F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH DEC 9 1998 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT __________________________
ANN FARLEY; DONNA L. RAMBO; CYNTHIA LEE SHANKLIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 97-5152 v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (D.Ct. No. 96-CV-863-CO)
Louis W. Bullock (Patricia W. Bullock and Michele T. Gehres with him on the briefs) of Bullock & Bullock, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Cathryn McClanahan (Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant- Appellee.
Before BRORBY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and MARTEN, District Judge. *
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
* The Honorable J. Thomas Marten, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal from the district court order dismissing their
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 1 Appellants filed this tort action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671 - 2680, based on alleged retaliation and
outrageous conduct by their former employer, the United States Probation Office.
This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and
remand with further instructions.
I. Background
Appellants are former employees of the United States Probation Office for
the Northern District of Oklahoma. They allege their former supervisor, Chief
Probation Officer Rod Baker, subjected them to various forms of sexual
discrimination during the course of their employment. As a result of these
actions, Appellants contend they suffered “severe emotional injury and financial
loss.” Because Appellants’ former positions are not within competitive federal
civil service, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -
1 Although Appellants’ argument addresses dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, we review the district court’s order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
-2- 2000e-17 is inapplicable. Instead, Appellants seek relief under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“Tort Claims Act”), arguing the United States is vicariously liable
for Chief Baker’s actions. The district court granted the government’s motion to
dismiss on two jurisdictional grounds. First, the court examined the merits of
Appellants’ tort claims and determined it lacked jurisdiction because Appellants
failed to state a viable claim under the Tort Claims Act such that the United
States waived its sovereign immunity. Second, the court recognized the potential
applicability of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (“Compensation Act”)
and determined it lacked jurisdiction absent a determination by the Secretary of
Labor that the Compensation Act did not apply.
Appellants raise two arguments on appeal: (1) the district court made
improper findings of fact and misapplied Oklahoma law in dismissing their tort
claims; and (2) the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over their claims
because no substantial question of Compensation Act applicability exists.
Because we find Appellants’ second argument to be determinative, we proceed
directly to that issue. We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) de novo. Holt v. United States, 46
F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995).
-3- II. Applicability of the Federal Employees Compensation Act
This case involves the relationship of two statutory schemes defining the
liability of the United States: the Tort Claims Act and the Compensation Act.
The Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity to allow suits against the United
States for damages arising from tortious acts of government employees. 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b). The Compensation Act, on the other hand, addresses work-
related injuries of federal employees. Specifically, the Compensation Act covers
claims “for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury
sustained while in the performance of his duty.” 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). An injury
occurs “in the performance of duty” if it arises out of and in the course of
employment. Tarver v. United States, 25 F.3d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1994).
The remedies provided by the Compensation Act are exclusive and “instead
of all other liability of the United States ... in a civil action ... or under a Federal
tort liability statute.” 2 5 U.S.C. § 8173. If the Compensation Act applies to a
particular injury, a tort action against the United States regarding those same
injuries is preempted and as such the courts lack jurisdiction to hear the case. See
2 As noted by the Supreme Court, the Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision “was designed to protect the Government from suits under statutes, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, that had been enacted to waive the Government's sovereign immunity.” Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1983).
-4- Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 90 (1991) (“[T]he courts have no
jurisdiction over FTCA claims where ... FECA applies.”); Swafford v. United
States, 998 F.2d 837, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, the district court has no
jurisdiction over Appellants’ Tort Claims Act action if the Compensation Act
covers their injuries.
The Compensation Act vests the Secretary of Labor with power to resolve
any disputes regarding the scope of Compensation Act coverage. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 8145; Swafford, 998 F.2d at 839-40. The Secretary’s decision is final and not
subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b). If a plaintiff brings a Tort Claims
Act action in federal court and a substantial question regarding Compensation Act
coverage exists, “the court must stay its proceedings pending a final decision of
the Secretary of Labor regarding FECA coverage.” Tarver, 25 F.3d at 902-03.
