Feagan v. Kendall

43 Ala. 628
Supreme Court of Alabama·Decided June 15, 1869·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

PETERS, J.

At a regular term of tbe probate court of Covington county, in tbis State, on tbe second Monday in March, 1867, tbe application of Josiab Jones and Samuel P. Feagan, tbe administrators of tbe estate of Samuel P. Feagan, deceased, to bave tbe estate of said deceased declared insolvent, came on to be beard, when Kennard Kendall, one of tbe creditors of said estate, made issue in due [629] form of law, denying that said estate is insolvent. It seems that a trial of this issue by a jury was waived by the parties, and it was tried by the court, without the intervention of a jury.

On this trial, the facts of the case, as we gather them from the bill of exceptions, and a very imperfect record, were these, namely: On the 29th day of March, 1859, the said administrators, under an order of the probate court of said county of Covington, sold the real and personal property, except the slaves, of said estate of said Samuel P. Feagan, deceased, for the sum of twenty-seven thousand, eight hundred and seventy-six dollars and seventy cents, ($27,876 70); that the said administrators paid off claims against said estate amounting to twenty-five thousand, eight hundred and seventy-three dollars and sixty cents, ($25,-873 60), “ including court fees and commissions, leaving a balance in their hands of $2,003 10; that, on the 27th day of November, 1860, said administrators, under an order of said probate court, made distribution of the slaves belonging to said estate to those persons entitled to the same; that said slaves were appraised at the sum of fifty-seven thousand and five dollars; that at the time said distribution of said slaves took place, said administrators took from each of said distributees “ refunding bonds, as the law requires in such cases;” that on the second Monday in March, 1861, the said administrators proceeded “ to make a partial settlement with the court, and then and there made division and partial settlement among the heirs and distributees of all the assets of said estate, then in their hands, except a note of the amount of four thousand dollars, and interest thereon, against William Judge, with a mortgage on about six hundred acres of land, with a steam saw-mill thereon, to secure the payment of said note, which note was retained by said administrators for the purpose of paying the balance of outstanding claims against said estate, of about the amount of thirty-seven hundred dollars, which remained not paid ” at the date “ of said settlement that the said steam saw-mill, on said mortgaged lands, was burned down during the late war.

Upon this “ statement of facts,” the court was asked to [630] decree said estate insolvent, for the following reasons, viz : 1st. That through and by the effects of the war the slaves were set free; thereby the refunding bonds had become void, and could not be sued on. 2d. That the burning of the steam saw-mill by the yankees had depreciated the value of the land, the only security to the note, so that the land could not and would not sell for enough to pay the claims against the estate.” This the court refused, and the administrators excepted, and appeal to this court.

In proceedings of this kind, the statute requires, that when an administrator of any estate is satisfied that the property of the estate is insufficient to pay its debts, he must file with the court having jurisdiction of the estate a report in writing, that such estate is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, insolvent; and also file with said report, certain statements, also in writing, of the personal property and assets belonging to said estate, and the estimated value of the same; also, another statement of the real property of said estate, and the estimated value thereof ; and, also, a full statement of all claims against the estate, which have come to his knowledge; each of these three statements containing such additional particulars as are named in the statute, and which are not now necessary here to be enumerated. This report and statements must be accompanied by affidavit of the administrator, that the same are correct, to the best of the administrator’s knowledge and belief. Notice of this proceeding is then required to be given by the court to the creditors of the estate, and a time is appointed to hear and determine the matters arising on this report. But any creditor of the estate may contest such report, by making an issue as to its correctness, by denying, in writing, that the estate is insolvent. Any of the creditors, or all, may join in this issue, and it must be tried by a jury, on the application of either party. If the issue is decided against the administrator, the report must be dismissed, and the administrator and his securities taxed with the costs, for which execution may issue. If, on the other hand, the issue is decided in favor of the administrator, the estate must be declared insolvent, and the contesting creditor or creditors must pay the costs, or [631] they may be paid out of the assets of the estate, as the court shall direct. — Revised Code, §§ 2178 to 2187.

In this case, it does not appear that these formalities were very strictly complied with. At least, the evidence of such compliance is not shown by the record. There is no report, no statements, and no issue found in the record ; but simply a declaration in the recitals of the judgment of the probate court, that they existed. But as no objection seems to have been interposed to such irregularities in the court below, if they existed in that court, and no such objection is raised in the assignment of errors, no further notice will be taken of them here.

The assignment of errors in this court are but two: “1st. That the court decreed the estate of Eeagan to be solvent on the facts stated. 2d. That the court did not declare said estate insolvent.” These raise the same issue, but in different words.

No question is raised on the record by these assignments, except a question as to the force and value of the facts given in the bill of exceptions already recited; and none will be considered in this opinion, because all questions sought to be reviewed and corrected in this tribunal must be distinctly stated in an assignment of error, and insisted on in argument; or they will be considered by the court to have been waived and abandoned. Such is the practice of this court.—Rule of Practice No. 1, Revised Code, p. 816; Shepherd’s Digest, p. 565, § 37; Waller v. Saltzbacher & Paige, 38 Ala. 38.

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Feagan v. Kendall, 43 Ala. 628 (Ala. 1869).

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