Farace v. Government Employees Insurance

328 So. 2d 400, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 4602
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 10, 1976
DocketNo. 5359
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 328 So. 2d 400 (Farace v. Government Employees Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Farace v. Government Employees Insurance, 328 So. 2d 400, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 4602 (La. Ct. App. 1976).

Opinion

PAVY, Judge.

This is a suit by Mrs. Sam Farace (hereinafter usually designated as plaintiff) and her husband (who joined to assert the medical expense claim) for damages arising out of an automobile accident on July 24, 1973. The trial judge awarded the wife $40,000 for her injuries and $6,323.44 to the husband for medical expenses. Mrs. Farace was a guest passenger in a car which collided at an intersection with one driven by an insured of Government Employees Insurance Company, the other defendant. Both defendants have appealed. They did not contest the issue of liability and direct their arguments solely to the matter of quantum.

The evidence shows that the accident was of sufficient force to throw plaintiff against the windshield and stun or daze her if not actually render her momentarily unconscious. Her original complaints consisted of pain in the head, neck and hip. The hip injury has passed out of the picture. She was hospitalized for a week.

Her family physician, Dr. Wesley Dyer, treated her initially and, off and on, during most of the times involved. In August, he referred her to Dr. Louis Cayer, an Alexandria orthopaedist, who treated her until November 28, 1973. On October 31, 1973, at Dr. Cayer’s suggestion, Mrs. Farace was examined by Dr. F. C. Boykin, a Shreveport neurosurgeon. On December 28, 1973, she consulted Dr. Homer Kirgis, a neurosurgeon at the Oschner Clinic in New Orleans. He treated plaintiff conservatively until September, 1974, when he operated on her and removed the intervertebral disc at the 5th cervical level and fused the two adjoining vertebrae with a piece of bone from the hip.

On December 2, 1974, subsequent to the operation and shortly before the trial held on January 9, 1975, Mrs. Farace was examined by Dr. Richard Levy, a New Orleans neurosurgeon. All the aforementioned experts had examined or treated plaintiff and testified in the case. Additionally, two radiologists, Dr. Lawrence Heard of New Orleans and Dr. R. O. Chadwick of Alexandria, neither of whom had seen or treated plaintiff, testified as to their interpretations of x-rays, a myleogram and a disco-gram, which latter two were performed on plaintiff at the Oschner Clinic.

It is defendants’ argument that, prior to the accident, plaintiff suffered from degenerative changes in neck and shoulder area, and that she suffered some type of cervical strain injury but not a disc involvement as a result of the accident; and that, although she may be entitled to a substantial sum for the pain, suffering etc., the award should not be based on a disc injury and should be substantially lower than the $40,000 awarded.

At the time of the accident, Mrs. Farace was 52 years of age and had been an active housewife and frequently assisted her husband at his store. She had no trouble or complaints of pain in the neck, shoulder, head or arm. Since the accident, she has constantly complained of pain in those areas except that the arm pain was not constant and late in manifesting itself. None of the doctors doubted her sincerity or thought her complaints were not genuine except that there were a few expressions by the experts that her complaints were slightly out of proportion to the findings. She was treated with muscular relaxants, analgesics, heat (lamps and soaks), hospital and home traction, cervical collar and shoulder harness.

Specifically, defendants argue that the weight of the clinical findings by the ex[402]*402perts, the correct interpretation of the x-rays, myleogram and discogram and the information, or lack of it, from the operation rule out any disc injury whatsoever and, especially, because of the time factor, rule out any disc involvement resulting from the accident.

It is true that the experts who examined plaintiff in the first phases of her problem diagnosed her condition as one other than a disc problem but none of these definitely ruled out such a possibility. Also, although most of the experts thought that any disc injury would manifest itself within the first several months subsequent to the accident, none would deny a causal relationship between the accident and an actual disc condition if there was no indication of a disc problem prior to the accident, there was constant complaints of the kind Mrs. Farace experienced subsequent to the injury and an operation actually revealed a disc involvement. There is reliable expertise in the record that a progression of the condition from the complaints of Mrs. Farace during the first few months to actual disc involvement at time of operation is not atypical.

The x-rays showed degenerative (aging process) changes which probably existed prior to the accident. They (the x-rays) were not indicative of any disc involvement, but it is clear that x-rays never rule out a disc problem. Most of the experts interpreted the myleogram to be negative, but it is shown that there are false negatives, the exact frequency of which is uncertain. A discogram is a diagnostic device in which dye is injected into the suspected disc itself. If the visualized dye exudes or shows the disc sac to protrude it is considered that the disc is pathological. Additionally, the injection of the dye into the disc sac is supposed to reproduce the complained-of pain if the disc is pathological. The determination of whether the pain is reproduced is made by the neurosurgeon attending the discogram. The report on the discogram shows that it resulted in reproduction of shoulder and neck pain. The report of the discogram by the radiologist attending the discogram and Dr. Kirgis’ interpretation of the discogram x-ray confirmed a bulging of the disc. The other testifying experts, who were not in attendance at the discogram, could not express themselves one way or the other with regard to the question of the pain reproduction. On the question of whether there was a bulging or exuding shown on the discogram x-rays, some of the experts (even radiologists), refused to express themselves because of their inexperience in, or skepticism toward, discography or because they thought the technique in the particular instance involved was not sufficient to justify a decision. Other experts interpreted the discogram film to be negative. While there may be doubt as to the discogram film interpretation, the evidence that the complained-of pain was reproduced stands uncontradicted and this evidence is supportive of a disc involvement condition.

The evidence shows that in a cervical disc operation there are two methods of gaining access to the disc. One is anteri-orly, from the front of the neck, and the other is posteriorly, from the rear of the neck. Both are accepted techniques in the medical profession. The anterior approach is the more preferred one and was used by Dr. Kirgis. Dr. Levy, defendants’ main expert on this aspect of the case, employs the posterior approach.

Defendants argue that in the anterior approach it is impossible for the surgeon to determine that the disc actually impinges on the nerve root because the disc is cut out before the nerve root, located to the rear of the disc, is visible; that in this case Dr. Kirgis could not testify that the disc impinged against the nerve root and there is a lack of proof that plaintiff had a disc problem.

We think defendants’ argument does not give accurate appraisal to the testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn [403]*403therefrom. On direct examination, Dr. Kirgis testified as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
328 So. 2d 400, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 4602, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/farace-v-government-employees-insurance-lactapp-1976.