Feder, Nusbaum & Co. v. Solomon & Nathan

42 N.W. 1, 26 Neb. 266, 1889 Neb. LEXIS 127
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedApril 11, 1889
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 42 N.W. 1 (Feder, Nusbaum & Co. v. Solomon & Nathan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Feder, Nusbaum & Co. v. Solomon & Nathan, 42 N.W. 1, 26 Neb. 266, 1889 Neb. LEXIS 127 (Neb. 1889).

Opinion

Cobb, J.

On the 10th day of May, 1888, the plaintiffs in error commenced an action in the district court of Cass county, to recover from the defendants in error the sum of $933-upon an account for merchandise sold and delivered, upon which account the sum of $425 was, at the commencement of the action, past due, and the sum of $508 was to become due on the 15th day of May, 1888. At the same time the plaintiffs in error filed in said action an affidavit [268]*268for an attachment, alleging, as their grounds therefor, that defendants “have sold, conveyed, and otherwise disposed of their property, with the fraudulent intent to cheat and defraud their creditors, and to hinder and delay them in the collection of their debts; and that said defendants are about to sell, convey, and otherwise dispose of their property, with the fraudulent intent to cheat and defraud their creditors, and to hinder and delay them in the collection of their debts.”

On the 9th day of August, 1888, the defendants in error filed their motion to vacate the plaintiff’s order of attachment, and discharge the same for the reasons:

■ 1. That the court had no jurisdiction to make the order

from the records presented.

2. That the affidavit on which the order was granted, states no fact or facts justifying an order of attachment.

3. That there was no bond given as required by law, the indebtedness shown as $933 and the bond for $1,666.

4. That the order of attachment was improvidently granted.

5. That the allegations of the affidavit, on which the attachment was sought, are false and untrue.

6. That at the date of the suing out of the attachment, the plaintiffs had already commenced, and there was pending, an action between the parties for the recovery of the same indebtedness upon which orders of attachment had been issued and lands seised, in the district court of Smith county, in the state of Kansas, sufficient to pay the debt, which action is still pending and in no manner released.

On the 22d day of August following, this motion was argued and heard before the district judge of Cass county, and it was ordered that the attachment heretofore granted be vacated and discharged, and the sheriff ordered to return all the property'taken under the attachment, and the garnishee released from all liability in this action'.

To the order of the court sustaining the motion and dis[269]*269charging and vacating the attachment and order of garnishment, the plaintiffs except, and bring the cause to this, court on the following assignments of error:

1. The court erred in sustaining the motion to discharge the attachment.

2. In ordering that said attachment be vacated and discharged.

3. The order vacating and discharging said attachment-is not sustained by the affidavits filed to support the same..

The first, second, third, and fourth grounds of defendants’ motion, on'which the plaintiffs’ order of attachment was dissolved, was doubtless abandoned before the district, judge. The third was based upon a mistake of fact, the ground of objection therein against the bond being untrue..

As to the sixth ground of objection, without expressing an opinion upon the point, I deem it sufficient to say that the evidence introduced to establish it, fails to show that the proceedings in Smith county, Kansas, had been commenced or were pending at the time of the commencement of these, proceedings here sought to be dismissed.

The fifth point was the only one argued at the bar of this, court, and to it our discussion will be confined.

The allegations of the affidavit for attachment, called in-question and put in issue by the fifth ground of the motion^ are that the defendants are about to sell, convey, and otherwise dispose of their property, with the fraudulent intent, to defraud and cheat their creditors, and to hinder and delay them in the collection of their debts, and have sold, conveyed, and otherwise disposed of their property, with the-fraudulent intent to cheat and defraud their creditors, and to hinder and delay them in the collection of their debts.

It is not contended by the plaintiffs in the argument that the defendants were about to make, or contemplated making, any other or further disposition of their property than that which they had already made by the execution of the chattel mortgages.

[270]*270Our attention will therefore be confined to the legal effect, of the chattel mortgages previously executed, and placed on file on the day previous to that on which the order of attachment was-issued. Was that disposition fraudulent, and made by the defendants with intent to cheat and defraud their creditors, and to hinder and delay them in the collection of their debts ? Much of the argument of the plaintiffs, in their brief, is directed to the character and legal effect of the disposition of the goods by these chattel mortgages, considering the transaction before the recording of the mortgages. I do not consider it necessary to follow this part of the argument, for it is admitted that before the commencement of the action, before the filing of the affidavit, and before the allowance and issuance of the order of attachment, the mortgages had been placed on file.

The case therefore does not come within the provision of section 14, chapter 32, of the Compiled Statutes, but must be construed in reference to the provisions of section 11 of said chapter, that: “ Every sale made by a vendor, of goods and chattels in his possession or under his control, and every assignment of goods and chattels by way of mortgage or security, or upon any condition whatever, unless the same be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and be followed by an actual and continued change of possession of the things sold, mortgaged, or assigned, shall be presumed to be fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the vendor, or the creditors of the person making such assignment, or subsequent purchasers in good faith; and shall be conclusive evidence of fraud,' unless it shall be made to appear on the part of the persons claiming under such sale or assignment, that the same was made in good faith, and without any intent to defraud such creditors or purchasers.”

The question is, therefore, whether the sale or assignment of said goods and chattels by way of mortgage or security, was accompanied by an immediate delivery and followed by an actual and continued change of possession of the [271]*271things sold, mortgaged, and assigned, or whether it was made to appear at the hearing of said motion that the same was made in good faith without any intention to defraud the creditors of the defendants. If upon the execution and delivery of said chattel mortgages the same was accompanied by immediate delivery, and followed by an actual and continuous change of possession of the mortgaged property, such mortgage and transfer must be presumed to have been made in good faith, and the burden of proving it to have been made with fraudulent intent rests upon the plaintiffs. But if there was no such immediate delivery followed by an actual and continued change of possession, it was incumbent on the defendants or those claiming under such sale or assignment to make it appear that the same was made in good faith and without intent to defraud the creditors of the defendants. *

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Bluebook (online)
42 N.W. 1, 26 Neb. 266, 1889 Neb. LEXIS 127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/feder-nusbaum-co-v-solomon-nathan-neb-1889.