Fanning v. Big Warrior Corp.

659 F. Supp. 2d 182, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92767, 2009 WL 3182736
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedOctober 5, 2009
DocketCivil Action 09-780(CKK)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 659 F. Supp. 2d 182 (Fanning v. Big Warrior Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fanning v. Big Warrior Corp., 659 F. Supp. 2d 182, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92767, 2009 WL 3182736 (D.D.C. 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Michael R. Fanning, in his official capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the Central Pension Fund of the International Union of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers, the Board of Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers and Pipe Line Employers Health and Welfare Fund, and the Board of Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers and Pipe Line Contractors Association National Pipe Line Training Fund (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or the “Funds”), filed a Complaint in this case against Defendant Big Warrior Corporation (“Defendant” or the “Corporation”), on April 29, 2009. Plaintiffs allege that the Corporation failed to submit reports or pay to Plaintiffs the proper amount of contributions owed under the relevant collective bargaining agreements. See Compl., Docket No. [1]. Although properly and timely served with the Complaint and Summons, Defendant failed to respond to the Complaint, and the Clerk of the Court, upon motion by Plaintiffs, entered default against the Corporation on June 30, 2009. See Clerk’s Entry of Default, Docket No. [6]. Presently before the Court is the Funds’ [7] Motion for Default Judgment on Count Three of the Complaint. Having thoroughly considered the Complaint, the Funds’ submissions and attachments thereto, applicable case law, statutory authority, and the record of the case as a whole, the Court shall GRANT the Funds’ [7] Motion for Default Judgment on Count Three of the Complaint, for the reasons stated below.

I. BACKGROUND

The Funds filed the Complaint in the above-captioned matter on April 29, 2009. See Compl. As set forth in the Complaint, the Funds assert that the Defendant is bound through its collective bargaining agreement with the International Union of Operating Engineers and related agreements to pay the Funds certain sums of money for each hour worked by employees of the Corporation performing work covered by the relevant agreements and to supply records necessary to permit the Funds to determine if the Corporation is making the required payments. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 15. Beginning on January 1, 2009 through the present, the Funds allege that the Corporation has employed employees performing work under the collective bargaining agreement, but has failed to submit reports or pay the proper amount of contributions owed, as is required under the collective bargaining agreement and related agreements. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.

Pursuant to the terms of those agreements, the Funds assert that they are therefore entitled to: a monetary award in *184 the amount of the unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, interest on the unpaid contributions, as well as costs, audit expenses and attorneys’ fees (Count I); a court order enjoining the Corporation from violating its collective bargaining agreements, as alleged herein, and requiring the Corporation to immediately submit the unpaid contributions, liquidated damages and interested owed (Count II); and an audit of the Corporation’s records to permit Plaintiffs to determine the amounts owed. Id. ¶¶ 16-31. Plaintiffs, in their instant motion, have moved for default judgment with respect to Count III only. See Pl.’s Mot. for Def. J. at 1-2. The Funds represent that once they are able to conduct an audit of the Corporation’s records and calculate the amount of damages owed, they intend to file a request for a final Default Judgment as to the exact sum owed. See id. at 2.

The Corporation was served with the Complaint and Summons on May 15, 2009, and was therefore required to respond by June 4, 2009. See Return of Serviee/Affidavit, Docket No. [4]; see also Affidavit in Support of Default, Docket No. [5]. The Corporation failed to file an answer or otherwise respond to the Funds’ Complaint, and the Funds subsequently moved for entry of default. See Pis.’ Aff. in Support of Default, Docket No. [5]. On June 30, 2009, the Clerk of the Court entered default against the Corporation. See Clerk’s Entry of Default, Docket No. [6]. The Funds subsequently filed the instant Motion for Default Judgment. See PL’s Mot. for Default J., Docket No. [7]. As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion, the Defendant Corporation has not entered an appearance nor filed any pleadings in this case.

II. LEGAL STANDARD AND DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides that the clerk of the court must enter a party’s default “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After a default has been entered by the clerk of the court, a court may enter a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b). Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b). “The determination of whether default judgment is appropriate is committed to the discretion of the trial court.” Int’l Painters and Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Auxier Drywall, LLC, 531 F.Supp.2d 56, 57 (D.D.C.2008) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C.Cir.1980)).

Where, as here, there is a complete “absence of any request to set aside the default or suggestion by the defendant that it has a meritorious defense, it is clear that the standard for default judgment has been satisfied.” Auxier Drywall, LLC, 531 F.Supp.2d at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Clerk of the Court entered the Corporation’s default, and the factual allegations in the Complaint are therefore taken as true. See Int’l Painters and Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 26, 30 (D.D.C.2002). The Court finds that the Funds’ Complaint sufficiently alleges facts to support its claims. The Funds are thus entitled to default judgment as to the Corporation’s liability for its failure to timely pay contributions to the Funds and to supply records necessary to permit the Funds to determine if the Corporation is making the required payments, as required under the terms of the Corporation’s collective bargaining agreement and related agreements.

Although the default establishes a defendant’s liability, the Court makes an independent determination of the sum to *185 be awarded in the judgment unless the amount of damages is -certain. Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F.Supp.2d 15, 17 (D.D.C.2001). The specific amount of damages owed by the Defendant Corporation to the Funds, however, cannot be determined until after an audit of the Corporation’s payroll books and records is conducted.

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Related

Fanning v. Big Warrior Corp.
707 F. Supp. 2d 8 (District of Columbia, 2010)
Fanning v. Big Warrior Corporation
District of Columbia, 2010

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
659 F. Supp. 2d 182, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92767, 2009 WL 3182736, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fanning-v-big-warrior-corp-dcd-2009.