See also Hudiburgh v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH DEC 9 1998 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT __________________________
ANN FARLEY; DONNA L. RAMBO; CYNTHIA LEE SHANKLIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 97-5152 v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (D.Ct. No. 96-CV-863-CO)
Louis W. Bullock (Patricia W. Bullock and Michele T. Gehres with him on the briefs) of Bullock & Bullock, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Cathryn McClanahan (Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant- Appellee.
Before BRORBY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and MARTEN, District Judge. *
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
* The Honorable J. Thomas Marten, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal from the district court order dismissing their
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 1 Appellants filed this tort action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671 - 2680, based on alleged retaliation and
outrageous conduct by their former employer, the United States Probation Office.
This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and
remand with further instructions.
I. Background
Appellants are former employees of the United States Probation Office for
the Northern District of Oklahoma. They allege their former supervisor, Chief
Probation Officer Rod Baker, subjected them to various forms of sexual
discrimination during the course of their employment. As a result of these
actions, Appellants contend they suffered “severe emotional injury and financial
loss.” Because Appellants’ former positions are not within competitive federal
civil service, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -
1 Although Appellants’ argument addresses dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, we review the district court’s order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
-2- 2000e-17 is inapplicable. Instead, Appellants seek relief under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“Tort Claims Act”), arguing the United States is vicariously liable
for Chief Baker’s actions. The district court granted the government’s motion to
dismiss on two jurisdictional grounds. First, the court examined the merits of
Appellants’ tort claims and determined it lacked jurisdiction because Appellants
failed to state a viable claim under the Tort Claims Act such that the United
States waived its sovereign immunity. Second, the court recognized the potential
applicability of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (“Compensation Act”)
and determined it lacked jurisdiction absent a determination by the Secretary of
Labor that the Compensation Act did not apply.
Appellants raise two arguments on appeal: (1) the district court made
improper findings of fact and misapplied Oklahoma law in dismissing their tort
claims; and (2) the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over their claims
because no substantial question of Compensation Act applicability exists.
Because we find Appellants’ second argument to be determinative, we proceed
directly to that issue. We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) de novo. Holt v. United States, 46
F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995).
-3- II. Applicability of the Federal Employees Compensation Act
This case involves the relationship of two statutory schemes defining the
liability of the United States: the Tort Claims Act and the Compensation Act.
The Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity to allow suits against the United
States for damages arising from tortious acts of government employees. 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b). The Compensation Act, on the other hand, addresses work-
related injuries of federal employees. Specifically, the Compensation Act covers
claims “for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury
sustained while in the performance of his duty.” 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). An injury
occurs “in the performance of duty” if it arises out of and in the course of
employment. Tarver v. United States, 25 F.3d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1994).
The remedies provided by the Compensation Act are exclusive and “instead
of all other liability of the United States ... in a civil action ... or under a Federal
tort liability statute.” 2 5 U.S.C. § 8173. If the Compensation Act applies to a
particular injury, a tort action against the United States regarding those same
injuries is preempted and as such the courts lack jurisdiction to hear the case. See
2 As noted by the Supreme Court, the Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision “was designed to protect the Government from suits under statutes, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, that had been enacted to waive the Government's sovereign immunity.” Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1983).
-4- Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 90 (1991) (“[T]he courts have no
jurisdiction over FTCA claims where ... FECA applies.”); Swafford v. United
States, 998 F.2d 837, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, the district court has no
jurisdiction over Appellants’ Tort Claims Act action if the Compensation Act
covers their injuries.
The Compensation Act vests the Secretary of Labor with power to resolve
any disputes regarding the scope of Compensation Act coverage. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 8145; Swafford, 998 F.2d at 839-40. The Secretary’s decision is final and not
subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b). If a plaintiff brings a Tort Claims
Act action in federal court and a substantial question regarding Compensation Act
coverage exists, “the court must stay its proceedings pending a final decision of
the Secretary of Labor regarding FECA coverage.” Tarver, 25 F.3d at 902-03.
