Farnham v. United States

49 Ct. Cl. 19, 1913 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 4, 1913 WL 1293
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 1, 1913
DocketNos. 28964; 30931
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 49 Ct. Cl. 19 (Farnham v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Farnham v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 19, 1913 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 4, 1913 WL 1293 (cc 1913).

Opinion

AtKinsoN, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case having been decided on February 12, 1912, is now before us^on plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, and for amendments of findings of fact by both plaintiff and defendants.

This suit was brought to recover from the United States under an implied contract the sum of $1,000,417.56, which is alleged to be the net profits accruing to them from the use of a patented device granted to plaintiff, covering a period of 10 years from April 16, 1900, to June 30, 1910. The defendants deny the validity of the patent, as well as the ex[37]*37istence of an implied contract in fact lor tbe use of tbe device by tbe Post Office Department.

Tbe most important question presented by tbe findings is tbat of jurisdiction. Tbe circumstances attending a transaction involving tbe manufacture and use of a patented device out of wbicb an implied contract to pay royalties tberefor arises, must indicate mucb more tban mere consent to its use upon tbe part of tbe patentee. Tbe convergence of other .important facts must obtain. It must clearly appear tbat tbe defendants not only used tbe patented device, but at tbe time of user did so witb knowledge of tbe patent and absolutely no claim of ownership or title upon their part in tbe thing used. In other words, tbe invitation to use tbe patented article must be accepted by a user of tbe same witb what amounts to a disclaimer upon tbe part of tbe defendants of title or ownership in tbe invention used, if as in this case tbe defendants positively disclaim having used tbe patented article, and follow this assertion witb a positive claim of invention upon their part, quite distinct from tbe letters-patent granted to tbe claimant, decbning to concede either use or ownership in tbe article used to tbe claimant, tbe elements of mutuality are lacking, and tbe transaction is one of infringement. This case is totally unlike United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S., 262, and United States v. Berdan Fire Arms Co., 156 U. S., 552. In these cases tbe patented article was exhibited to competent boards appointed by tbe proper departments to test as prehminary to user tbe proffered articles; tbe United States not only knew of tbe patented invention, but used tbe same without claim of ownership or title in itself to tbe article used. Kesponsi-bility attached as upon contractual relations, wholly upon tbe idea tbat tbe circumstances of user by tbe defendants disclosed a lack of any claim of ownership or title upon its part in the article used. As was said by tbe Supreme Court in Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S., 169, “The successive allegations place tbe parties in continued antagonism to each other, and there is no statement tending to show a coming together of minds in respect to anything.” Tbe findings in this case disclose tbat tbe Post Office Department [38]*38previous to the issuance of stamp books worked out the plans and specifications for the same without actual knowledge and certainly quite independently of the Farnham patent; that before issuing the same through its proper legal officer reviewed said letters-patent and then proceeded in strict disregard of the same to manufacture and sell the same as an invention wholly its own, expressly repudiating the Farnham patent as having any relation thereto.

The Supreme Court in deciding the Berdan case used this language: “While the findings are not so specific and emphatic as to the assent of the Government to the terms of any contract, yet we think they are sufficient. There was certainly no denial of the patentee’s rights to the invention; no assertion on the part of the Government that the patent was wrongfully issued; no claim of a right to use the invention regardless of the patent; no disregard of all claims of the pat-entee, and no use, in spite of protests or remonstrance. Negatively, at least the findings are clear. The Government used the invention with the consent and express permission of the owner, and it did not, while so using it, repudiate the title of such owner,” which clearly differentiates that case from this and at the same time states the rule upon which we predicate the decision of the court in this case. We think the language entirely apposite and that the transaction here involved was one of infringement.

Plaintiff vigorously opposes the findings of the court respecting the prior state of the art, and all other contentions challenging the validity of claimant’s patent, asserting a want of authority upon the part of the defendants to make such a defense. If the case involved an express contract between the parties, plaintiff’s objections would be sound: Harvey Steel Co. v. United States, 38 C. Cls., 662; 196 U. S., 310; United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S., 262. Where, however, the jurisdiction of the court as well as plaintiff’s right to recover depends upon a user of the alleged invention under such circumstances as to warrant an implication of a contract to pay therefor, the rule is quite the opposite, especially so where the defendants deny all the allegations of the petition. The existence of the essential elements out of which an implied contract arises, heretofore set forth, is a subject [39]*39of disputation, and tbe defendants can not be precluded, simply because the United States is involved, from showing by positive proof, a situation that in itself precludes the idea of mutuality or recognition of plaintiff’s patent on its part. The question raised is not new, it has heretofore been passed upon, and the court has uniformly held it to be without merit. Morse Arms Co. v. United States, 16 C. Cls., 296; Harvey Steel Co. v. United States, 38 C. Cls., 681; Societe Anon. v. United States, 224 U. S., 309; Knapp v. United States, 46 C. Cls., 601; Beach v. United States, 226 U. S., 243.

This court is, of course, without jurisdiction to invalidate a patent; its judgments do not assume to do so. The purpose of the findings objected to, as well as the defense interposed thereunder, is to ascertain just what the plaintiff’s invention really was, the full extent or limitations of his claims and their identity with reference to the article employed by the defendants in their manufacture and sale of stamp books and his property right therein. One of the principal defenses goes specifically to the question of identity. As was said by the court in Harvey Steel Go. v. United States, supra: “In all such cases all defenses were open to the defendants — the Government — -which are open to ordinary defendants in ordinary actions for infringement. They could set up another title, a license under another antecedent patent; they could attack the validity of a patent, and show that the invention which they appropriated was not property; they could maintain that the device which they manufactured differed in essential particulars from the device which the inventor had protected by letters patent: * * * In a word, they could always treat such suits * * * as if they were actions for infringement.”

Bookmaking and bookbinding are very old; no claim of novelty is made by the plaintiff as to any of the elements entering into the stamp book produced by his alleged invention. They are admittedly old. The invention claimed related specifically to a method, a process by which certain specially designed elements combined in a certain way produced a certain result not heretofore produced in that way.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
49 Ct. Cl. 19, 1913 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 4, 1913 WL 1293, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/farnham-v-united-states-cc-1913.