Farrar v. Stackpole

6 Me. 154
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine·Decided June 15, 1829·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

Weston J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

If the chain in question passed as a constituent part of the mill, the plaintiffs have made out their title, and have a right to judgment on the verdict. A considerable portion of the machinery and power of a mill, like that conveyed by the defendant, is designed to be applied to draw up logs into the mill; which is essential to'the operation of one of this construction. It is not denied that other parts of the machinery, intended for this purpose, go with the mill; but it is insisted that the chain is of the nature of personal property, and therefore passes not by a deed of the realty, unless specially named. To this it may be answered, first, that if it be an essential part of the mill, it is included in that term, whether real or personal; secondly, that that which is in its nature persona], may change its character, if fixed, used, and appropriated to that which is real. Is it, too much to say that the mill is incomplete, without a chain, a cable, or other substitute ? It may be that a mill-wright, who contracts to erect a mill, and to furnish materials, may be deemed to have completed his engagement, without supplying a chain. One mill-wright, a witness in this case, has testified that such is his impression. And if this is understood generally, his contract might not extend further. But the owner would find that he had yet something more to procure, before the mill could be in a condition to operate. The chain is the last of the parts in the machinery, to which the impelling power is communicated, to effect the object in view. Its actual location in the succession of parts can make no difference. If it is in its nature essential to the mill, it is included in that term ; and' that, as has been before remarked, whether it be personal or real property. But upon consideration, we are of opinion that it ought to be regarded as appertaining to, and constituting a part of the realty.

It is an ancient principle of law, that certain things which in their nature are personal property, when attached to the realty bécome part of it, as fixtures. One criterion is, that if that, which is ordinarily personal, be so fixed to the realty that it cannot be severed therefrom without damage, it becomes part of the realty ; as wain[157] scot work, and old fixed and dormant tables and benches. Other things pass as incident to the realty : as doves in a dove house, fish in a pond, or deer in a park. 2 Com. Dig. Biens B. On the other baud, as between landlord and tenant, for the benefit of trade, iu modern times many things are regarded as personal, which, as between the heir and executor, would descend to the heir as part of the inheritance.

Although the being fastened or fixed to the freehold, is the leading principle in many of the cases in regard to fixtures, it has not been the only one. Windows, doors, and window shutters are often hung but not fastened to a building; yet they are properly part of the real estate and pass with it; because it is not the mere fixing or fastening, which is regarded, but the use, nature and intention. Dane’s Abr. ch. 76, art. 8, sec. 39. Modern times havo been fruitful in inventions and improvements for the more secure and comfortable use of buildings, as well as of many other things, which administer to the enjoyment of life. Venetian blinds, which admit the air and exclude the sun, whenever it is desirable so to do, are of modern use ; so are lightening rods, which have now become common in this country and in Europe. These might be removed from buildings without damage; yet as suited and adapted to the buildings, upon which they are placed, and as incident thereto, they are doubtless part of the inheritance, and would pass by deed as appertaining to the realty. But the genius and enterprise of the last half century has been in nothing moro remarkable than in the employment of some of the great agents of nature, by means of machinery, to an infinite variety of purposes, for the saving of human labor. Hence there has arisen in our country a multitude of establishments for working in cotton, wool, wood, iron and marble, some under the denomination of mills, and others of factories, propelled generally by water power, but sometimes by steam. These establishments have in many instances, perhaps in most, acquired a general name, which is understood to embrace all their essential parts ; not only the building, which shelters, encloses, and secures the machinery, but the machinery itself. Much of it might be easily detached, without injury to the remaining partí- or to the building ; hut it would be a. [158] very narrow construction, which should exclude it from passing by the general name by which the establishment is known, whether oí mill or factory. The general principles of law must be applied to new kinds of property, as they spring into existence, in the progress of society, according to their nature and incidents, and the common sense of the community. The law will take notice of the mutations of language, and of the meaning of new terms, applied to new subjects, as they arise. In other words it will understand terms used by parties in their contracts, whether executed or executory, whether in relation to real or personal estate, according to their ordinary meaning and acceptation.

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