Federal Home Loan v. Petty
This text of 2013 MT 91N (Federal Home Loan v. Petty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
April 9 2013
DA 12-0445
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2013 MT 91N
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JEFFREY S. PETTY and MEGAN A. PETTY,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV-11-1313C Honorable Stewart E. Stadler, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Timothy Baldwin, Lerner Law Firm, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellee:
Cassie R. Dellwo, Mackoff Kellogg Law Firm, Dickinson, North Dakota
Submitted on Briefs: March 20, 2013
Decided: April 9, 2013
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Defendants Jeffrey S. Petty and Megan A. Petty appeal a decision of the Eleventh
Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granting summary judgment to Plaintiff Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”). We affirm.
¶3 The Pettys executed a deed of trust on February 21, 2007, encumbering a tract of
real property in Marion, Montana. The original beneficiary of the deed of trust,
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., assigned its interest to BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP FKA Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP (“BAC”), pursuant to
an assignment of deed of trust executed December 18, 2009. Thereafter, BAC appointed
ReconTrust Company, N.A., as substitute trustee.
¶4 The Pettys defaulted on their obligations under the deed of trust as stated in the
Notice of Trustee’s Sale dated December 17, 2010. ReconTrust thereupon initiated a
trustee’s sale, which was held May 3, 2011. BAC was the purchaser at the sale. On
May 5, 2011, BAC conveyed the subject property by warranty deed to Freddie Mac.
¶5 The Pettys remained on the property after the trustee’s sale. As a result, Freddie
Mac served the Pettys a Notice to Quit on July 19, 2011, advising the Pettys that the
tenancy under which they remained on the property would not be renewed and that they
2 were required to quit and deliver possession of the property to Freddie Mac within
thirty days. The Pettys refused to vacate. Freddie Mac served the Pettys a second Notice
to Quit on October 3, 2011, stating that the Pettys’ tenancy had ended on August 19 and
that they had three days to vacate the property. Still, the Pettys refused to vacate.
¶6 As a result, Freddie Mac initiated the instant unlawful detainer action against the
Pettys on October 24, 2011. Following oral argument on June 5, 2012, the District Court
granted Freddie Mac’s motion for summary judgment under M. R. Civ. P. 56(c), thus
rendering other pending motions moot. Citing § 71-1-319, MCA, the court determined
that Freddie Mac, as the successor in interest to the purchaser at the trustee’s sale, was
entitled to possession of the subject property on May 15, 2011. The court observed that
Freddie Mac had offered proof in support of its allegations, which the Pettys had not
rebutted. Furthermore, the court concluded that the Pettys had failed to properly plead
constructive fraud. After finding that notice and process were complete and that there
were no genuine issues of material fact, the District Court determined that Freddie Mac
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
¶7 The Pettys contend on appeal that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Freddie Mac. We disagree. Pursuant to § 71-1-319, MCA, Freddie
Mac was entitled to possession of the subject property as the successor to the purchaser at
the trustee’s sale. Montana’s unlawful detainer statutes require a thirty-day notice to quit,
§ 70-27-104, MCA, and a three-day notice of reentry, § 70-27-106, MCA. Freddie Mac
gave both notices prior to filing this unlawful detainer action. The Pettys continued to
occupy and possess the property. Based on the record before us, it is clear that Freddie
3 Mac complied with the applicable provisions of law and is the owner of the property.
The Pettys have presented no evidence suggesting that there are genuine disputes as to
any material issues of fact. Furthermore, we agree with the District Court that the Pettys
failed to properly plead fraud pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Accordingly, the District
Court correctly granted summary judgment to Freddie Mac.
¶8 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The
issues in this case are legal and are controlled by settled Montana law, which the District
Court correctly applied.
¶9 Affirmed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT /S/ JIM RICE
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