See also Hudiburgh v. United States, 626 F.2d 813, 814 (10th Cir. 1980). A
substantial question regarding Compensation Act coverage exists unless it is
certain the Secretary would not find coverage. White v. United States, 143 F.3d
232, 234 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]o avoid sending the case to the Secretary of Labor,
we must essentially decide as a matter of law that ... the Secretary could not find
FECA coverage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bruni v. United States, 964
F.2d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 1992).
-5- The pivotal issue, then, is whether a substantial question regarding
Compensation Act coverage exists in this case. The district court concluded a
question exists, and we agree. As noted by the district court, Appellants allege
their emotional distress injuries “arose during the performance of their duties as
probation officers.” In addition, the Secretary of Labor has determined the
Compensation Act covers work-related emotional distress injuries in some
instances. See, e.g., Swafford, 998 F.2d at 840 (emotional distress resulting from
sexual harassment by coworker); McDaniel v. United States, 970 F.2d 194, 197
(6th Cir. 1992) (emotional distress resulting from harassment by supervisor);
Jones v. Tennessee Valley Author., 948 F.2d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 1991) (emotional
distress resulting from harassment and intimidation by supervisors). But see
DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 290 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that
Compensation Act does not appear to cover claims for mental distress). As a
result, we cannot conclude the Secretary could not find Compensation Act
coverage in this case. 3 Therefore, a substantial question as to coverage exists and
3 Appellants contend the Compensation Act does not apply to injuries resulting from intentional torts. However, Compensation Act applicability turns on whether the injury was suffered in the performance of the employee’s duty. 5 U.S.C. §8102(a). Except for those exclusions noted in the statute, it does not matter whether the injury was caused by an intentional or negligent act. 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a)(1)-(3); Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104, 1111 n.6 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The fact that a tort is intentional certainly does not preclude it from being suffered while in the performance of a public employee’s duty. ).
-6- the Tort Claims Act action must be stayed pending a coverage determination by
the Secretary. 4 Id. at 902-03. If the Secretary determines the Compensation Act
applies, the district court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Tort Claims Act action and
it must be dismissed, regardless of whether Compensation Act benefits are
actually awarded. Id. at 903; Swafford, 998 F.2d at 841. Only if the Secretary
determines the Compensation Act does not apply, may Appellants’ action under
the Tort Claims Act proceed. Id.
III. Abatement
In its order, the district court acknowledged our holding in Tarver that a
court must stay proceedings where a substantial question regarding Compensation
Act coverage exists. Nonetheless, the district court chose to dismiss the action
rather than stay it. We believe the district court erred. Abatement is the most
appropriate course of action in a situation such as this. Tarver, 25 F.3d at 902-
03; Hudiburgh, 626 F.2d at 814. By staying the action, the district court avoids
4 Appellees argue a stay is not required because our holding in Swafford conclusively establishes Compensation Act coverage of emotional distress injuries. However, that case merely acknowledged the Secretary of Labor’s findings regarding that particular plaintiff. Swafford, 998 F.2d at 841. As we emphasized in Swafford, “[t]he Secretary of Labor, not the Tenth Circuit, has the final say as to the scope of FECA.” Id. We are not inclined to predict the Secretary of Labor’s decision on the particular facts of this case.
-7- running the Tort Claims Act statute of limitation and leaving plaintiffs
remediless. 5 Concordia v. United States Postal Service, 581 F.2d 439, 444 (5th
Cir. 1978).
The district court also found Appellants failed to allege a viable tort claim
against the United States. Because the Compensation Act may ultimately supplant
Appellants’ Tort Claims Act action and deprive the district court of jurisdiction to
hear the case, the court’s evaluation of the tort claims was premature. See
Southwest Marine, 502 U.S. at 90; Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting the Compensation Act’s “judicial door-closing provision” may
deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear a Tort Claims Act
action). We therefore express no opinion as to those findings. Accordingly, the
judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to
the district court with directions to reinstate the Tort Claims Act suit and order it
held in abeyance pending Appellants’ pursuit of the claim under the
Compensation Act.
5 “A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)
-8-