Farmer de la Torre v. Catholic Charities of Southern Missouri, Inc.

District Court, W.D. Missouri·Decided September 23, 2025·No. 6:24-cv-03112·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN FARMER DE LA TORRE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 6:24-cv-03112-MDH ) CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF SOUTHERN ) MISSOURI, INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER Before the Court is Defendant Catholic Charities of Southern Missouri, Inc.’s (“CCSM”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 77). Defendant CCSM filed suggestions in support (Doc. 78), Plaintiff filed suggestions in opposition (Doc. 79) and Defendant CCSM has filed a reply. (Doc. 88). The motion is now ripe for adjudication on the merits. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant CCSM’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. BACKGROUND This case arises out of an alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on Plaintiff’s sex and national origin. Plaintiff was the Director of Communications and Marketing for Defendant CCSM, a non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Springfield, Missouri. Plaintiff brings this action against CCSM, and the Diocese, a non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Springfield, Missouri. Plaintiff was hired as CCSM’s Director of Communications and Marketing in December of 2018. Plaintiff filed a complaint to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on December 21, 2023. The EEOC Complaint alleged discrimination that took place from November 30, 2022, to March 1, 2023. Plaintiff alleged in the EEOC Complaint that he complained to Human Resources about discrimination based on being a Hispanic male within CCSM. After his complaint to human resources, Plaintiff was then placed on a Performance

Improvement Plan (“PIP”) that he alleged was a retaliatory objective to generate pretests to discharge him from the job. Plaintiff alleged he received positive feedback from various people for his work on February 10, 2023, and February 15, 2023. The PIP was closed on February 15, 2023, and Plaintiff was fired from his job on March 1, 2023. Plaintiff received a Determination and Notice of Rights letter issued on January 17, 2024. The letter stated the EEOC will not proceed further with its investigation and makes not

determination about whether further investigation would establish violations of this statute. Plaintiff was made aware he had 90 days from the letter to file a lawsuit. Plaintiff commenced the current action on April 18, 2024. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges four counts: Count I – Retaliation Under Title VII against CCSM and the Diocese; Count II – Defamation against the Diocese; Count III – Negligent Supervision against the Diocese and Bishop; and Count IV – Civil Conspiracy to Retaliate against CCSM and the Diocese. The Court in its July 10, 2025, Order dismissed Count I – Retaliation Under Title VII against Defendant Diocese. (Doc. 73). Additionally, the Court in its August 26, 2025, Order granted Defendant Diocese’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.

Defendant CCSM asks this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint arguing Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged his Count I – Title VII Retaliation claim or his Count IV – Civil Conspiracy to Retaliate claim. The Court will take each argument in turn. STANDARD OF REVIEW A complaint must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face. Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court “must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). The complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and the motion to dismiss must be granted if the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Further, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). ANALYSIS

I. Count I – Retaliation Under Title VII Defendant CCSM argues that Plaintiff has not attached a Charge of Discrimination or a

Notice of Rights to Sue to his First Amended Complaint. Defendant CCSM further argues that Plaintiff does not allege any fact that he filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC or that he received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC in his First Amended Complaint. As such, Defendant CCSM argues that Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation in Count I against CCSM fails to demonstrate he exhausted his administrative remedies which are a statutory prerequisite mandated by Title VII. Plaintiff argues that he timely filed an EEOC charge naming Defendant CCSM and clearly identified the Diocese as a materially involved party. Plaintiff further argues that the EEOC records show the Diocese received notice during that process, and as such, administrative exhaustion was achieved to the extent required.

In reviewing the Complaint, the court construes it liberally and draws all reasonable inferences from the facts in the plaintiff’s favor. Myers v. Shangri-La Jefferson LLC, No. 5:24- CV-06154-DGK, 2025 WL 1241908, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2025) (citing Monson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 589 F.3d 952, 961 (8th Cir. 2009)). The court generally ignores materials outside the pleadings but may consider materials that are part of the public record or materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings. Miller v. Toxicology Lab. Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2012).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has properly exhausted his administrative remedies to bring a claim for Count I – Retaliation Under Title VII. While Defendant CCSM is correct that Plaintiff has not attached a Charge of Discrimination or a Notice of Rights to Sue to his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has submitted a Notice of Rights to Sue letter in his original Complaint. (Doc. 5-2). The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s filing due to his pro se status and will not penalize him for failing to submit a document within his First Amended Complaint when he has already demonstrated he has properly exhausted his administrative remedies. Further, Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint states “Plaintiff has complied with all pre-filing and administrative requirements to bring this action.” (Doc. 54, ¶ 58). The Court finds this statement sufficient to necessarily embrace the Notice of Rights to Sue letter from the EEOC Plaintiff had submitted within his original Complaint. Additionally, the Court finds the Notice of Rights to Sue letter being a matter of public record in this case is further evidence of the sufficiency to allow Plaintiff to proceed with his Count I claim. For the reasons stated, Defendant CCSM’s Motion to Dismiss Count I – Retaliation Under Title VII is DENIED. II. Count IV – Civil Conspiracy to Retaliate

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Farmer de la Torre v. Catholic Charities of Southern Missouri, Inc., (W.D. Mo. 2025).

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