Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Leahy

173 S.W.2d 417, 351 Mo. 428, 1943 Mo. LEXIS 430
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedMay 4, 1943
DocketNo. 37801.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 173 S.W.2d 417 (Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Leahy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Leahy, 173 S.W.2d 417, 351 Mo. 428, 1943 Mo. LEXIS 430 (Mo. 1943).

Opinion

*432 HYDE, J.

This is an action in equity seeking to cancel notes held by defendants aggregating $42,800.00, to enjoin suits commenced on three of these notes totaling $600.00, and to have judgment for $42,200.00 paid to defendants, all for attorney’s fees. The court entered a decree canceling the notes and entering a money judgment for the net amount of principal and interest of $33,500.63. (Being $32,200.00 principal, less $1,323.09 credit for value of bonds received by plaintiffs, plus $2,623.72 interest.) Defendants have appealed.

Plaintiff Fanchon & Marco, Inc., alleges that defendants were employed by it and acted as its attorneys from February 1, 1934, to December 3,. 1936. (By plaintiff as hereinafter used we mean plaintiff Fanchon & Marco, Inc., since the other two plaintiffs are subsidiary corporations, incorporated in Missouri, interested only because they endorsed the notes given to defendants.) The basis of this action as charged in the petition is that defendant John S. Leahy (hereinafter referred to as defendant since all charges are made against him), being senior partner of defendant’s firm was guilty of breaches of professional conduct, so as to forfeit all right to compensation, as follows:

1 — That in February, 1934, defendant, unknown to plaintiff, contributed one-half of the purchase price of the stock interest of Allen Snyder in two corporations which plaintiff claims that defendant was employed by it to organize for its benefit, and that it was his duty *433 to plaintiff as its attorney to make a full and complete disclosure of liis private interest in the subject matter.

2— That these corporations, operating moving picture theatres, were sustaining heavy operating losses, because of a conspiracy in restraint of trade to deprive them of films concerning which plaintiff made complaint to the Department of Justice of the United States, and in which complaint defendant represented plaintiff; that during this period defendant advised plaintiff to buy Snyder’s interest; that in January, 1935, plaintiff did so (paying him his original purchase price of $25,000.00) being ignorant of defendant’s interest; and that this stock was then without substantial value.

3— That in April, 1936, after defendant at plaintiff’s request, had induced the Attorney General of Missouri to bring state anti-trust suits against certain film companies, defendant failed to ask the Attorney General to delay filing such suits and discontinue any such proceedings because of pending negotiations for settlement with the companies, as plaintiff thereafter had requested him to do.

Plaintiff very clearly states the controlling fact issues decisive of these contentions, as follows:

. (1) The question whether an attorney and client relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant from and after February 1, 1934;

(2) the concealment by the defendant of his investment with Snyder in the theatre and his subsequent conduct until and after the sale of Snyder’s interest;

(3) defendant’s conduct in connection with the state anti-trust suits:

(4) the question as to whether Harry Arthur (who was plaintiff’s representative in handling these matters) had learned of the alleged violations by defendant of his professional obligations before he made the agreement in December, 1936,. for the fees to be paid by the plaintiff for the legal services rendered by the defendant.

This case being in equity and considered here de novo, it is necessary to review all the evidence. Since this is before us in a printed record of three volumes containing 2257 pages, it is obviously impracticable to do more than state a narrative outline of the facts. We think this matter can be logically divided into two parts (although these are somewhat interrelated) as follows:

I. The period from January, 1934, to January, 1935, inclusive, during which defendant, by negotiations with the bondholder’s committee for certain theatres in receivership obtained leases and approval thereof by the United States District Court and organized corporations to operate them, working under an oral contract for a fee of $10,000.00 paid to him in September, 1934. This period runs to the end of January, 1935, when plaintiff purchased the interest of Snyder, in whose name the bids for the leases were made to and *434 accepted by the bondholders committee which had reorganized [419] the companies holding title to the theatres. The events of this period determine the first two points stated above as the basis of plaintiff’s claim and also the first two of the controlling fact issues involved and have considerable bearing on the fourth. The decree did not require defendant to pay back the $10,000.00 fee received during this period.

II. The period from February, 1935, to December, 1936, inclusive, during which defendant worked under a written contract for services made in April, 1935. During this period anti-trust indictments brought by the Federal Government were tried and anti-trust equity suits were brought by both the United States and the State o'f Missouri and settled by agreement. Defendant’s services in connection with these cases began in the fall of 1934 before the written contract was made. For defendant’s services under this written contract, plaintiff, by settlement contract made in December, 1936, agreed to pay defendants $75,000.00. Notes. were given for $65,000.00 and $10,000.00 was paid in cash. The decree cancelled all of these unpaid notes amounting to $22,800.00 and required defendants to pay back the, $10,000.00 paid in cash and also all amounts paid on notes which' totaled $22,200.00.

I. Events of First Period — January, 1934, to January, 1935, Inclusive.

This story begins in 1933, when defendant met Mr. Arthur, plaintiff’s vice-president, by reason of being attorney for the receivers of Theatre’ Realty Company of St. Louis, which owned the Fox Theatre there. (The receivers were Judge James T. Blair and Ed Koeln.) Arthur had then had much experience in the moving picture business and was negotiating leases for theatres. His headquarters were in New York and he was acting principally through F. & M. Stageshows, Inc., a subsidiary corporation of plaintiff. In 1933, he had acquired a half interest in a Missouri corporation called the Eden Theatre Corporation (hereinafter called Eden) operating the St. Louis Theatre on Grand Boulevard; the other half interest being owned by a group headed by a banker, Mr. A. W. Waldheim, which had acquired ownership of the fee through a defaulted bond issue. Mr. Arthur at this time became acquainted with Mr. Harry Koplar who was employed as Manager of the St. Louis Theatre. Arthur negotiated for a lease of the Fox Theatre, for the duration of its receivership, with defendant and the receivers he represented, and this lease was agreed upon in January, 1934. (This receivership continued from January, 1932, to September, 1935.) This lease was likewise taken in the name of Eden. About this time, two other companies owning theatres went into receivership. These were the Central Properties Corporation, owning the Ambassador and New Grand Central theatres; and the St. Louis Properties Corporation, owning the Mis *435

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Bluebook (online)
173 S.W.2d 417, 351 Mo. 428, 1943 Mo. LEXIS 430, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fanchon-marco-inc-v-leahy-mo-1943.