1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 FANJUN CONG, Case No.: 25-cv-3730-GPC-DEB
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, Department of [ECF No. 10] Homeland Security; PAM BONDI, 15 Attorney General; TODD LYONS, 16 Executive Associate Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations 17 (ERO); GREGORY J. 18 ARCHAMBEAULT, Director, San Diego Field Office, Immigration and Customs 19 Enforcement; CHRISTOPHER J. 20 LAROSE, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center. 21 Respondents. 22
23 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees under 24 the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). ECF No. 10. For the 25 reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS the motion IN PART. 26 // 27 2 On January 9, 2026, this Court granted, in part, Petitioner’s petition for writ of 3 habeas corpus and ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond 4 hearing within seven days. ECF No. 7. On January 13, 2026, Petitioner was released from 5 custody on bond. ECF No. 10, at 4. Petitioner now moves for an award of attorney’s fees 6 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). See ECF No. 7 10. 9 “The EAJA provides . . . that in an action brought by or against the United States, a 10 court must award fees and expenses to a prevailing non-government party ‘unless the court 11 finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special 12 circumstances make an award unjust.’” Medina Tovar v. Zuchowski, 41 F.4th 1085, 1089 13 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). The government bears the burden of 14 showing that its position was substantially justified. Id. 15 The EAJA specifies a maximum statutory rate of $125 per hour, which the Ninth 16 Circuit has adjusted to $258.36 for work performed in 2025. United States Courts for the 17 Ninth Circuit, Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 18 https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited March 23, 19 2025). The statutory rate is to apply “unless the court determines that . . . a special factor, 20 such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies 21 a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 22 Thus, a court may award enhanced hourly rates based on the limited availability of 23 qualified attorneys when an attorney possesses (1) “distinctive knowledge and specialized” 24 skill that was (2) “needful to the litigation in question” and (3) “not available elsewhere at 25 the statutory rate.” Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 26 quotation marks and citations omitted). Examples of “distinctive knowledge” include “an 27 1 identifiable practice specialty such as patent law, or knowledge of foreign law or language." 2 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988). 4 Respondents do not oppose an award of attorney’s fees in this case.1 ECF No. 12, at 5 3. Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under 6 the EAJA. However, Respondents do oppose the amount requested by Petitioner’s counsel. 7 Id. 8 I. Petitioner is Entitled to Enhancement 9 Petitioner seeks an enhanced rate based on “special factors” identified in 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2412(d)(2)(A). ECF No. 10, at 7. Specifically, Petitioner’s counsel—Mr. Chuangchuang 11 Chen—points to his knowledge of China’s socio-political environment and fluency in 12 Mandarin Chinese. ECF No. 10, at 8. Mr. Chen relied on his knowledge of Mandarin to 13 communicate with Petitioner and his family throughout Petitioner’s case. Id. Thus, Mr. 14 Chen argues that “specialized skills were required to achieve the successful outcome in this 15 case and are not available elsewhere at the statutory rate.” Id. Specifically, Mr. Chen seeks 16 an award of fees at rate of $500 an hour for his own work and $200 an hour for the work 17 of two paralegals—both of which he avers are in line with prevailing market rates for 18 similar legal services. ECF No. 10-2, at 1. 19 Respondents maintain that Petitioner’s counsel is not entitled to a special factor 20 enhancement. ECF No. 12, at 3. Specifically, Respondents argue that the practice of 21 immigration law generally is not viewed as a specialty meriting a special factor adjustment, 22 and that counsel’s increased knowledge of China’s socio-political landscape was not 23 24 1 Respondents assume for the purposes of this motion that attorney’s fees are appropriate 25 under the EAJA. ECF No. 12, at 3. However, Respondents clarify that such an assumption 26 is only in the interest of judicial economy and is not a concession regarding whether their position in this litigation was substantially justified. Id. 27 1 necessary to prevail in this litigation. ECF No. 12, at 4. They further argue that, while 2 counsel’s ability to speak Mandarin Chinese may merit some adjustment, it does not justify 3 counsel’s requested rate of $500 per hour. Id. Though Respondents identify an 4 enhancement of $50 above the statutory rate as a “standard” enhancement for foreign 5 language knowledge, they do not provide any case law in support of their claim. 6 Petitioner’s counsel did not file a reply to rebut any of Respondents' arguments. 7 The Court finds that Mr. Chen’s proficiency in Mandarin Chinese was (1) distinctive 8 knowledge (2) needful to this litigation, that is (3) not available elsewhere at the statutory 9 rate. See Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 912; see Truong v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-02179-BEN- 10 RNB, 2019 WL 1863655 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2019) (finding Plaintiff could not have 11 received specialized representation elsewhere at the statutory rate where attorneys’ fluency 12 in Vietnamese was necessary to communicate with plaintiff and her mother). Indeed, the 13 Supreme Court has identified that knowledge of a foreign language may qualify as the 14 distinctive knowledge necessary to justify an enhancement, see Pierce, 487 U.S. at 572, 15 and Respondents concede as much, ECF No. 12, at 4. 