[Cite as Farrar v. Univ. Hosp. Health Sys., Inc., 2024-Ohio-5374.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY
ERIN FARRAR, CASE NO. 2024-L-028
Appellant, Administrative Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas
UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., et al., Trial Court No. 2023 CV 000788
Appellees.
OPINION
Decided: November 12, 2024 Judgment: Affirmed
Lester S. Potash, 25700 Science Park Drive, Suite 160, Beachwood, OH 44122 (For Appellant).
David A. Campbell and Donald G. Slezak, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, 600 Superior Avenue, E., Fifth Third Building, Suite 1300, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Appellee, University Hospitals Health System, Inc.).
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, State Office Tower, 30 East Broad Street, 16th Floor, Columbus, OH 43215, and Patrick MacQueeney, Assistant Attorney General, 615 West Superior Avenue, 11th Floor, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Appellee, Matt Damschroder, Director, Department of Job and Family Services).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Erin Farrar, appeals the judgment affirming the decision of the
Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission disallowing Farrar’s claim for
unemployment compensation benefits. We affirm. {¶2} In 2014, Lake Health Hospital hired Farrar as a coding specialist. In 2021,
appellee University Hospitals Health Systems, Inc. (“University Hospitals”) acquired Lake
Health Hospital. On January 1, 2022, University Hospitals notified its coding specialists
that, as a condition of employment, they were required to acquire a medical coding
certification within six months. Farrar did not possess a medical coding certification, nor
did she obtain a certification after extensions of the six-month deadline.
{¶3} On December 1, 2022, University Hospitals terminated Farrar’s
employment. Farrar then filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits, which
appellee Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”) disallowed, finding that
Farrar was discharged from employment with just cause pursuant to R.C.
4141.29(D)(2)(a). Following Farrar’s request for redetermination, ODJFS affirmed its
determination disallowing benefits. Farrar appealed the redetermination, and the case
was then transferred to the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission (the
“review commission”) pursuant to R.C. 4141.281.
{¶4} On April 11, 2023, a telephonic hearing took place before a review
commission hearing officer, who heard testimony from Farrar and Curtis Lane, a human
resources business partner employed by University Hospitals. Lane testified that Farrar
began employment as a coding specialist on June 15, 2014, and University Hospitals
discharged her on December 1, 2022. Lane maintained that, effective December 31,
2021, University Hospitals “changed” the job description for coding specialists to require
a coding certificate be obtained prior to June 30, 2022. University Hospitals informed the
employees of this requirement on January 1, 2022, and explained that if the employees
failed to obtain the certification prior to the deadline, they could be terminated. Lane
Case No. 2024-L-028 explained that the certification for medical coding involved a test that could be taken and
retaken, and believed a test was offered at least every two weeks. He further indicated
that University Hospitals reimbursed employees for classes, textbooks, and the exam if it
was passed, and it offered study materials at cost. However, Farrar failed to obtain the
certification by the June deadline. After extensions of the deadline, Farrar still had not
obtained the certification, and University Hospitals then discharged her for that reason.
{¶5} Farrar did not dispute Lane’s testimony, but she maintained that she was
not aware that University Hospitals would reimburse her for the test and associated
materials. Farrar indicated that, although she was aware that she was required to take
and pass a certification test prior to the June deadline, she did not first attempt to take a
test until June, which she did not pass. She indicated that she had waited to take the test
due to financial constraints and personal time commitments. In addition, Farrar indicated
that she was not aware of the different test options. After receiving the last extension of
the deadline, in November, Farrar retook the test she had originally failed, and then she
took a different coding test a few days thereafter. However, she did not pass either test
taken in November. Farrar acknowledged that she was aware that she could be
discharged for failing to obtain a coding certification, but she believed that termination
was improper because she was close to passing the tests, and she was actively
attempting to pass a certification test at the time of discharge.
{¶6} Following consideration of the testimony, the hearing officer issued a
decision affirming the ODJFS’ determination, finding that Farrar was discharged with just
cause for failing to meet a condition of continuing employment. In the findings of fact, the
hearing officer determined:
Case No. 2024-L-028 Claimant, Erin Farrar, worked as HIS Coding Specialist for University Hospitals Health System, Inc. from June 15, 2014 until December 1, 2022. Claimant was discharged for allegedly failing to secure her coding certification as required.
On January 1, 2022, University Hospitals Health System, Inc. notified coding specialists that, by June 30, 2022, they were being required to take and pass a coding specialist exam, in order to meet new certification requirements. They were notified that this was a new condition of continuing employment.
Claimant did not meet the June 30, 2022 deadline due to personal and financial reasons. The deadline was extended through November 30, 2022. Although claimant took the exam numerous times, she was unable to pass the exam by November 30, 2022. On December 1, 2022, claimant was discharged.
