Fatoumata Diallo v. Michael B. Mukasey

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedNovember 19, 2007
Docket07-1237
StatusPublished

This text of Fatoumata Diallo v. Michael B. Mukasey (Fatoumata Diallo v. Michael B. Mukasey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fatoumata Diallo v. Michael B. Mukasey, (8th Cir. 2007).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ___________

No. 07-1237 ___________

Fatoumata Jolloh Diallo, * * Petitioner, * * Petition for Review of an v. * Order of the Board * of Immigration Appeals. Michael B. Mukasey, United * States Attorney General,1 * * Respondent. * ___________

Submitted: November 12, 2007 Filed: November 19, 2007 ___________

Before RILEY, BOWMAN and SMITH, Circuit Judges. ___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Fatoumata Jolloh Diallo (Diallo) petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). In support of her petition, Diallo argues the BIA erred in: (1) upholding the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) adverse credibility determination and (2) upholding the IJ’s

1 Michael B. Mukasey has been appointed to serve as Attorney General and is substituted as respondent pursuant to Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. finding that changed country conditions precluded a determination Diallo would face persecution if removed to her native country of Sierra Leone. We dismiss Diallo’s petition as it relates to her asylum claim, and deny the remainder of the petition.

I. BACKGROUND After the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commenced removal proceedings against Diallo, she conceded removability, and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. The IJ designated Sierra Leone as her country of removal. Diallo testified she was persecuted in Sierra Leone. Specifically, Diallo stated she and her family were active in a disfavored political party and, based upon this political involvement, her father and two brothers were killed in 1995, and her husband was killed in 1998. Diallo also claimed she was raped and beaten by the men who killed her husband, and she was later arrested and falsely charged with arson. Diallo further testified she fled to Guinea after her release from prison, and eventually came to the United States in early 2002.

The IJ considered Diallo’s application and found her lacking in credibility. The IJ noted “[o]ne of the major issues in this case is [Diallo’s] identity in addition to her citizenship and nationality.” The IJ based this finding on numerous factors. First, a government investigation determined the birth certificate Diallo produced was a forgery. Second, Diallo also presented an identity card that the IJ stated appeared to have been altered to coincide with the information on the forged birth certificate. Third, the IJ found Diallo’s testimony regarding her travels and arrival in the United States was “general, vague, and meager[.]” Finally, the IJ reviewed records from Greyhound Bus Line, upon which Diallo claimed to have traveled, and noted these records contradicted Diallo’s accounts of her travel dates and whereabouts. Based upon these factors, the IJ not only made an adverse credibility finding, but also found Diallo had “failed to prove her time, place and manner of entry into the United States [and] . . . [a]ccordingly . . . failed to show she filed for asylum within one year of

-2- her arrival into the United States.” The IJ thus denied Diallo’s asylum claim due to the untimeliness of the asylum application.

The IJ also denied Diallo’s requests for withholding of removal and CAT relief, based upon the adverse credibility determination. Finally, the IJ found, even if Diallo had credibly established past persecution, circumstances had materially changed in Sierra Leone, and “the human rights situation has vastly improved since Sierra Leone’s devastating civil war was officially declared over in January 2002.” Accordingly, the IJ determined Diallo could not establish she would more likely than not face persecution or torture if returned to Sierra Leone, thus precluding withholding of removal or CAT relief. Diallo appealed this decision to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s decision on all counts.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW Where “[t]he BIA’s decision is the final decision of [the] agency . . . it is the subject of our review.” Salkeld v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 2005). “To the extent, however, that the BIA adopted the findings or the reasoning of the IJ, we also review the IJ’s decision as part of the final agency action.” Id. (citation omitted). When we review a BIA determination regarding eligibility for asylum, the BIA’s findings are reviewed under a substantial evidence standard. See Zheng v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 955, 959 (8th Cir. 2005). The BIA’s findings regarding eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT relief are also reviewed for substantial evidence. See Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 413 (8th Cir. 2007). This is an “extremely deferential standard of review[.]” Salkeld, 420 F.3d at 809. Under the substantial evidence standard, the agency’s findings of fact “must be upheld unless the alien demonstrates that the evidence he presented not only supports a contrary conclusion but compels it.” Sultani v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). “This court defers to an immigration judge’s credibility finding where the finding is supported by a specific, cogent reason for disbelief.” Perinpanathan v. INS, 310 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations and internal

-3- quotation marks omitted). “[B]ecause the immigration judge is in the best position to evaluate an alien’s testimony, his or her credibility determinations are to be given much weight.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION A. Asylum Review - Jurisdiction Diallo was required to “demonstrate[] by clear and convincing evidence that the [asylum] application ha[d] been filed within 1 year after the date of [her] arrival in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). This court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s finding that Diallo’s asylum application was not filed within one year of her arrival in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3); see also Bejet Viali Al-Jojo v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 823, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2005).

To the extent Diallo’s argument could be characterized as a procedural due process claim, this court has left open the possibility that such claims could qualify as an exception to the jurisdictional bar in § 1158(a)(3). See Somakoko v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005). However, Diallo has not asserted a procedural due process claim. Additionally, for the reasons outlined in the following section, if characterized as a due process claim, Diallo’s asylum arguments are still without merit.

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