16 However, the Court does not find the same as to Mr. Chen’s knowledge of China’s 17 socio-political environment. While such knowledge may be necessary to prevail in 18 Petitioner’s underlying asylum claim, it was not necessary to prevail on this habeas 19 petition. See Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 913 (finding knowledge of foreign culture may justify 20 enhancement when “needed to give the [noncitizen] a fair shot at prevailing” (internal 21 quotation marks and citation omitted)). 22 Here, because (1) Petitioner’s counsel’s distinctive knowledge is limited to counsel’s 23 knowledge of a foreign language, (2) Respondents oppose counsel’s fee request, and (3) 24 Petitioner’s counsel failed to file a reply addressing Respondents’ legal arguments, the 25 Court finds that a limited enhancement of $100 above the statutory rate is appropriate rather 26 than the requested market rate of $500 per hour. See I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 27 1 (1990) (courts have “substantial discretion in fixing the amount of an EAJA award.”).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 FANJUN CONG, Case No.: 25-cv-3730-GPC-DEB
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, Department of [ECF No. 10] Homeland Security; PAM BONDI, 15 Attorney General; TODD LYONS, 16 Executive Associate Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations 17 (ERO); GREGORY J. 18 ARCHAMBEAULT, Director, San Diego Field Office, Immigration and Customs 19 Enforcement; CHRISTOPHER J. 20 LAROSE, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center. 21 Respondents. 22
23 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees under 24 the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). ECF No. 10. For the 25 reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS the motion IN PART. 26 // 27 2 On January 9, 2026, this Court granted, in part, Petitioner’s petition for writ of 3 habeas corpus and ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond 4 hearing within seven days. ECF No. 7. On January 13, 2026, Petitioner was released from 5 custody on bond. ECF No. 10, at 4. Petitioner now moves for an award of attorney’s fees 6 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). See ECF No. 7 10. 9 “The EAJA provides . . . that in an action brought by or against the United States, a 10 court must award fees and expenses to a prevailing non-government party ‘unless the court 11 finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special 12 circumstances make an award unjust.’” Medina Tovar v. Zuchowski, 41 F.4th 1085, 1089 13 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). The government bears the burden of 14 showing that its position was substantially justified. Id. 15 The EAJA specifies a maximum statutory rate of $125 per hour, which the Ninth 16 Circuit has adjusted to $258.36 for work performed in 2025. United States Courts for the 17 Ninth Circuit, Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 18 https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited March 23, 19 2025). The statutory rate is to apply “unless the court determines that . . . a special factor, 20 such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies 21 a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 22 Thus, a court may award enhanced hourly rates based on the limited availability of 23 qualified attorneys when an attorney possesses (1) “distinctive knowledge and specialized” 24 skill that was (2) “needful to the litigation in question” and (3) “not available elsewhere at 25 the statutory rate.” Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 26 quotation marks and citations omitted). Examples of “distinctive knowledge” include “an 27 1 identifiable practice specialty such as patent law, or knowledge of foreign law or language." 2 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988). 4 Respondents do not oppose an award of attorney’s fees in this case.1 ECF No. 12, at 5 3. Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under 6 the EAJA. However, Respondents do oppose the amount requested by Petitioner’s counsel. 7 Id. 8 I. Petitioner is Entitled to Enhancement 9 Petitioner seeks an enhanced rate based on “special factors” identified in 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2412(d)(2)(A). ECF No. 10, at 7. Specifically, Petitioner’s counsel—Mr. Chuangchuang 11 Chen—points to his knowledge of China’s socio-political environment and fluency in 12 Mandarin Chinese. ECF No. 10, at 8. Mr. Chen relied on his knowledge of Mandarin to 13 communicate with Petitioner and his family throughout Petitioner’s case. Id. Thus, Mr. 14 Chen argues that “specialized skills were required to achieve the successful outcome in this 15 case and are not available elsewhere at the statutory rate.” Id. Specifically, Mr. Chen seeks 16 an award of fees at rate of $500 an hour for his own work and $200 an hour for the work 17 of two paralegals—both of which he avers are in line with prevailing market rates for 18 similar legal services. ECF No. 10-2, at 1. 