{¶7} The hearing officer then reasoned that Farrar’s failure to obtain the coding
certification requirement was sufficient fault on her behalf to establish just cause for her
discharge from employment. Accordingly, the hearing officer affirmed the ODJFS’
redetermination disallowing Farrar unemployment compensation benefits.
{¶8} Farrar requested review of the hearing officer’s determination, which the
review commission allowed. Thereafter, the review commission affirmed the hearing
officer’s decision.
{¶9} On June 22, 2023, Farrar appealed the review commission’s decision to the
Lake County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 4141.282. Farrar argued that she
satisfied the expectations of employment communicated to her when she was hired in
2014. She maintained that University Hospitals lacked just cause to discharge her based
on a subsequent alteration of the requirements of her job, which she did not satisfy.
Case No. 2024-L-028 {¶10} Following briefing, the common pleas court affirmed the decision of the
review commission. Farrar now appeals the decision of the common pleas court, arguing,
in her sole assigned error:
{¶11} “The trial court committed prejudicial error in affirming the final decision
denying Erin Farrar’s unemployment compensation claim.”
{¶12} The review commission’s determination of whether a claimant was
discharged with just cause is appealable to the court of common pleas, which may review
the determination under the following standard: “If the court finds that the decision of the
commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence,
it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to the commission.
Otherwise, the court shall affirm the decision of the commission.” R.C. 4141.282(H). The
same “limited standard of review applies to all appellate courts.” Williams v. Ohio Dept.
of Job & Family Servs., 2011-Ohio-2897, ¶ 20, citing Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of
Review, 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18 (1985). “Thus, a reviewing court may not make factual
findings or determine a witness’s credibility” and must affirm the commission’s findings
when supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. Williams at ¶ 20, citing Irvine at
18. “In other words, a reviewing court may not reverse the commission’s decision simply
because ‘reasonable minds might reach different conclusions.’” Williams at ¶ 20, quoting
Irvine at 18.
{¶13} To receive unemployment compensation benefits, a claimant must satisfy
the requirements of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), which provides that “no individual may . . . be
paid benefits . . . [f]or the duration of the individual’s unemployment if the director [of
OJDFS] finds that . . . [t]he individual quit work without just cause or has been discharged
Case No. 2024-L-028 for just cause in connection with the individual’s work, . . . .” See also Williams at ¶ 14-18.
“R.C. 4141.46 provides that R.C. 4141.01 through 4141.46 is to be liberally construed.”
Williams at ¶ 19.
{¶14} “Just cause” within the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) “‘“is that which, to
an ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular
act.”’” Williams at ¶ 22, quoting Irvine at 17, quoting Peyton v. Sun T.V. & Appliances, 44
Ohio App.2d 10, 12 (10th Dist. 1975). “The determination whether there is just cause for
discharge depends upon the factual circumstances of each case.” Williams at ¶ 22, citing
Warrensville Hts. v. Jennings, 58 Ohio St.3d 206, 207 (1991). “‘[W]hat constitutes just
cause must be analyzed in conjunction with the legislative purpose underlying the
Unemployment Compensation Act. Essentially, the Act’s purpose is “to enable
unfortunate employees, who become and remain involuntarily unemployed by adverse
business and industrial conditions, to subsist on a reasonably decent level and is in
keeping with the humanitarian and enlightened concepts of this modern day.”’” (Emphasis
in original.) Williams at ¶ 22, quoting Irvine at 17, quoting Leach v. Republic Steel Corp.,
176 Ohio St. 221, 223 (1964).
{¶15} Accordingly, although an employee’s behavior need not amount to
misconduct, the employee must have borne some fault to establish “just cause” for a
discharge for purposes of unemployment compensation. Quartz Sci., Inc. v. Ohio Bur. of
Unemp. Comp., 2013-Ohio-1100, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.); Sellers v. Bd. of Rev., 1 Ohio App.3d
161, 164 (10th Dist. 1981). Fault has been recognized in a variety of situations, including
“willful or heedless disregard of a duty, a violation of an employer’s instructions, or
Case No. 2024-L-028 unsuitability for a position.” Moore v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 2012-Ohio-1424,
¶ 21 (10th Dist.), citing Williams, 2011-Ohio-2897, at ¶ 24.
{¶16} Here, in their briefs, the parties focus extensively on the test for unsuitability
stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp.
Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d 694 (1995), paragraph four of the syllabus. In Tzangas, the claimant
was employed as a word processor. Id. at 694. However, the claimant’s work failed to
meet the employer’s expectations, resulting in the claimant’s discharge. Id. at 694-695.
