

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Federal Trade Commission v. American Financial Benefits Center, (N.D. Cal. 2021).

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Related

Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman
208 U.S. 360 (Supreme Court, 1908)
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Byers
590 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D. New York, 2008)
Drilling & Exploration Corp. v. Webster
69 F.2d 416 (Ninth Circuit, 1934)
Gaskill v. Gordon
27 F.3d 248 (Seventh Circuit, 1994)
In re Imperial "400" National, Inc.
432 F.2d 232 (Third Circuit, 1970)