19 Respondents maintain that Petitioner’s counsel is not entitled to a special factor 20 enhancement. ECF No. 12, at 3. Specifically, Respondents argue that the practice of 21 immigration law generally is not viewed as a specialty meriting a special factor adjustment, 22 and that counsel’s increased knowledge of China’s socio-political landscape was not 23 24 1 Respondents assume for the purposes of this motion that attorney’s fees are appropriate 25 under the EAJA. ECF No. 12, at 3. However, Respondents clarify that such an assumption 26 is only in the interest of judicial economy and is not a concession regarding whether their position in this litigation was substantially justified. Id. 27 1 necessary to prevail in this litigation. ECF No. 12, at 4. They further argue that, while 2 counsel’s ability to speak Mandarin Chinese may merit some adjustment, it does not justify 3 counsel’s requested rate of $500 per hour. Id. Though Respondents identify an 4 enhancement of $50 above the statutory rate as a “standard” enhancement for foreign 5 language knowledge, they do not provide any case law in support of their claim. 6 Petitioner’s counsel did not file a reply to rebut any of Respondents' arguments. 7 The Court finds that Mr. Chen’s proficiency in Mandarin Chinese was (1) distinctive 8 knowledge (2) needful to this litigation, that is (3) not available elsewhere at the statutory 9 rate. See Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 912; see Truong v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-02179-BEN- 10 RNB, 2019 WL 1863655 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2019) (finding Plaintiff could not have 11 received specialized representation elsewhere at the statutory rate where attorneys’ fluency 12 in Vietnamese was necessary to communicate with plaintiff and her mother). Indeed, the 13 Supreme Court has identified that knowledge of a foreign language may qualify as the 14 distinctive knowledge necessary to justify an enhancement, see Pierce, 487 U.S. at 572, 15 and Respondents concede as much, ECF No. 12, at 4. 16 However, the Court does not find the same as to Mr. Chen’s knowledge of China’s 17 socio-political environment. While such knowledge may be necessary to prevail in 18 Petitioner’s underlying asylum claim, it was not necessary to prevail on this habeas 19 petition. See Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 913 (finding knowledge of foreign culture may justify 20 enhancement when “needed to give the [noncitizen] a fair shot at prevailing” (internal 21 quotation marks and citation omitted)). 22 Here, because (1) Petitioner’s counsel’s distinctive knowledge is limited to counsel’s 23 knowledge of a foreign language, (2) Respondents oppose counsel’s fee request, and (3) 24 Petitioner’s counsel failed to file a reply addressing Respondents’ legal arguments, the 25 Court finds that a limited enhancement of $100 above the statutory rate is appropriate rather 26 than the requested market rate of $500 per hour. See I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 27 1 (1990) (courts have “substantial discretion in fixing the amount of an EAJA award.”). 2 Thus, the Court will award Mr. Chen’s attorney’s fees at a reasonable rate of $358.56 per 3 hour. 4 Mr. Chen further requests a billable rate of $200 per hour for each of his two 5 paralegals, which he asserts is in line with the prevailing market rates. ECF No. 10-4, at 2. 6 Respondents do not oppose this request. Thus, the Court finds the rate reasonable. See 7 Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 918 (citing Richlin Sec. Serv. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 577 (2008) 8 (“Under EAJA, paralegal fees may be awarded at prevailing market rates.”). 9 II. Petitioner’s Fee Request is Reasonable 10 Petitioner’s counsel has provided an itemized log detailing the number of hours that 11 he and his paralegals dedicated to this action and how that time was spent. ECF No. 10-2, 12 at 3. Mr. Chen billed 13 hours on this case on a combination of case review, legal research, 13 brief drafting, and client and family communication. Mr. Chen’s paralegals spent a 14 combined 13.5 hours on this case on a combination of drafting, research, and client and 15 family communication. 16 While Respondents assert that counsel’s fee request is “unreasonable” and note that 17 the Court should “exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or 18 otherwise unnecessary,” ECF No. 12, at 3 (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 19 1397 (9th Cir. 1992)), Respondents do not identify any billed hours as excessive or present 20 argument as to why the time billed is unreasonable. 21 Courts should generally “defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to 22 how much time he was required to spend on the case.” Costa v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 23 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Upon 24 reviewing the itemized billing hour record, ECF No. 10-2, at 3, the Court finds the hours 25 and associated work reported by Petitioner’s counsel to be reasonable. 26 // 27 ] II. Total Fee Award 2 Fees awarded under the EAJA are calculated pursuant to the lodestar method. Costa, 3 F.3d at 1135. Under the lodestar method, the Court multiplies the number of hours 4 ||reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate to determine an ultimate fee award. Id. 5 || The Court has determined that the reasonable rate for Mr. Chen’s billable hours is $358.56 6 || per hour, and that the reasonable rate for his paralegals is $200 per hour. The Court has 7 further found that the hours billed by Mr. Chen and his paralegals—13 and 13.5 hours, 8 || respectively—are reasonable. Thus, applying the lodestar method, the fee award for Mr. 9 || Chen’s hours amounts to $4,661.28 and the fee award for the paralegals’ hours amounts to 10 || $2,700. The total fee award in this case amounts to $7,361.28. 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion for attorney’s 13 || fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act IN PART. The Court finds that an enhancement 14 || of $100 above the EAJA statutory hourly rate is merited. Petitioner is awarded fees and 15 || costs in the amount of $7,361.28. 17 Dated: April 20, 2026 18 Hon. athe Ck 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 25-ev-3730-GPC-DEB