The claimant applied for unemployment compensation, and her claim was allowed and
affirmed on appeal to the common pleas court. Id. at 695. On appeal to the Sixth District,
the court reversed the decision of the lower court. Id. On certification of a conflict to the
Ohio Supreme Court, the Court held:
An employer may properly find an employee unsuitable for the required work, and thus to be at fault, when: (1) the employee does not perform the required work, (2) the employer made known its expectations of the employee at the time of hiring, (3) the expectations were reasonable, and (4) the requirements of the job did not change substantially since the date of the original hiring for that particular position.
Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus. Applying this test to the facts at issue in that case,
the Supreme Court determined that the claimant was “at fault” for her discharge for
purposes of unemployment compensation, stating that, while her inability to meet her job
expectations, “may not be her fault in a moral sense, it does constitute fault in a legal
sense sufficient for her termination to have been made with just cause.”
{¶17} Thereafter, in Williams, the Supreme Court cited the four-prong Tzangas
test when addressing whether a claimant was at fault for her discharge when she failed
to obtain a license as an independent social worker within fifteen months, which was an
Case No. 2024-L-028 express condition of a promotion that she had accepted. Williams at ¶ 3-5. The Court
concluded that unemployment compensation was properly disallowed to the employee,
holding:
When employment is expressly conditioned upon obtaining or maintaining a license or certification and an employee agrees to the condition and is afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain or maintain the license or certification, an employee's failure to comply with that condition is just cause for termination for unemployment compensation purposes.
Id. at syllabus.
{¶18} Here, Farrar maintains that the certification requirement was not a condition
of employment when originally hired in 2014, and thus her termination was not for just
cause under the standard for unsuitability announced in Tzangas. Appellees respond that
when University Hospitals acquired Lake Health Hospital in 2021, Farrar was a new
employee for purposes of the unsuitability test, and she acknowledged that University
Hospitals required certification when it acquired Lake Health Hospital.
{¶19} These arguments pertain to just cause for discharge solely on the basis of
unsuitability. For the reasons that follow, although we agree that the record does not
support a finding of unsuitability under Tzangas, this is not dispositive of this appeal. As
previously set forth, unsuitability under Tzangas is not the only basis for a finding that an
employee is at fault, i.e., that there existed just cause, for discharge. The Supreme Court
did not hold differently in Williams, when it applied the Tzangas unsuitability test. Instead,
because the Williams claimant “accepted the promotion to program manager knowing
that she was required to obtain the LISW certification within 15 months,” the facts
supported a finding of unsuitability, and it was unnecessary for the Court to determine if
Case No. 2024-L-028 just cause existed independent of the unsuitability test. Williams, 2011-Ohio-2897, at ¶
24, 29.
{¶20} Here, in applying Tzangas, the parties dispute whether Farrar was notified
of the coding certification as a condition of employment at the time of hiring. See id., 73
Ohio St.3d 694, at paragraph four of the syllabus. The parties first disagree as to the date
of hire for purposes of applying Tzangas. Farrar maintains that she was “hired” in 2014
by Lake Health Hospital. Appellees argue that Farrar was “hired” in 2021 when University
Hospitals acquired Lake Health Hospital in May 2021.
{¶21} However, appellees have provided no authority standing for the proposition
that a change in ownership of an employer necessarily results in a new “hire” of a retained
employee for purposes of applying the Tzangas unsuitability test. Further, although
appellees maintained at oral argument that the acquisition occurred in May 2021, the
record does not appear to contain the date in 2021 that University Hospitals acquired
Lake Health Hospital.
{¶22} Moreover, even if we were able to discern that University Hospitals acquired
Lake Health Hospital in May 2021, and if we were to assume such an acquisition resulted
in a new “hire” status for purposes of the unsuitability test, the record does not support
that the coding position required a certification, much less that such a requirement was
communicated to Farrar, at the time of acquisition. In ODJFS’ answer brief, in support of
its position that the coding certification requirement was communicated to Farrar at the
time of acquisition, it cites to a “job description” that was included in the director’s file.
ODJFS maintains that this job description was provided to Farrar on May 17, 2021.
Case No. 2024-L-028 {¶23} However, the job description does not on its face reflect that it was provided
to the employees or Farrar on May 17, 2021. Instead, the job description for the coding
specialists is dated as “submitted” on “5.17.2021 rev. 12.10.2021.” The description
contains a section for “Required Credentials, Licenses, and / or Certifications,” and states,
“You may choose from a list of certifications currently used in Oracle here. Be sure to also
add credentials and licensure if applicable.” On the form, the word “here” is underlined
and the font is lightened, apparently indicating a hyperlink. Thereafter, this section
provides, “One of the following coding certifications required or must be obtained within
6 months of hire: CCA, CPC, CPC-A, COC, CPC-P, RCC. ROCC, RHIT, or RHIA.”
