Fast v. Sotelo

CourtColorado Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 20, 2025
Docket25CA0018
StatusUnpublished

This text of Fast v. Sotelo (Fast v. Sotelo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fast v. Sotelo, (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

25CA0018 Fast v Sotelo 11-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0018 El Paso County District Court No. 23CV31473 Honorable David A. Gilbert, Judge

Christina Fast,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Javier Sotelo,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Freyre and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 20, 2025

Linden Kominek, P.C., Mary Kominek Linden, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Todd Collins & Associates, LLC, Todd Collins, Marc B. Tull, Elizabeth, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 In this civil action for damages related to a domestic violence

dispute, defendant, Javier Sotelo, appeals the trial court’s judgment

in favor of plaintiff, Christina Fast. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Fast and Sotelo had been partners for ten years when Sotelo

accused Fast of infidelity and assaulted her. Sotelo later pled guilty

to third degree assault. In the civil lawsuit at issue in this appeal,

Fast sued Sotelo for negligence and battery, and Sotelo filed

multiple counterclaims. After the deadline in the case management

order for amending the pleadings had passed, Fast filed a motion

for leave to amend her complaint to add a claim for exemplary

damages under section 13-21-102(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. Over

Sotelo’s objection, the trial court granted the motion. Fast then

filed an amended complaint seeking exemplary damages.

¶3 The case proceeded to trial, where the jury found Sotelo liable

for battery and awarded Fast $312,000 in noneconomic damages,

$38,000 in economic damages, and $400,000 in punitive damages.1

1 Fast dismissed her negligence claim before trial. Neither it nor Sotelo’s counterclaims, which were either dismissed, resolved by directed verdict, or denied by the jury, are at issue in this appeal. 1 ¶4 Sotelo filed a motion for post-trial relief pursuant to C.R.C.P.

59, asking the court, in part, to reduce the amount of exemplary

damages. The trial court denied the motion and entered judgment

against him.

¶5 Sotelo appeals the court’s entry of judgment and the denial of

his motion for post-trial relief. He argues that the trial court erred

by granting Fast’s motion to amend her complaint and denying his

motion to reduce exemplary damages. He further argues that

cumulative irregularities in the proceedings led to an unfair trial

and excessive jury verdict. We reject Sotelo’s arguments and affirm.

II. Discussion

¶6 In a series of numbered contentions structured more like a

complaint than an opening brief, Sotelo raises three distinct

arguments on appeal. But none of them are supported by

meaningful analysis or relevant authority. While we briefly

summarize Sotelo’s contentions, we reject them as insufficiently

raised to warrant our review. See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo

Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 44 (rejecting appellate issues

presented without any coherent, developed argument).

2 ¶7 First, Sotelo argues that the court abused its discretion by

granting Fast’s motion to amend her complaint because Fast filed

her motion past the deadline set by the case management order,

offered no justification for the late filing, and prejudiced him as a

result. But while he summarizes cases that found no abuse of

discretion in a court’s decision to deny a motion to amend, he

provides no authority to suggest that granting a motion to amend

under these circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Worse, Sotelo misrepresents the record — arguing that Fast based

her motion to amend on a need to rely on Sotelo’s deposition

testimony but then failed to rely on that testimony. In fact, Fast

cited the “trove of testimony” Sotelo provided in his deposition as

support for her exemplary damages claim.2

¶8 Relatedly, Sotelo argues that he was unable to develop

meaningful defenses to Fast’s exemplary damages claim, but,

critically, he does not specify what those defenses might have been

or how he was otherwise prejudiced. It is not our job to develop

Sotelo’s arguments for him. See Gravina Siding & Windows Co. v.

2 As he admits in his reply brief, Sotelo also misrepresented Fast’s

closing argument in his opening brief. 3 Gravina, 2022 COA 50, ¶ 71. Because this issue lacks any

meaningful analysis, we do not address it further.

¶9 Second, Sotelo asserts that the trial court erred by denying his

C.R.C.P. 59 motion to reduce exemplary damages because there

was no evidence they were necessary to deter him from future

misconduct and the court failed to consider the required factors.

But as Sotelo recognizes, exemplary damages serve not only to

punish the defendant but also “to deter others from similar conduct

in the future.” Leidholt v. Dist. Ct., 619 P.2d 768, 770 (Colo. 1980).

Sotelo’s position on appeal is nothing more than a rehashing of the

arguments he made before the trial court and a request that we

reach a different conclusion. Because he provides no argument as

to why the court’s decision not to reduce damages constitutes an

abuse of discretion, we do not consider this issue further.

¶ 10 Sotelo also appears to argue that section 13-21-102(2)

somehow requires a court to make findings regarding specific

factors and to reduce a damages award when those factors are met.

Not so. Instead, that statute provides that “the court may reduce or

disallow the award of exemplary damages to the extent” certain

circumstances exist. § 13-21-102(2) (emphasis added); see also In

4 re Marriage of Zander, 2021 CO 12, ¶ 17 (we give the words in a

statute their ordinary and natural meanings). In other words, the

court has discretion to decrease damages, see Hensley v. Tri-QSI

Denv. Corp., 98 P.3d 965, 968 (Colo. App. 2004), but it is not

required to do so. Once again, Sotelo provides no authority to

support his argument that the court abused its discretion by

declining to reduce damages in this case. While he argues that the

court erred by incorporating Fast’s response to his motion to reduce

damages in its decision denying the motion, he does not address

the substance of that response or explain how the court erred by

relying on it. We therefore reject this argument. See Woodbridge

Condo. Ass’n, ¶ 44.

¶ 11 Third, Sotelo points to multiple evidentiary rulings and trial

management decisions as bases for reversal. While he

acknowledges that each of these assertions of error was harmless

when viewed individually, he argues that, in the aggregate, they

constituted cumulative error. For a third time, Sotelo fails to

identify any relevant authority to support his position. Perhaps this

is because the doctrine of cumulative error “has not been extended

5 to civil cases.” Scott R. Larson, P.C. v. Grinnan, 2017 COA 85, ¶ 79

(citation omitted).

¶ 12 Finally, Sotelo requests an award of costs pursuant to C.A.R.

39. We deny that request.

III. Disposition

¶ 13 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE YUN concur.

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Related

Leidholt v. District Court in and for City and County of Denver
619 P.2d 768 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1980)
Hensley v. Tri-QSI Denver Corp.
98 P.3d 965 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2004)
Larson, P.C. v. Grinnan
2017 COA 85 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2017)
ge Condominium Association, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC
2020 COA 34 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2020)
In re Marriage of Zander
2021 CO 12 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2021)

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