Farm Air Service, Inc. v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.

309 S.W.2d 510, 1958 Tex. App. LEXIS 1756
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 15, 1958
Docket10538
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 309 S.W.2d 510 (Farm Air Service, Inc. v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Farm Air Service, Inc. v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 309 S.W.2d 510, 1958 Tex. App. LEXIS 1756 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958).

Opinion

ARCHER, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order overruling a plea of privilege.

This suit was instituted by Houston Fire- & Casualty Insurance Company, a private-corporation, with its main office and principal place of business in Fort Worth, Tar-rant County, Texas, appellee herein, against Farm Air Service, Inc., a private corporation domiciled in Jefferson County, Texas,, appellant herein, for the purpose of collecting certain excess premiums over and above-the “estimated” or “deposit” or “initial”' premiums that were stated in the declarations in the policies.

The policies are issued in accordance with the exclusive rules and procedures established for risks by Article 5.76, Insurance Code of Texas, V.A.T.S., and reads in part:

“From and after the date the rules made and adopted under paragraph (e) *512 have been approved by the Board the procedures and remedies established under this Article shall be the sole and exclusive procedure and remedies, either at law or in equity, of any applicant for such insurance whose insurance has been rejected or cancelled by any company or association.
“(d) When any such rejected risk is called to the attention of said Agency and it appears that said risk is in good faith entitled to insurance, said Agency shall calculate the deposit premium therefor in accordance with the classifications and rates promulgated by the Board and upon payment thereof, the Agency shall designate a member whose duty it shall be to issue a policy on such form and for such limits of liability as shall be prescribed by the Board as provided in paragraph (g) of this Article, but the undertakings of said policy shall be entirely rein-sured by all members of said Agency, and the liability of the member issuing said policy shall be limited to its liability as a reinsurer. * * * ”

Appellant filed its plea of privilege to be sued in its home county and appellee filed a controverting affidavit asserting that venue could be retained in Travis County under Subdivisions 5 and 23 of Article 1995, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. After a hearing the plea was overruled.

The appeal is based on three points assigned as error and are to the effect that the Court erred in overruling the plea because appellee failed to establish by any sufficient proof necessary venue facts to make any exception to venue in appellant’s residence, and in holding that appellee’s evidence revealed a right to retain venue in Travis County, under Subdivision 5 of Article 1995, or under authority of Subdivision 23 of Article 1995.

There is no issue as to the fact that plaintiff is a corporation domiciled in Tarrant County and that defendant is a corporation domiciled in Jefferson County.

Appellee takes the position that its suit can be maintained in Travis County under Subdivision 23 of Article 1995, providing that suits against a private corporation may be brought in the county in which the cause of action or part thereof arose.

Paragraph (c) of Article 5.76, Insurance Code, provides for the establishment of insurance for any risk which shall have been tendered to and rejected by any member, that rules made and adopted under paragraph (e) and remedies established shall be the sole and exclusive procedure and remedies, either at law or in equity, of any applicant for such insurance.

Paragraph (d) provides that when any rejected risk is called to the attention of the agency that the deposit premium shall be calculated in accordance with the classifications and rates promulgated by the Board, and upon payment thereof that the agency shall designate a member to issue a policy.

Article III provides that the agency shall:

“2. Establish and maintain an office in Austin, Texas to carry out the requirements of the Act.”

Article VII, Section 3 provides:

“ * ⅜ * All premium collections * * * shall be deposited into the ‘Assigned Risk Pool Fund.’ [This Fund is maintained in Austin, Texas.]”
“IV. (a) Upon receipt of application, the General Manager shall establish classifications and determine the initial premium based upon the procedure set forth in Items Nos. V and VI as hereinafter provided and, following payment thereof by certified check, money order or bank draft, shall designate a Servicing Company to carry the risk, the coverage to commence not sooner than 12:01 A.M., on the day *513 following receipt of the premium by the Agency, * * * ”
“VII. An employer who does not pay the advance premium or earned premium when due or who does not otherwisé comply with the provisions of Article 5.76 Section H of the Insurance Code of Texas shall not be considered in good faith and shall not be entitled to insurance.”

The venue question is:

“Did Appellee’s cause of action or any part thereof arise in Travis County, Texas so as to constitute an exception to the general venue rule under Subdivision 23, Art. 1995, R.C.S. ?”

Appellee concedes that there are no facts authorizing an exception under Subdivision 5.

Under the provisions of Article 5.76, the application for the policies of insurance was made to the “Assigned Risk Pool”, and the “Pool” issued a “Binder” providing for temporary emergency insurance for a period of ten days. The risk was later assigned to Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, which company did enter into such contract of insurance with appellant.

We recognize that the right of trial in the county of a defendant’s domicile is a valuable one and unless the case filed against him comes within one of the exceptions to Article 1995 a plea should be sustained.

In order for plaintiff herein to maintain venue of this suit in Travis County under the authority of Subdivision 23 of Article 1995, there must be a pleading of and proof by a preponderance of the evidence that this cause of action arose in whole or in part in Travis County, and the truth of the exception must be clearly established.

We believe that appellee has sufficiently plead a cause of action maintainable in Travis County and has sustained the'burden of showing by a preponderance of .the evidence that the cause of action arose, either in whole or in part, in Travis County.

• The suit was instituted to collect premiums claimed to be due upon two policies of insurance, discovered to be due by a general audit made by appellee.

The Binder issued by the Pool is as follows:

“Binder for Workmen’s Compensation Insurance
“Texas Workmen’s Compensation Assigned Risk Pool
Austin, Texas
hereby acknowledges itself bound by a Workmen’s Compensation Insurance undertaking, the subject matter of the insurance being described in the employer’s application on file with this . Pool, and the said undertaking being ■ subject to all the terms and conditions of the approved form of policy contract. This Binder shall end at 12:01 A.M., Standard Time, on the expiration date shown below.

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895 S.W.2d 816 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
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325 S.W.2d 860 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1959)

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Bluebook (online)
309 S.W.2d 510, 1958 Tex. App. LEXIS 1756, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/farm-air-service-inc-v-houston-fire-casualty-insurance-co-texapp-1958.