Farmer v. Osburn (In Re Osburn)

203 B.R. 811, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1655, 1996 WL 733200
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedDecember 18, 1996
Docket15-60596
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 203 B.R. 811 (Farmer v. Osburn (In Re Osburn)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Farmer v. Osburn (In Re Osburn), 203 B.R. 811, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1655, 1996 WL 733200 (Ga. 1996).

Opinion

ORDER

JOHN S. DALIS, Chief Judge.

Beverly Farmer filed this Complaint against the debtor Curtis L. Osbum (hereinafter “Debtor”) to determine the discharge-ability of debts allegedly arising from the parties’ divorce. Ms. Farmer filed her original complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) 1 prior to the bar date for filing dischargeability actions, and amended her complaint to state a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) 2 *812 subsequent to the bar date. At the scheduled trial of this ease on August 14,1996, the Debtor orally objected to the amended complaint, alleging that it is time barred under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (Fed.R.Bank.P.) 4007(c) 3 . The Objection is overruled.

Ms. Farmer filed her § 523(a)(5) action on February 1, 1996, one day before the last day for filing objections to the discharge-ability of any debt. The Debtor filed his answer to the complaint on February 14, 1996, and the Court issued a notice of trial on April 25, 1996, scheduling the case for trial on June 10, 1996. On the scheduled trial date, Ms. Farmer filed an amended complaint which added a claim under § 523(a)(15). The court continued trial of the case until August 14, 1996, at which time the Debtor verbally moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the § 523(a)(15) Count.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P.) 15(a) 4 , made applicable to this case under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (Fed.R.Bankr.P.) 7015, Ms. Farmer is ineligible to amend her complaint as a matter of course without either leave of the court or consent of the Debtor because the case had been set for trial prior to her filing the amendment. However, Rule 15(a) directs the court to freely grant leave to amend a pleading when justice so provides. The Debtor has not demonstrated any prejudice or harm which would arise from allowing the amendment. On the other hand, Ms. Farmer would lose her § 523(a)(15) claim if the amendment is not allowed. Equity and justice compel the amendment be allowed.

The Debtor asserts that the time limitation contained in Rule 4007(c) is jurisdictional, and that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the amended complaint, citing my decision in Hsu v. Ginn (In re Ginn), 179 B.R. 349 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1995). In Hsu, I sua sponte dismissed a creditor’s § 523 complaint which was filed with the debtor’s consent subsequent to the expiration of the Rule 4007(c) time limitation. The creditor had filed for and was granted three consecutive extensions to file an action to deny the debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727, but the creditor never requested an extension for filing a § 523 action. The creditor filed the § 523 complaint subsequent to the running of the last extension to file a § 727 action, but argued that the court had authority to hear the action because the debtor had expressly consented thereto. Under the prevailing *813 Eleventh Circuit precedent, I found the time limitation for filing a § 523 action to be jurisdictional, thereby divesting the court of subject matter jurisdiction to enter the consent judgment. Id. at 352, citing Coggin v. Coggin (In re Coggin,) 30 F.3d 1443, 1451 (11th Cir.1994) (Time limitation contained in Fed.R.Bank.P. 4004(b) raises a jurisdictional bar to § 727 action.)

Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the amended complaint depends upon whether the amended complaint relates back to the date of filing the original Complaint. A party’s amended pleading relates back to the date of the original filing if the claim arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) 5 . Because Ms. Farmer’s § 523(a)(15) complaint arises out of the same transactions and set of facts giving rise to the timely filed § 523(a)(5) complaint, the amendment relates back to the date of the original filing and is timely under Rule 4007(e). See, Bank of La. v. Bercier (In re Bercier), 934 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1991) (creditor allowed to add § 523(a)(6) claim to § 523(a)(2) complaint after the bar date); American Gen. Fin. Inc. v. Heath (In re Heath), 114 B.R. 310 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1990) (creditor granted leave to add § 523(a)(6) claim after court granted summary judgment on creditor’s § 523(a)(4) claim); Stone v. Stone (In re Stone), 199 B.R. 753 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1996) (creditor allowed to add § 523(a)(5) count to complaint which only sought determination of dischargeability under § 523(a)(15).) These facts are distinguished from the Hsu case wherein the creditor failed to file any complaint within the statutory time period.

It is therefore ORDERED that the Debt- or’s Objection to Ms. Farmer’s amended complaint is OVERRULED, and that the Debtor shall file an answer to the amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this order whereupon the Clerk shall set this matter for status conference at the next available hearing date.

1

. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) provides:

(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—

(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that—

(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such State); or

(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support;

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
203 B.R. 811, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1655, 1996 WL 733200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/farmer-v-osburn-in-re-osburn-gasb-1996.