Fearon v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Health and Human Services

Maine Superior

Fearon v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Health and Human Services

DecidedJuly 27, 2017

DocketANDap-17-002

StatusUnpublished

This text of Fearon v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Health and Human Services (Fearon v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Fearon v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Health and Human Services, (Me. Super. Ct. 2017).

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Opinion

(

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-17-002 ASHLEY FEARON ) ) Petitioner, ) v. ) ORDER ON BOC PETITION FOR ) REVIEW OF FINAL AGENCY COMMISSIONER, MAINE ) ACTION DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ) HUMAN SERVICES ) JUN 2? '11 PM3:32 ) ANDROSUPERIOR COlJ Respondent. )

Before the court is Petitioner Ashley Fearon's appeal for review of Respondent

Department of Health and Human Services' (DHHS's) decision that she was overpaid

Transitional Child Care (TCC) benefits. M.R. Civ. P. BOC; 5 M.R.S. § 11002. For the

reasons below, this court denies Petitioner's appeal.

I. Background

Petitioner filed a hearing request with DHHS to challenge an assessment that she

was not eligible for TCC benefits from February 2015 through September 2016, and had

been overpaid. (Pet'r's Compl. <][

December 5, 2016, and Petitioner received notice that DHHS has decided against her on

January 25, 2016. (Pet'r's Compl.

complaint for review of the decision, and asks this court to reverse the decision. On

April 5, 2017, DHHS filed the certified record of the hearing.

II. Standard of review

When acting in an appellate capacity pursuant to Rule BOC and the

Administrative Procedures Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 11001-11008, the court reviews an

agency's decision for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or findings not supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Somerset Cnty. v. Dep't of Corr., 2016 ME 33,

A.3d 1006. The party seeking to vacate an agency's decision bears the burden of

1 of 4 persuasion to demonstrate error. Rossignol v. Me. Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys., 2016 ME 115, <[

6, 144 A.3d 1175.

Questions of law are subject to de novo review. York Hosp. v. HHS, 2008 ME 165,

<[ 32, 959 A.2d 67. Deference is given to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous

regulation or statute that is within its area of expertise unless the interpretation is

unreasonable or if the statute or regulation plainly compels a contrary result. Cheney v.

Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 2016 ME 105, <[ 6, 144 A.3d 45; Lippitt v. Bd. of Certification for

Geologists & Soil Scientists, 2014 ME 42, <[ 17, 88 A.3d 154. The Court will not substitute

its judgment for that of the agency where there is sufficient relevant evidence that a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the resultant conclusion, and the

fact-finder could have fairly and reasonably found the facts as they did, even if the

record contains inconsistent evidence or evidence contrary to the result reached by the

agency. Cheney, 2016 ME 105,

of Ins., 2013 ME 102, <[ 18, 82 A.3d 121; Watts v. Bd. of Envtl. Prat., 2014 ME 91,

A.3d 115. An agency has the authority to determine the weight to be given to the

evidence. Rossignol, 2016 ME 115, <[ 6, 144 A.3d 1175; 5 ·M.R.S.A. § 11007(3). The

reviewmg court will vacate a determmation that a party failed to meet its burden of

proof only if the record compels a contrary conclusion to the exclusion of any other

inference. Rossignol, 2016 ME 115, <[ 6, 144 A.3d 1175.

III. Discussion

Petitioner argues that DHHS was mistaken that she was ineligible for TCC

benefits after resigning from her job m January 2015, because she remarried in February

2015, establishing the conditions for a two-parent household such that there was no gap

in her eligibility. (Pet'r's Br. 4, 5.) Respondent DHHS argues that she was not a two

parent family when she resigned from her job, and the payments to her were in error.

2 of 4 (Resp't's Br. 1,3.) The DHHS rule is that TCC benefits automatically terminate when

employment of the working recipient in the household ceases. (Resp't's Br. 6.) But, two

parent families may qualify for TCC benefits, if one parent is working at paid

employment, and the non- working parent is engaged in an education or training

program. 10-144 C.M.R. Ch. 331, V(I)(a)(l).

Here, there is no dispute that Petitioner was eligible for TCC benefits as the

employed member of a single-parent household prior to resigning from her job in

January 2015 to attend school. According to the plain language of the rules, DHHS

reasonably interpreted the rules to conclude her resignation triggered an automatic

termination of the benefits. Petitioner was the sole recipient of the TCC benefits at that

moment. Regardless of whether the two-parent family rule applies to step-parents, or

only natural and adoptive parents, she did not marry until the end of February 2015.

Next, Petitioner argues that, even if she was not eligible for TCC, she was eligible

for CCSP benefits which DHHS should have figured out and enrolled her in based on a

single application (Pet'r's Br. 6). In support, she cites to the "Single application form"

requirement whereby DHHS was required to develop a universal application for all

publicly funded child care programs for applicants who are seeking child care as their

primary service, to be used by all caseworkers and contractors to determine eligibility

for applicants. 5 M.R.S. § 3735. But, DHHS reasonably interprets that the Single

application form statute did not require DHHS to automatically enroll Petitioner into

benefits programs for which she may have been eligible but did not apply.

Finally, even if she was erroneously provided TCC benefits, Petitioner argues

DHHS should be equitably estopped from retrieving these benefits. (Pet'r's Br. 7.) To

prove equitable estoppel against a governmental entity, the party asserting it must

demonstrate that: (1) the statements or conduct of the governmental official or agency

3 of 4 induced the party to act; (2) the reliance was detrimental; and (3) the reliance was

reasonable. Dep't of Health and Human Services v. Pelletier, 2009 ME 11,

630. The reviewing court will consider "the totality of the circumstances, including the

nature of the government official or agency whose actions provide the basis for the

claim and the governmental function being discharged by that official or agency."

Kittery Retail Ventures, LLC v. Town of Kittery, 2004 ME 65,

marks omitted). But, a government entity can act only in a manner consistent with its

authorizing document. Budge v. Town of Millinocket, 2012 ME 122, 9I 27, 55 A.3d 484.

Payments of benefits promised by government officials cannot effect estoppel because

the officials are not authorized to make such a promises when the government entity

has not promised to make such payments. Id.

Here, Petitioner testified that she based her decision to resign from her job, in

part, on an assurance from a DHHS representative that she would continue to receive

TCC benefits. (Pet'r's Br. 9.) But, her reliance on an alleged promise by a DHHS

representative was not reasonable, where her ineligibility for TCC benefits upon

resigning from her job meant the representative was unauthorized to make that

promise. Kittery Retail Ventures, LLC v. Town of Kittery, 2004 ME 65, 9I 36,856 A.2d 1183.

IV. Conclusion

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