Farrell v. American Flyers Airline Corp.
This text of 42 F.R.D. 341 (Farrell v. American Flyers Airline Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The defendant moved under Fed.R. Civ.P. 42(a) to consolidate all of the above actions, and further moved, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer them to the Eastern District of Oklahoma where they might have been brought since the defendant is doing business there.1
All of the actions arise out of a crash of one of the defendant’s airplanes on April 22, 1966, near Ardmore, Oklahoma. The plane, under military charter, was carrying ninety-two soldiers and six employees of defendant. Only fifteen soldiers survived the crash. The plaintiffs are either survivors, guardians of survivors or administrators of the estates of deceased soldier-passengers.
In urging consolidation the defendant alleges, in the language of the Rule, that there are common questions of law or fact on the issue of liability. This can hardly be denied. Defendant’s answers in all of the actions contain only a general denial and an “Act of God” defense. There is no claim that any plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
Two arguments are urged in opposition to the motion. It is asserted that while most plaintiffs allege negligence in the operation, maintenance and/or ownership of the airplane, some have alleged only operational negligence. Plaintiffs urge denial of the motion because of this difference in legal theories. Any problems occasioned by this difference, however, could be obviated easily by recourse to the procedures available under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49 2 Plaintiffs next, contend that the motion for consolidation is an attempt to contravene an order-denying the requested assignment of a Rule 2 Judge in the Farrell, Schmidt and Kennedy actions. Rule 2 of the General Rules of the Southern District of New York provides, in part:
“(b) The * * * chief judge * * upon his own motion or the motion of any party, may assign a long and com[343]*343•plicated case to a judge for all purposes including the ■ following: (1) to hear all motions and preliminary applications; (2) to conduct the pre-trial conference; and (3) to preside at the trial of the action.”
The grant of a motion to consolidate ■would clearly not contravene that order. The motion for a consolidated trial, limited to the issue of liability, is granted.3
The next motion, to transfer these actions to the Eastern District of Oklahoma, is not the first such motion made by the defendant in an action arising out ■of this crash.4 Two of the prior motions were denied- by judges in this circuit: .'Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline 'Corp.,5 and Searamuzzo v. American Fly■ers Airline Corp.,6 on facts not substantially different from those presented here.7 Defendant urges, however, that two significant facts serve to distinguish the instant- motion from the prior motions. The first is the increased number of cases now pending in the proposed transferee district. At the time of the prior motions only one action was pending there. To date, in addition to the fifteen actions pending in the Southern District of New York, there are nine actions pending in the proposed transferee district; one action pending in the Eastern District of New York; one in the Eastern District of Arkansas; two in the Northern District of California; and one in the Central District of California.8
The courts in Schmidt and Searamuzzo rejected arguments predicated on this, .then hypothetical, situation. Those courts-.noted that even if all actions were transferred, the Oklahoma court would still have to research and decide questions of New York law, and that the prospects. [344]*344of having a single consolidated trial in Oklahoma were, and are, highly speculative.9 This reasoning applies equally to the present motion. It should be noted further that the defendant has not demonstrated why the increased number of eases in the proposed transferee district compels a transfer “for the convenience of parties and witnesses” or “in the interest of justice.” In fact, it appears that a transfer would do nothing more than shift the inconvenience from defendant to plaintiffs.10
The second factual distinction between the present motion and the prior motions to which defendant draws attention is that in both Schmidt and Scaramuzzo the plaintiffs were citizens of New York, whereas in the actions sought to be transferred by the instant motion some plaintiffs are not New York citizens. In light of the determination of the motion to consolidate, this argument carries little weight. Again, the reasons for denying the motions in Schmidt and Scaramuzzo apply equally here and are, accordingly, adopted.11
The motion to transfer is denied.
Settle one order for both motions.
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42 F.R.D. 341, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1092, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/farrell-v-american-flyers-airline-corp-nysd-1967.