Fearn v. Taylor

7 Ky. 363, 4 Bibb 363, 1816 Ky. LEXIS 66
Court of Appeals of Kentucky·Decided June 5, 1816·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

[363] OPINION of the Court, by

Ch. J. B otee.

The appellants were complainants in the court below, and derive their title to the land which is the subject of controversy under an entry for 1000 acres, made in the name of Francis Eppes Harris, on the 28th of Decern-her 1782, which calls to lie—

“ On Hingston’s fork of Licking, above the mouth of Taylor’s creek; to begin at a sugar tree marked H. standing on the bank of the south side of said fork, to extend 200 poles north, and 200 poles south, from said t^ee, and then from the extremities of said line west-V;;mlly, to form a square figure as nearly as the vacancy will admit to include the quantity.”

, The appellee, w ho was defendant in the court below, has a junior cut"- 'wit elder grant; so that the principal question in the case turns upon the validity of the entry under which the appellants derive their claim.

Where a deed has been burnt by accident* the written aclcnow ledgment of the grantor is fuffi-c<enc evidence that fuch deed had been executed*

Kingston's fork of Licking and Taylor’s creek, which empties into Kingston’s fork, are admitted by the parties to have been well known by those appellations respectively at and prior to the date of the entry in question; andón the south bank of Kingston’s fork, 103 poles above the mouth of Taylor’s creek, a sugar tree is shown which is proven to have been marked prior to the time when the entry was made with the letter H. so large and conspicuous that for many years afterwards it was visible at the distance of 20 or 25 yards. Other sugar trees are shown to stand on Kingston, both above and below the one claimed by the appellants ; but there is none of them represented to be so immediately on the bank of the stream, nor is it pretended that any of them is marked as described in the entry. Under these circumstances we cannot suppose that a subsequent locator would have had any difficulty in finding the tree which is the beginning of this entry. He would naturally commence his search at the mouth of Taylor’s creek. If from that point he pursued the margin of Kingston’s fork only for the distance of 103 poles, the object of his search could not in all reasonable probability escape his notice; and to make such a search would certainly not require more than reasonable diligence.

But admitting the beginning to be well established, it-is still contended that the entry is vague and uncertain. This objection is predicated, not upon any want of precision in the calls which fix the base of the survey, for that is defined with absolute certainty, but upon the vagueness of the calls which direct the course of the lines from the base. The call “ to run westwardly,’* unquestionably admits of considerable latitude : for lines, directed to any point between N. 45 W. and S. 45 W. would be equally within its meaning, according to the common acceptation of the term westwardly. If indeed there were no other controling call in the entry, for the purpose of conforming to the squaring principle, the call to run westwardly would by construction be limited to that point between N. 45 W. and S. 45 W, which would render the figure of the survey rectangular. But the subsequent call “to form a square figure as warty as, the vacancy will admit, to include the quantity,” clearly manifests the intention of the locator that the lines from the base should be controled by prior claims, if there should be any such which would inter* [365] fere with those lines extended at right angles from the base. Whether there were any such claims existing or not, or if there were, lsow far their position might require a variation of those lines from a rectangular figure, could not he presumed to be within the knowledge of a subsequent locator | and as the entry affords no means by which such a knowledge could be acquired, it is in this respect uncertain. Had the uncertainty been only in the extent of the lines from the base, the case would have been within the principle of the case of Craig and Mosby vs. Cogar, Hard. Rep. 383 ; but it is evident that the uncertainty exists in the course of those lines; and the case, so far as there is uncertainty in the course, comes completely within the principle of the case of Hanson, &c. vs. Lashbrook,(a) and other cases subsequently decided upon the authority of it. The uncertainty, howtver, in this case, does not, we apprehend, affect the whole location. The existence of prior claims might vary the course of the lines from the base, so far as the latitude of the call “ to run westwardly” would permit, but no farther : for notwithstanding there might be prior claims which could not be avoided by running those lines westwardly, yet to have extended them north, or south, or east, or any course which would in common acceptation receive its denomination from either of those points, would have been utterly irreconcileable with the intention of the locator as indicated by the call to run -ivestwardly, According to a fair construction of the entry, therefore, those lines must at all events have run westwardly. Consequently the land which would be common to a survey made by extending the lines from the base N. 45 W. and a survey made by extending those lines S.45 W. is certainly included in the entry; andtoso much of that as is included in the patent under which the appellants claim, they are entitled, unless an objection taken in ⅛⅜ argument to the derivation of their title should be sustained. The objection is, that they show no conveyance from the patentee. The appellants allege that the deed from the patentee was lodged in the clerk’s office of the Fayette county court, and that it was there -recorded, and that it was, together witli all the papers and records of that office, consumed by fire; and to prove that the deed had been made and executed, they produpcd on the trial a written acknowledgment to that effect signed by the patentee. That the deed may have [366] been destroyed, as the appellants allege, is a fact in it* self altogether probable; and as the allegation is supported by their affidavit, we can have no doubt that it is sufficiently verified to justify the admission of other evidence to show that the deed had been executed. If so, the written acknowledgment of the grantor is surely admissible evidence for that purpose. Had it been shown that there were subscribing witnesses to the deed, there might perhaps have been some room to doubt whether they or some of them ought not to have been produced ; but subscribing witnesses were not necessary to the validity of the deed, and it is not shown that there were any. The objection, therefore, to the derivation of the appellants’ title, cannot be sustained.

The decree must he reversed with costs, and the cause remanded, that a decree may be entered agreeable to the foregoing opinion.

Talbot and Bibb, counsel for the appellants, presented the following petition for a rehearing.

The counsel for the appellants most respectfully suggest, that the entry under which they claim falls within that class of cases which have heretofore been deemed valid, and that the opinion delivered by the court has treated the entry with a severity not consistent with former adjudications.

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Fearn v. Taylor, 7 Ky. 363, 4 Bibb 363, 1816 Ky. LEXIS 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1816).

7 Ky. 363 (Fearn v. Taylor) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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