Farrington v. Go On Time Car Service

76 A.D.2d 818, 907 N.Y.S.2d 479

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Geoffrey D. Wright, J.), entered on or about September 16, 2009, which denied defendant Chavez’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the complaint as against that defendant.

The court properly concluded that defendant, through his medical experts, made a prima facie showing that plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) in her accident on January 13, 2008. Indeed, even where there is objective medical proof of an injury, summary dismissal of a serious injury claim may be appropriate when additional contributory factors, such as preexisting conditions, interrupt the chain of causation between the accident and the claimed injuiy (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 572 [2005]). Here, plaintiff claims she suffered degenerative disc herniations and disc bulges in her lower back as a result of the accident, as well as injuries to her head, neck, shoulder and left knee. Chavez supported his motion with the reports of three physicians. Neurologist Michael J. Cárdente, who examined plaintiff on March 18, 2009, opined that there were no objective findings such as myotomal weakness, dermatomal sensory deficits, asymmetric reflexes or atrophy supporting the presence of a cervical or lumbosacral radiculopathy. Dr. Cárdente concluded that there was no evidence of a causally related neurological injury or disability, or the need for any specific neurological treatment in reference to the accident. Orthopedic surgeon John H. Buckner, who also examined plaintiff 14 months after the accident, concluded that her spinal examination was normal except for degenerative changes common for a person of her age, physique and preexisting scoliosis. In particular, Dr. Buckner noted that the ranges of motion of plaintiffs cervical spine were greater than most standard tables, while those of her thoracic and lumbar spine were lower. He attributed the difference to preexisting idiopathic scoliosis unrelated to any injury. Dr. [819]*819Buckner also opined that MRI findings with respect to plaintiffs left knee were indicative of a preexisting condition. In this respect, he also noted that the first medical report submitted for his review, which is dated a month after the accident, does not mention complaints of left knee pain or injury. David A. Fisher, a radiologist, reviewed MRIs of plaintiffs cervical and lumbar spine and left knee which were taken two months after the accident. As to the spinal MRIs, Dr. Fisher found degenerative changes consistent with a preexisting condition. He further opined that there was no radiographic evidence of recent traumatic or causally related injury to plaintiffs cervical or lumbar spine, or to the left knee. Hardly conclusory, the reports of all of defendants’ examining physicians cite cervical, lumbar and left knee MRIs taken two months after the accident. In addition, the reports of Drs. Cárdente and Buckner recite a review of reports prepared by plaintiffs treating physicians.

Notwithstanding Chavez’s prima facie showing that plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury, the court denied his motion, finding the reports of plaintiffs physicians sufficient to enable her to survive the motion for summary judgment. This was error because plaintiffs physicians did not address the medical findings of preexisting degenerative conditions (see e.g. Depena v Sylla, 63 AD3d 504, 505 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 706 [2009]; Valentin v Pomilla, 59 AD3d 184 [2009]; cf. Linton v Nawaz, 62 AD3d 434 [2009], affd 14 NY3d 821 [2010]). In addition, plaintiffs deposition testimony that she stayed home for a few days after the accident and lost no time from work demonstrates prima facie that she did not sustain a 90/180-day injury (see Cruz v Aponte, 60 AD3d 431, 432 [2009]), and the medical evidence she submitted in opposition to defendant’s motion fails to substantiate any qualifying injury or impairment (Nelson v Distant, 308 AD2d 338, 339-340 [2003]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Renwick and DeGrasse, JJ.

Moskowitz and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ., dissent in part in a memorandum by Manzanet-Daniels, J., as follows: I take issue with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiffs medical evidence failed to address defendant’s alleged expert opinions that her claimed limitations are the result of preexisting conditions and not attributable to the January 13, 2008 accident.

Defendant’s experts merely alleged, in entirely conclusory terms, that plaintiffs injuries were attributable to a “preexisting condition.” In this case there is no “persuasive” evidence of a preexisting injury of the type described in Pommells v Perez (4 NY3d 566 [2005]). Because I believe these conclusory assertions do not satisfy defendant Chavez’s burden on a mo[820]*820tion to dismiss for lack of serious physical injury, the burden never shifted to plaintiff. Even assuming the burden had shifted to plaintiff, the affirmations of plaintiffs treating physicians and experts more than sufficed to raise a triable issue of fact. Plaintiffs treating physicians and experts, upon examination and after considering all of the medical records, unequivocally opined that her injuries were caused by the January 13, 2008 accident. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

The record evidence herein shows that plaintiff, 49 years old, had never suffered prior injuries to her neck, back or left knee. Prior to the accident, she was asymptomatic. Only after the accident did she complain of neck, back and knee pain. She was found, upon examination, to have range-of-motion limitations in the left knee and in the cervical and lumbar spine. A cervical EMG showed the existence of left-sided C-7 radiculopathy and bilateral median sensory entrapment neuropathies at the wrists. MRI studies on March 29, 2008 showed bulging and herniated discs at multiple levels in the cervical (C2-3, C3-4, C4-5, C5-6, C6-7, C-7-T1) and lumbar (L2-3, L3-4, L4-5, L5-S1) spine, with thecal sac and nerve root impingement. The reports noted disc dessication and degenerative endplate changes at L5-S1, but did not describe the numerous other positive findings as degenerative' in nature. The radiological reports noted, in passing, that axial images demonstrated counterclockwise rotary scoliosis. An MRI study of the left knee revealed a lateral shift of the patella, with mild arthrosis, a tear of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus, degenerative thinning of the anterior cruciate ligament, and scarring of the medial collateral ligament.

Plaintiff commenced physical therapy immediately after the accident, which she continued until it was determined, in December 2008, that she had reached the maximum medical improvement from conservative management. Approximately six months after the accident, she underwent arthroscopic knee surgery for chondral erosion of the patella femoral joint and a partial thickness tearing of the posterior horn of the lateral meniscus.

Chavez moved for summary judgment, relying, inter alia, on the affirmed medical reports of Dr. Cárdente, a neurologist, Dr. Buckner, an orthopedist, and Dr. Fisher, a radiologist. Both Dr. Cárdente and Dr. Buckner, in rendering their opinions, reviewed plaintiffs medical records, including the MRI reports, but did not review the MRI films. Dr. Cárdente found “no correlation between the findings allegedly found in the spine MRI reports” and plaintiff’s examination, which he described as normal, observing that as “is well known, bulges and herniations may [821]

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Farrington v. Go On Time Car Service, 76 A.D.2d 818, 907 N.Y.S.2d 479 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

76 A.D.2d 818 (Farrington v. Go On Time Car Service) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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