Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Omaha v. L'Herisson

33 F.2d 841, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2831
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMay 30, 1929
Docket8191, 8192
StatusPublished
Cited by47 cases

This text of 33 F.2d 841 (Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Omaha v. L'Herisson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Omaha v. L'Herisson, 33 F.2d 841, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2831 (8th Cir. 1929).

Opinion

BOOTH, Circuit Judge.

Both by writ of error and by appeal review is sought of a judgment in an aetion for damages for conversion of certain promissory notes. By reason of the statute (45 Stat. 54 [28 USCA §§ 861a, 861b]) abolishing writs of error and substituting appeals, the writ of error will be dismissed and the cause reviewed on the appeal.

The aetion was commenced by Eugene G. Bamum, as receiver of' the Winner National Bank of Winner, S. D., hereafter called the Winner National Bank, against the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Omaha, hereafter called the Credit Bank of Omaha, a corporation organized under the laws of the United States, and .the Winner Agricultural Credit Corporation of Winner, S. D., hereafter called' the Winner Credit Corporation. Bamum was appointed receiver, October 24, 1925, by the Comptroller of the Currency. Subsequent to the commencement of the aetion the appellee herein was appointed receiver in place of Bamum, resigned, and was substituted as plaintiff. The Winner Credit Corporation made default; the Credit Bank of Omaha answered. The action was tried to the court without a jury, compliance having been had with the statutory requisites. The court made special findings in favor of the plaintiff, and judgment was entered thereon against both defendants.

The Credit Bank of Omaha alone has appealed, and the record shows no severance of the Winner Credit Corporation. We have considered the question of lack of joinder of parties appellant, since it is jurisdictional, though it has not been raised by counsel. We think, however, that the judgment, though joint in form, was in its essential nature sev *843 eral; so that an appeal by the Credit Bank of Omaha alone was properly taken. See 34 C. J. § 799, p. 505 ; 3 C. J. § 961, p. 1008; Cox v. United States, 6 Pet. 172, 8 L. Ed. 359; Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207, 52 L. Ed. 340; Lamon v. Speer Hardware Co., 198 F. 453 (C. C. A. 8) ; National Surety Co. v. Leflore County (C. C. A.) 262 F. 325, 18 A. L. R. 269. See also Hahn v. Sleepy Eye Milling Co., 21 S. D. 324, 112 N. W. 843; Merchants’ Nat. Bank v. Stebbins, 15 S. D. 280, 89 N. W. 674; Black Hills Nat. Bank v. Kellogg, 4 S. D. 312, 56 N. W. 1071.

We turn to the merits. Appellant by its assignments of error has suggested very numerous questions which it desires to have considered and determined. But in accordance with well-established rules the review here must be a limited one. When an action at law is tried to a federal court without a jury, stipulation waiving a jury having been filed with the clerk, the questions open for review in the appellate court are limited, first of all, by statute. Revised Statutes, §§ 649, 700, 1011 (28 USCA §§ 773, 875, 879). The statute (section 1011) as construed by us forbids the appellate court to reverse a judgment for any error of fact. A finding contrary to the weight of the evidence is an error of fact. It follows that the appellate court will not review findings to ascertain whether they are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. Errors of law, however, may be reviewed. These may arise in connection with various questions. One such question is expressly stated in the statute: Whether the special findings support the judgment. Another is whether there is any substantial evidence to support the findings. Still other questions of law relate to rulings made in the course of the trial on motions and on the admission or rejection of evidence. But these errors of law, except the one arising out of the question whether the special findings support the judgment, are reviewable only if their occurrence is shown in a properly certified bill of exceptions, and if the particular ground for claiming error is sharply brought to the attention of the court and a ruling had.

If a party seeks to have reviewed the question whether the record contains any substantial evidence to support the findings and judgment against him, it is incumbent upon him to make a motion for judgment in his favor on that ground, or to .request a declaration of law to that effect, or to take some other equivalent step, and secure a ruling by the trial court, and to take exception to such ruling.

If a party desires to have reviewed the question of the admissibility of evidence, he should at the proper time on the trial make his objection or his offer of proof as the ease may be, and state the ground therefor, and secure a ruling of the trial court.

And finally, if a party wishes to have reviewed questions touching the admissibility of evidence, the assignments of error relating thereto must conform to the rules of the court, if any, regarding the same.

The foregoing rules of practice which have application to the case at bar have been enunciated and applied in a legion of cases. A few typical cases from this circuit are given in the margin. 1 Decisions of other circuits are in accord.

Applying these rules to the case, at bar, *844 it is evident that there can be no review of the question whether the findings or any of them are against the weight of the evidence, by reason of the statutes above cited.

There can be no review of questions as to the admission or rejection of testimony, because compliance has not been had with Rules 11 and 24 of this court; and no sufficient reason appears for waiver of the rules.

The question whether there is any substantial evidence to support the findings of fact is properly for consideration, since a motion for judgment in favor of defendant was made covering this ground, and assignments of error present the question for review.

The question whether the special findings support the judgment is, of course, open to review by virtue of the statutes above cited.

Among the facts found by the court are the following:

The Winner National Bank was, prior to October 23,1925, engaged in business at Winner, S. D. On that day the board of directors of the bank passed a resolution declaring the bank to be insolvent, and on the next day a receiver was appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency.

The Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Omaha was, during the time involved in the action, doing business in Omaha.

The Winner Agricultural Credit Corporation was, during the times in question, doing business in Winner, S. D., negotiating loans on agricultural paper and rediscounting such paper exclusively with the Credit Bank of Omaha.

M. P. Dougherty was the president of the Winner National Bank and of the Winner Credit Corporation; but the Winner National Bank was in no way benefited or interested in the transactions of the Winner Credit Corporation with the Credit Bank of Omaha.

Prior to July 28, 1924, the Winner National Bank was the owner and in possession of some 30 promissory notes made by various parties and amounting to $36,135.76.

Prior to the same date, the Winner Credit Corporation had negotiated loans, amounting in the aggregate to $84,997.52, and had rediscounted the same with the Credit Bank of Omaha.

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Bluebook (online)
33 F.2d 841, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2831, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federal-intermediate-credit-bank-of-omaha-v-lherisson-ca8-1929.