Farrow v. Farrow

2 Va. Col. Dec. 243
CourtGeneral Court of Virginia
DecidedOctober 15, 1737
StatusPublished

This text of 2 Va. Col. Dec. 243 (Farrow v. Farrow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering General Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Farrow v. Farrow, 2 Va. Col. Dec. 243 (Va. Super. Ct. 1737).

Opinion

Abraham Farrow Father of the Pit. & Deft, being seised of divers Lands by his Will devises them among his Children & after-wards purchases Lands of one Barton which both before & [B262]*B262after he bought it he declared he intended for his Son Abraham (the Pit.) whom he seated upon it And the Pit. has made Improvements The Father in his last Sickness procures a Promise from his eldest Son (the Deft.) [244] to convey this Land to the Pit. And this Bill is brought to compel a Conveiance accordingly

The Promise is confessed by the Deft, but sworn by him to be made upon an Apprehension that his Father had no Will he having declared some few Days before that he had none Only two Papers containing Pieces of Wills Neither of which he liked & would alter them or make a new Will One of these Papers is since established as the Will By which Deft, has a very slender Provision only 750 A. of poor Land & the Reversion of 200 more & not a Penny of the personal Estate appraised to 500;£. whereas Pit. has Lands to 3 Times the Value exclusive of Bartons besides Slaves & other Estate So that Deft, is almost disinherited When the Will -was in Contest Pit. proposed to Deft, to release his Right to the Mann’r Plantation ab’t 200 A. not so valuable as Bartons w’ch is given to Pit. by the Will if Deft, would convey Bartons Land to him This Deft, agreed to But after the Will was established Pit. claimed both & refused to stand to his Agreement For which Reason Deft, not believing it was his Father’s Intention that Pit. should have Bartons Land & the Mann’r Plantation too brought an Ejectm’t in the County Court for Bartons Land & had Judg’t to recover

The Equity set up by the Pit. in Order to have a Conveiance of the Land in Question is founded 1. Upon the Fathers declaring both before & after the Purchase that he designed the Land for the Pit. 2. Upon the Defts. Promise to his Father when sick to convey it I shall consider both these Points abstracted from the' Circumstances appearing in this Case And-see what Effect or Operation they have at Law Then I will enquire how far a Court of Equity will interpose in Cases of this Nature And afterwards consider this Case in all its Circumstances After which I hope it will be no difficult Matter to convince the Court that the Pit. ought not to be relieved

The Fathers Declaration if it can operate at all at Law so as to convey any Estate to the Son must be as a Covenant to stand seised And so it would had it been committed to Writing but being only by Parol it cannot operate as a Cov’t to stand seised which being a Conveiance to Use cannot be good unless put in Writing for no Use can be raised by Parol So is Callard & [B263]*B263Callard 2. Ro. A. 788. Mo. 687. “ The Father being upon the “ Land says to his Son I do here reserving an Estate for my “ own & my Wife’s Life give unto thee & thy Heirs forever “ these my Lands &c.” In this Case it was adjudged that no Use could arise to the Son being by Parol And the like Point is adjudged in 1. Sid. 26. Hore & Dix & [245] 82. Foster & Foster — But this ex abwndanli The Laws of this Country are express that no Estate in Land pass but by Deed So that this Decl. can avail nothing at Law.

Then as to the Defts. Promise to his Father there being no Cons, to induce that Promise it is void in Law. There is no Rule of Law more universally known than Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio I need say no more since the very bringing of this Suit is a Confession that the Pit. is without Remedy at Law

I shall proceed then to consider how far a Court of Equity will relieve in Cases of this Nature And 1. As to the Fathers Decl. This it is sayed sufficiently shews his Intention that the Pit. should have the Land which to be sure cannot be denied But then that Intention I humbly conceive is not suffic’t alone for a Court of Equity to make a Decree upon A Mans Intention to do an Act without the Concurrence of those Forms &c. Circumstances which the Law requires is of no Signification at all As may be illustrated by various Instances If a Man makes a Will & declares an Intention to revoke it but does not actually revoke it This Intention will not amount to a Revocation So if a Man devises his Land by a Nuncupative Will or in England makes a Will in Writing And there is but one Circumstance or Formality required by the Statute of Frauds wanting Or if a Deed be signed & sealed but not delivered In all these Cases the Intention is apparent but yet a Court of Equity will not relieve From these Instances & many others that might be named it is evident that a Mans Intention alone is not a suffic’t Ground or Foundation for a Court of Equity to make a Decree In the Case of Callará & Callará cited supra the Fathers Intention was plain to give the Land to his Son Yet that Intention not being manifested according to the Forms of Law nothing passed Nor do we read that the Son attempted to support this Gift in a Court of Equity Indeed I am yet to learn if there be any Case where a Court of Equity has decreed an Heir to convey meerly upon the Intention of his Ancestor to give the Land to another The Argument is as strong & the Case equally equitable- where the [B264]*B264Ancestor devises Land by Will without Writing that the Heir should be compelled to convey to the Devisee The Intention is sufficiently evident but there never was an Instance of that kind I can venture to affirm

The Case of Clavering a Clavering 2 Vern. 473. is a very strong one to prove that a Mans Intention alone without the Concurrence of those Forms & Ceremonies which the Law for very wise Ends has appointed to the Consummation of every [246] Act is not a suffic’t Reason for a Court of Equity to interpose & interrupt the Course of the Law. The Case was thus “ Sir Ja’s “ Clavering made a Settlem’t in 1684. under which the Deft. “ claimed In 1690. he made another Settlement without any “ Regard to that of 1684. under which the Pit. claimed There “ was no Power of Revocation in the Deed of 1684. but it was “ in Proof that the Deed was not published or delivered out by “ Sir James & was found among his wast Papers at his Death “ That the Deed of 1690. was often mentioned by him as the “ Settlement of that Estate & so indorsed with his own Hands & “ he told the Ten’ts the Pit. was to be their Landlord.” But notwithstanding all these Circumstances to favour the Settlem’t of 1690. & tho’ Sir James’s Intention was very plain & evident Yet no Relief could be had ag’t the Settlement of 1684. In which there being no Power of Sir Ja’s could not resume the Estate whatever his Intention or Inclination might be

There is indeed a very great Difference between Conveiances made to a Purchasor for a valuable Cons. & voluntary Conveiances without any Cons, at all In the first if there be any Defect in Point of Form or Ceremony a Court of Equity will always interpose & compel a perfect Conveiance according to the Agreem’t of the Parties but in the latter Equity scarce ever intermeddles [Except in some special Instances where Cred’rs or younger Children are concerned 2 Vent. 365. Vern. 37, 38. 40.]

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Bluebook (online)
2 Va. Col. Dec. 243, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/farrow-v-farrow-vagensess-1737.