Fatigate v. Lion Insurance

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Fatigate v. Lion Insurance

70 A.D.2d 874, 417 N.Y.S.2d 120, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12446

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 4, 1979

StatusPublished

This text of 70 A.D.2d 874 (Fatigate v. Lion Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fatigate v. Lion Insurance, 70 A.D.2d 874, 417 N.Y.S.2d 120, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12446 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979).

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Opinion

— In an action, inter alia, to declare that the disclaimer interposed by the defendant insurance company is. improper, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated March 28, 1978, which granted the relief requested. Judgment affirmed, with costs. During the course of this nonjury trial the defendant offered no explanation for its delay of almost three months in disclaiming, after having unconditionally agreed to defend the action during the intervening period. Under these circumstances, an argument that the plaintiff was also delinquent in notifying it of the accident is of no avail (see Hartford Ins. Co. v County of Nassau, 46 NY2d 1028). Subdivision 8 of section 167 of the Insurance Law requires that a notification of disclaimer must be made "as soon as is reasonably possible”. Defendant’s additional argument that it had been prejudiced by settlement negotiations held between plaintiff’s counsel and a third party’s insurer is a bare assertion unsupported by evidence and must, therefore, be rejected. Lazer, J. P., Rabin, Shapiro and Hargett, JJ., concur.

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— In an action, inter alia, to declare that the disclaimer interposed by the defendant insurance company is. improper, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated March 28, 1978, which granted the relief requested. Judgment affirmed, with costs. During the course of this nonjury trial the defendant offered no explanation for its delay of almost three months in disclaiming, after having unconditionally agreed to defend the action during the intervening period. Under these circumstances, an argument that the plaintiff was also delinquent in notifying it of the accident is of no avail (see Hartford Ins. Co. v County of Nassau, 46 NY2d 1028). Subdivision 8 of section 167 of the Insurance Law requires that a notification of disclaimer must be made "as soon as is reasonably possible”. Defendant’s additional argument that it had been prejudiced by settlement negotiations held between plaintiff’s counsel and a third party’s insurer is a bare assertion unsupported by evidence and must, therefore, be rejected. Lazer, J. P., Rabin, Shapiro and Hargett, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

70 A.D.2d 874, 417 N.Y.S.2d 120, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12446, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fatigate-v-lion-insurance-nyappdiv-1979.

Opinion

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