FATUR v. KIJAZI

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 11, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-00336
StatusUnknown

This text of FATUR v. KIJAZI (FATUR v. KIJAZI) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
FATUR v. KIJAZI, (W.D. Pa. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FELICIA FENECE FATUR, ) ) Plaintiff, ) vs. ) ) Civil Action No. 21-336 ) KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1 ) )

) Defendant.

ORDER AND NOW, this 11th day of July 2022, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 17) filed in the above-captioned matter on October 18, 2021, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED. AND, further, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14) filed in the above-captioned matter on September 16, 2021, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED insofar as she seeks remand to the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) for further administrative proceedings. Accordingly, this matter is hereby remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. Background Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) on August 9, 2016. (R. 247). She later pursued her application before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.). The ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled, a decision that Plaintiff challenged before the Appeals Council. (R. 10). The Appeals Council remanded

1 Defendant’s surname is misspelled on the docket as “KIJAZI.” The Clerk is directed to amend the docket to reflect this change. the matter to the ALJ and, pursuant to the remand, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ for another hearing in pursuit of benefits under the Social Security Act (“Act”). (Id.). The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s alleged disability anew, but again decided that she was not disabled under the Act. His decision became the final agency decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s

request for review (R. 1). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. Plaintiff now challenges the ALJ’s decision before the Court and the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment are pending. II. Standard of Review The Court reviews an ALJ’s decision to determine whether it is supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” i.e., “substantial evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citations omitted). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Id. It is deferential, such that reviewing courts “are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations” in place of the ALJ’s findings. Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011); Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e are mindful that

we must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.”). “The presence of evidence in the record that supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as the record provides substantial support for that decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009). See Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Although there was record evidence from a treating psychiatrist suggesting a contrary conclusion, the ALJ is entitled to weigh all evidence in making its finding.”). The Court will not, however, find an ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence if the ALJ has failed to address all the evidence, particularly evidence he or she appears to have rejected. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1979)). Whether a claimant applies for DIB or SSI benefits, the claimant’s alleged disability is assessed pursuant to a five-step regulatory evaluation. Guerrero v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 249

Fed. Appx. 289, 291 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920); Biller v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 776 (W.D. Pa. 2013). Pursuant to the five-steps: The Commissioner must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a combination of impairments that is severe; (3) whether the medical evidence of the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x. 1; (4) whether the claimant’s impairments prevent [him or] her from performing past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of performing [his or] her past relevant work, whether [he or] she can perform any other work which exists in the national economy.

Biller, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)). Challenges to an ALJ’s decision are often directed at the ALJ’s preliminary step-four determination of the claimant’s functional limitations and remaining work ability, i.e., residual functional capacity (“RFC”). A claimant’s RFC represents his or her “maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). With it, the ALJ decides whether the claimant can return to past work at the fourth step of the inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). At step five, the ALJ asks whether the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience permit adjustment to other work notwithstanding the claimant’s inability to return to past work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). III. The ALJ’s Decision In this matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not done any substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date—January 1, 2015. (R. 13). Next, the ALJ found Plaintiff had six severe, medically determinable impairments: fibromyalgia, arthritis, degenerative disc disease, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety, and obesity. (Id.). At step three of the five-step evaluation, the ALJ considered whether Plaintiff satisfied the criteria for certain presumptively disabling impairments. (R. 13—17). Specifically, he considered whether

Plaintiff’s impairments or combination of impairments met the criteria for Listing 1.02 (major joint dysfunction), Listing 1.04 (spine disorders), Listing 14.09 (inflammatory arthritis), and Listing 12.11 (neurodevelopmental disorders). Finding Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria for any of the Listings, the ALJ set out to determine whether Plaintiff could return to her past work as a nail technician or adjust to other available work. (R. 17—26). Accordingly, the ALJ first formulated Plaintiff’s RFC—a modified range of sedentary work. (R. 17). He found Plaintiff to be capable of sedentary work that did not demand she “work[] overhead with the right, upper and dominant extremity.” (Id.). He further limited her exposure to certain workplace hazards; “to no more than frequent handling, fingering[,] and feeling;” and to work demanding “only routine, repetitive tasks” and “occasional judgment,

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Bluebook (online)
FATUR v. KIJAZI, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fatur-v-kijazi-pawd-2022.