{¶24} There is no dispute that the coding specialists, including Farrar, were
originally provided until June 30, 2022, to obtain a coding certificate. Thus, it would follow
that the job description’s coding requirement was a revision to the job description six
months prior, in December 2021.
{¶25} Moreover, the testimony provided by University Hospitals at the hearing
before the review commission makes no indication that any coding certification
requirement existed prior to December 2021. To the contrary, as summarized above,
Lane testified for University Hospitals as follows:
[HEARING OFFICER:] Was she discharged?
[LANE:] Yes.
[HEARING OFFICER:] What was she discharged for?
[LANE:] The situation was the job description changed and required a coding certificate and there was a time frame provided and after two extensions of the, the deadline it was not, uh, collected or received by Erin. So we discharged on that.
Case No. 2024-L-028 [HEARING OFFICER:] Right. So, when did this requirement change?
[LANE:] The requirement changed effective December 31st, 2021, and was communicated to employees on January 1st of 2022 with a six-month deadline for June 30th, 2022, to earn the credential.
{¶26} Lane went on to reiterate that the communication of the certification
requirement was made to the employees on January 1, 2022, and he confirmed that “this
communication on January 1, 2022 is telling individuals in Ms. Farrar’s position that
there’s this change in the description and you’re going to need a coding certification[.]”
{¶27} Based on the testimony adduced at the hearing, the review commission
determined that the certification requirement was communicated to Farrar on January 1,
2022.
{¶28} We recognize that on a questionnaire included in the record, Farrar
indicated that “when” or “once” University Hospitals acquired Lake Health Hospital,
University Hospitals required a coding certification. However, we do not read these
responses as Farrar indicating that the coding certification requirement existed, and was
communicated to employees, contemporaneously with the acquisition. Instead, Farrar
indicated on the questionnaire that “we didn’t know right away that we had to be certified
with the transition of UH.”
{¶29} Accordingly, we conclude appellees’ argument that Farrar was notified upon
“hiring” that her employment was conditioned on successfully obtaining a coding
certification is unavailing. Whether we consider Farrar to have been hired in 2014, when
she began her position with Lake Health Hospital, or in 2021, when University Hospitals
acquired Lake Health Hospital, pursuant to the review commission’s supported findings,
Case No. 2024-L-028 she was not informed of the certification requirement until January 1, 2022. Because she
was not informed of the certification requirement at the time of hire, unsuitability would
not serve as a basis for establishing just cause for discharge for failing to acquire the
certification. See Tzangas, 73 Ohio St.3d 694, at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶30} However, again, unsuitability is only one of several bases of a finding of just
cause for a discharge. See Moore, 2012-Ohio-1424, at ¶ 21 (10th Dist.), citing Williams,
2011-Ohio-2897, at ¶ 24; see also McCarthy v. Connectronics Corp., 2009-Ohio-3392, ¶
15 (6th Dist.) (“Unsuitability for a position constitutes fault by the employee, as Tzangas
made clear, but unsuitability is not the only way of proving fault.”). Thus, contrary to
Farrar’s position in her brief, it does not follow that, where the Tzangas test is unsatisfied,
an employee is not at fault for the discharge for purposes of just cause. Instead, as
previously addressed, whether just cause exists is dependent on the factual
circumstances of the case, viewed in light of the purposes of the Unemployment
Compensation Act. Williams at ¶ 22.
{¶31} Here, the review commission considered the particular facts of this case: on
January 1, 2022, University Hospitals notified the coding specialists, including Farrar, of
the requirement that they obtain coding certification within six months; Farrar failed to
meet the deadline due to personal and financial reasons; University Hospitals provided
extensions of the deadline, allowing her until November 30, 2022 to pass a certification
examination; and Farrar failed to pass a certification examination prior to November 30,
2022. The review commission concluded that these facts demonstrated sufficient fault on
behalf of Farrar to deem her discharged for just cause. Such a conclusion is consistent
Case No. 2024-L-028 with the underlying purposes of the Unemployment Act. As the Ohio Supreme Court has
cautioned:
The Act does not exist to protect employees from themselves, but to protect them from economic forces over which they have no control. When an employee is at fault, [s]he is no longer the victim of fortune’s whims, but is instead directly responsible for h[er] own predicament. Fault on the employee’s part separates h[er] from the Act's intent and the Act’s protection. Thus, fault is essential to the unique chemistry of a just cause termination.
Williams at ¶ 22, quoting Tzangas at 697-698.
{¶32} Accordingly, we cannot say the review commission’s determination is
unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore,
Farrar’s sole assigned error lacks merit.
{¶33} The judgment is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
Case No. 2024-L-028