Farr & Bailey Mfg. Co. v. International Nav. Co.

98 F. 636, 39 C.C.A. 197, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2767
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedNovember 28, 1899
DocketNo. 13
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 98 F. 636 (Farr & Bailey Mfg. Co. v. International Nav. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Farr & Bailey Mfg. Co. v. International Nav. Co., 98 F. 636, 39 C.C.A. 197, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2767 (3d Cir. 1899).

Opinion

DALLAS, Circuit Judge.

By the libel filed in the court below damages were claimed for injury done by sea water to several bales of burlap which, were received on board the steamship Indiana at the port of Liverpool, consigned to the libelant, in Philadelphia. These goods were stowed in a compartment on the lower steerage deck in such manner as to admit of free access being had to the port through which the water subsequently entered. This port, and others similarly situated, were inspected on the day before the vessel sailed, and they were believed to be closed and properly fastened; but, after the Indiana had proceeded for four or five days upon her voyage, water made its appearance in the compartment, and a day or two later investigation disclosed that both the glass cover and the iron dummy of the port in question were open, and that through this opening the water was admitted. There had been no severe weather, no accident was known to have happened, and the port, its covers, fastenings, and surroundings, did not appear to have been in any way broken or impaired.

The bearing upon the case thus presented of the act of congress of February 13,1893, known as the “Harter Act,” is now for consideration. The third section of that act provides that:

“If tlie owner of any vessel transporting merchandise to or from any port In the United States of America shall exercise due diligence to malte the said vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the vessel, her owners, agents or charterers shall become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in. navigation or in the management of said vessel.”

This act has not modified the obligation of owners to furnish a seaworthy ship. The Delaware, 161 U. S. 459, 16 Sup. Ct. 516, 40 L. Ed. 771; The Carib Prince, 170 U. S. 655, 18 Sup. Ct. 753, 42 L. Ed. 1181; The Silvia, 171 U. S. 462, 19 Sup. Ct. 7, 43 L. Ed. 241. Did the damage in question result from unseaworthiness? Respecting its immediate cause there can he no doubt. It was the condition of the port. Was this condition chargeable to unseaworthiness, or should it he ascribed to lack of due care, skill, or judgment on the part of those engaged in navigating and managing the vessel? The definition of “seaworthiness” which the learned counsel for the ap-pellee has supplied from Carver on Carriers by Sea (section 18, p. 20) is, so far as it is here material, that “the ship must be fit in design, structure, condition, and equipment”; and, although the Indiana seems to have been structurally fit, her “condition,” as respects the port in question, was, we think, palpably unfit. The learned judge of the court below found as a fact that it “was either not fastened at all, or was insecurely fastened,” and this finding is quite consistent with the contention of the appellee’s counsel that it was not open at the time of sailing. The impression made upon us by the evidence is that it was probably closed, but, be this as it may, certain it is that it was not securely fastened; and we are of opinion that by reason of this fact the vessel was unseaworthy, for the conclusion is inevitable that a ship with a hole in her side, which those in charge [638]*638of her navigation suppose, and have a right to assume, is tightly closed, hut which in fact had been so inadequately fastened as to admit of its being opened by ordinary pressure of the sea, and so permit the water to flow in upon the cargo, does not “have that degree of fitness which an ordinary careful and prudent owner will require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage, having regard to all the probable circumstances of it”; and “to that extent * ⅞ the shipowner undertakes absolutely that she is fit, and ignorance is no excus§.” Carv. Carr, by Sea, supra. It has, however, been contended that the master of the Indiana had no right to assume that the covers of this port had been properly secured, but should himself have made timely discovery that they had not been, and therefore that his omission to have them made fast during the voyage, and before the damage had been done, was a fault in navigation or in management, for which the vessel is not liable. We cannot sustain this contention. The record shows that the custom was to close and securely fasten all such ports before sailing, and that in this instance this practice, except as to this one port, was effectually pursued. The master was, of course, not responsible for the vessel’s general fitness of condition, and, this being so, we are at a loss to conceive upon what ground neglect could be imputed to him by reason of his not having seen to the condition of this particular part of the ship at a time when its unfit condition had not become known to him. This case was twice argued in the court below. Upon the first occasion the learned judge directed a decree to be entered for the libelant, but upon reargmnent he dismissed the libel. In all that he said in support of the conclusion which he first announced, we fully concur; but we are unable to acquiesce in the result which he finally reached, because we cannot agree that it was rendered necessary by the decision in the case of The Silvia, 171 U. S. 462, 19 Sup. Ct. 7, 43 L. Ed. 241. The facts of that case and of this one, though similar, are not precisely the same; and the differences between them, though seemingly slight, are, when considered with reference to the reasoning upon which the judgment in the Silvia Case was founded, of controlling importance. It was there said that “the test of seaworthiness is whether the vessel is reasonably fit to carry the cargo which she has undertaken to transport”; and, applying this test, it was held that the Silvia was not, under the circumstances there presented, to be regarded as being unseaworthy, merely because at the time of sailing, when the weather was fair, and with the glass covers tightly closed, the iron covers of some of her ports were left open to light the compartmefit. There was in that case, as in this one, no structural defect or omission of appliances, and the question there, as here, was only as to fitness of condition. The compartment involved contained no cargo, but only spare sails and ropes and a small quantity of stores. The ports were in a place where the iron shutters would usually be left open for the admission of light, and there was nothing to prevent or embarrass access to them in case a change of weather should make it necessary or proper to close them. In the afternoon of the day of sailing rough weather was encountered, the glass cover of one of the ports was broken, and [639]*639the water came in through the port and damaged the cargo; and this damage, it was held, was occasioned, not by unseaworthiness, but by fault or error in the navigation or in the management of the ship, because the control during the voyage of everything with which the vessel is equipped for the purpose of protecting her and her cargo against the inroad of the seas is included in navigation and management, and consequently the neglect to close the iron covers of the ports was in that case ascribed to those in charge of the navigation and management, and not to those responsible for seaworthiness. But in the present case the port in question was not designedly left open, and its shutters ought not to have been left unfastened. They would not “usually be left open for the admission of light,” or for any purpose.

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Bluebook (online)
98 F. 636, 39 C.C.A. 197, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2767, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/farr-bailey-mfg-co-v-international-nav-co-ca3-1899.