Faye Hobson v. Department of Defense

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided October 6, 2022·No. CH-1221-17-0203-W-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

FAYE R. HOBSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-1221-17-0203-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: October 6, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Faye R. Hobson, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, pro se.

Melissa Martinez, Peachtree City, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal without prejudice, subject to automatic refiling at a later date. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argu ment is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and FORWARD the matter to the Central Regional Office for adjudication as a timely refiled appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 For purposes of this decision, we note that the appellant previously filed her first IRA appeal, Hobson I, alleging that eight nonselections between 2012 and 2014 were the result of her protected whistleblowing activity. Hobson v. Department of Defense (Hobson I), MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-15-0470-W-1, Initial Appeal File (0470 IAF), Tab 115, Initial Decision (0470 ID); Hobson v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-15-0470-W-1, Final Order (Oct. 4, 2022). In that case, the administrative judge found that the appellant met her burden of proving exhaustion through Office of Special Counsel (OSC) File No. MA-15-0932. 0470 ID at 6-7; see 0470 IAF, Tab 1 at 8. She also found that the appellant proved that she engaged in protected activity when, in 2005, she made a disclosure concerning the agency’s alleged noncompliance with state and Federal special education requirements at Barkley Elementary School. 0470 ID at 7-8. However, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that this protected disclosure was a contributing factor in her nonselections . 0470 ID at 8-24. Therefore, she denied the appellant’s request for corrective action. 0470 ID at 24. The appellant filed a petition for review. Hobson v. 3

Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-15-0470-W-1, Petition for Review File, Tab 1. ¶3 While Hobson I was pending, the appellant filed another complaint with OSC, File No. MA-16-4697. Hobson v. Department of Defense (Hobson II), MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-17-0203-W-1, Initial Appeal File (0203 IAF), Tab 1 at 2, 10-13. The instant IRA appeal, Hobson II, followed OSC’s closure of that complaint. Id. The administrative judge instructed the appellant to identify the precise issues involved in Hobson II, separate from those addressed in Hobson I, and meet her jurisdictional burden. 0203 IAF, Tabs 3 -4. After the appellant responded, 0203 IAF, Tabs 7-11, the administrative judge dismissed Hobson II without prejudice, 0203 IAF, Tab 12, Initial Decision (0203 ID) at 7 -8. She explained that there was at least some overlap between Hobson I and Hobson II, the former was pending review before the Board, and that review could affect the latter. Id. The administrative judge’s decision further explained that Hobson II would be automatically refiled within 10 days of the Board’s decision in Hobson I, or on September 28, 2017, whichever was earlier. 0203 ID at 8. ¶4 Rather than wait for the automatic refiling of Hobson II, the appellant filed a petition for review. Hobson v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-17-0203-W-1, Petition for Review (0203 PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response, and the appellant has replied. 0203 PFR File, Tabs 3, 5. ¶5 An administrative judge has wide discretion to control the proceedings before her, and a dismissal without prejudice to refiling is a procedural option committed to her sound discretion. Gingery v. Department of the Treasury, 111 M.S.P.R. 134, ¶ 9 (2009). The Board has held that an administrative judge may sua sponte dismiss an appeal without prejudice when such a dismissal is in the interests of fairness, due process, and administrative efficiency. Gidwani v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 74 M.S.P.R. 509, 511 (1997). 4

¶6 The appellant’s arguments on review do not demonstrate that the administrative judge abused her discretion in dismissing this case without prejudice for automatic refiling at a later date. 0203 PFR File, Tab 1 at 6 -13. In fact, it appears that the appellant’s arguments merely reflect a misunderstan ding of that dismissal; she essentially has argued the merits of her appeal, rather than the propriety of the administrative judge’s decision to delay that appeal. Id.; see generally Brown v. Department of the Navy, 102 M.S.P.R. 377, ¶ 14 (2006) (recognizing that a dismissal without prejudice is not a decision on the merits); Peltier v. Department of Justice, 79 M.S.P.R. 674, 677 (1998) (same). ¶7 Even if the administrative judge had erred in dismissing Hobson II without prejudice for automatic refiling, the matter is now moot. The administrative judge determined that Hobson II would be automatically refiled after either September 28, 2017, or the Board’s decision in Hobson I. 0203 ID at 8. Both of those intervening events have occurred, so Hobson II is ripe for adjudication, regardless of our decision on the propriety of the dismissal without prejudice. See Henry v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 213, ¶ 6 (2008) (concluding that the Board need not determine whether the administrative judge abused her discretion in dismissing an appeal without prejudice pending an intervening event because that event had since occurred and the appeal was ripe for adjudication). Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s petition concerning the dismissal of Hobson II without prejudice and forward the appeal to the Central Regional Office for docketing and adjudication as a refiled appeal. 2

2 We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal. 5

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1).

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