Federal Life Ins. v. Kemp

257 F. 265, 168 C.C.A. 349, 1919 U.S. App. LEXIS 2192
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJanuary 10, 1919
DocketNo. 2567
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 257 F. 265 (Federal Life Ins. v. Kemp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Federal Life Ins. v. Kemp, 257 F. 265, 168 C.C.A. 349, 1919 U.S. App. LEXIS 2192 (7th Cir. 1919).

Opinion

MACK, Circuit Judge.

In an action by the children, assignees of insured, on a $10,000 twenty-payment life policy issued by a company which was reinsured by defendant, judgment was entered on a directed verdict for plaintiffs in the sum of $8,475.41, the face of the policy less the amount concededly due on a loan, plus interest. The facts are not disputed; the controversy turns on the construction of the policy and the accompanying certificate of loan, the essential portions of which are copied as an appendix hereto.

Concededly, the policy lapsed on December 31, 1910, for nonpayment of the eleventh premium, unless it was continued in force for the face amount under the extended insurance provision. The premiums were $365 annually for 20 years; pursuant to the terms of the premium loan certificate bearing even date with the policy and executed concurrently therewith, only one-half of the first ten annual premiums, $182.50 each, was paid in cash. When the eleventh premium was due, the unpaid one-half of the first ten premiums, with interest, amounted to $2,278.77. The insured'died July 31, 1914. No application was made within 30 days or within 6 months after December 31, 1910, for any of the methods of settlement specified in paragraph 8 of the conditions. If the first ten premiums had been paid in full, the insured would have been entitled, at the time of default in payment of the eleventh premium, to extended insurance for 15 years and 233 days, and thus, at the time of his death in 1914, the policy would have been in force for its face amount. A like situation arises if the loan be deemed an obligation separate and distinct from the policy, and not to be deducted from the value of the extended insurance at the time of the lapse.

If, however, the surrender value at that time, whether expressed in dollars or extended insurance, is to be reduced by the amount of the then existing loan as an indebtedness on account of the policy, then, as the loan exceeded the then guaranteed cash values and loan values specified on page 3 of the policy, and also exceeded the then value of the 15 years and 233 days of extended insurance, testified to be $2,074.20, there was no value remaining for the purchase of any extended insurance.

Rife insurance under such a policy as the one in question is based upon the creation out of the annual premiums of a reserve fund which at compound interest will equal the face of the policy at the expiration of a certain time, determined by certain mortality tables based upon experience. The annual premium charged is in excess of this amount; this excess provides-for the expenses of the company and losses greater than those counted upon; out of any balance, dividends are paid and surpluses accumulated.

[267]*267It is the reserve fund which enables the company to guarantee certain loan and cash surrender values at stated periods; and it is this same fund which enables it to offer, on a default, an extension of the insurance for definite periods without payment of further premiums. The reserve in whole or in part is used to pay a single premium for the extended term insurance, which the insured may thus purchase in lieu of surrendering the policy for cash or taking a pro rata amount of insurance, in case be is compelled to lapse the policy by his inability to keep on paying the stipulated premiums.

[1] An insurance company, like an individual, may disregard the fundamental elements of legitimate business and by contract agree to give its policy holders, or some of them, privileges which, if given to all, would inevitably result in time in insolvency; and if the contract clearly so provided, the folly of it would be no defense to its enforcement. But all contracts are to be interpreted in the light of the surrounding circumstances; and while the terms of an insurance policy, framed as they are by the insurer, are to be construed, if ambiguous, most strongly against him, yet even ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted with regard to the evident purposes of the parties and the nature of the general undertakings of the insurer towards its policy holders, and that, too, whether the insurer be a mutual or a stock company.

Even, therefore, if there were some ambiguity in the provisions of these form documents -which constitute the contract, an interpretation which would necessarily result in eventually destroying the insurer and thus rendering performance of similar obligations to others impossible should not be given to it, if any other reasonable construction could fairly be given to the language used. The question in this case is: What “indebtedness on account of this policy” is embraced within that phrase as used in the cited passage from page 3 of the policy, and what “surrender value” does it reduce ?

Plaintiffs contend that the loans covered by the premium loan certificate are independent of the policy and not intended to be covered by this clause; further, even if they are included therein, the “surrender value” to be reduced thereby in case of lapse is only the “cash surrender value” specified in the table on page 2 of the policy, and not the automatic alternative option of the extended insurance. Specifically, they urge that under this option the insurance, on lapse in the payment of the eleventh premium; was automatically extended for 15 years and 233 days for the face of the policy; that the unpaid half of the ten premiums constituted a loan, not enforceable directly as a debt, but only as a lien upon and payable out of proceeds of the policy on its maturity; if death occurred during this extension period, as it did occur, the face of the policy, less the loan, would then be payable; if, however, death should occur after the extension period, and when, therefore, the insurance would no longer he in force, while the company would not have to pay the insurance, it could not collect the amount loaned.

If these contentions are to be upheld, the practical result is this: That the company on December 31, 1910, had already paid out, by [268]*268way of a conditional loan, nearly the entire reserve held by it on the policy; that although it no longer had the money in hand to pay for the extended insurance for over 15 years, it was nevertheless bound to grant it practically without charge; that, if the insured outlived the 15 years, it would thus have made a gift of this insurance cost during that period, and only if he died during that period would it be repaid the loan. Such a contract, given to all policy holders, would inevitably bankrupt the company.

[2] In our judgment, these contentions are not to be upheld. ■ Not only Is a different construction of the policy consonant with sound business principles, fair and reasonable; it is, we believe, the only fair interpretation of the language, practically free of any ambiguity. The privileges accorded a defaulting policy holder are three. He may accept any one of them: The cash, paid-up policy good for life, or extended insurance good only for fixed periods, which he will be entitled to dependent upon the time of default, as specifically stated in the table of surrender values. This table is termed “Table of Eoans and of Surrender Values Either in Cash, Extended or Paid-Up Assurance.” While loans are necessarily cash, clearly surrender values may be cash, or a paid-up policy, or extended insurance; any of these is equally a thing of value to be given in exchange for the surrendered and defaulted policy.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
257 F. 265, 168 C.C.A. 349, 1919 U.S. App. LEXIS 2192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federal-life-ins-v-kemp-ca7-1919.