3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 FEI FEI FAN, Case No. 3:24-cv-00427-MMD-CLB
7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 STATE OF NEVADA EX REL. BOARD 9 OF REGENTS OF THE NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION, ON 10 BEHALF OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO, 11 Defendant. 12 13 I. SUMMARY 14 This dispute stems from Plaintiff Fei Fei Fan’s employment at the University of 15 Nevada, Reno (“UNR” or Defendant1) as an Assistant Professor. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) This 16 order addresses the following, pending motions: (1) Defendant’s motion for summary 17 judgment (ECF No. 15 (“Motion”));2 (2) Defendant’s motion to seal documents filed in 18 support of its Motion (ECF No. 16); and (3) Plaintiff’s motion to change venue, or in the 19 alternative, for judicial reassignment (ECF No. 49).3 Because Fan responds to the Motion 20
21 1The Complaint names State of Nevada ex. rel. Board of Regents of the Nevada System of Higher Education, on behalf of the University of Nevada, Reno. 22 2Defendant filed the Motion shortly after filing its Answer. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff 23 filed a response to the Motion after her counsel withdrew. (ECF No. 46.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 50.) Defendant objects to the length of Plaintiff’s response as exceeding 24 the page limit for a response to a dispositive motion. (ECF No. 50 at 5.) Local Rule 7-3(a) provides that motions for summary judgment and responses are limited to 30 pages. 25 Plaintiff filed a 22-page opposition but attached an appendix that is 21 pages in length to raise various objections and arguments in response to exhibits attached to Defendant’s 26 Motion. (ECF Nos. 46, 46-1.) The objections raised in the appendix contain arguments, so the Court considers the appendix part of the response for purposes of LR 7-3(a)’s limit 27 on the length of briefs. So considered, Plaintiff’s response exceeds the applicable page limit. While the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s response and considered all the arguments 28 raised in it, Plaintiff is admonished to comply with the Court’s Local Rules going forward. 2 relevant standards for transfer or recusal, and as further explained below, the Court will 3 deny the Motion, deny the motion to change venue, and grant Plaintiff leave to file an 4 amended complaint within 45 days. The Court will also grant Defendant’s motion to seal 5 because Defendant presented compelling reasons supporting sealing. 6 II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 7 Defendant hired Plaintiff, a Chinese national woman, as a tenure-track Assistant 8 Professor on July 1, 2015, and terminated her employment on January 19, 2024. (ECF 9 No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges she “filed a harassment complaint against Defendant in 2021.” 10 (Id. at 2.) Defendant asserts that, “[i]n January, 2021, Fan filed a complaint against 11 Professor X with EOTIX4, alleging sexual assault, harassment and misconduct.” (ECF 12 No. 15 at 4.) Plaintiff was awarded tenure in March 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges she 13 “received retaliation, discrimination and was eventually terminated as a result of making 14 the harassment complaint.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) After her employment termination on 15 January 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Nevada Equal Rights 16 Commission (“NERC”) and then this lawsuit after she received a NERC right to sue notice. 17 (Id.) 18 More specifically, on September 23, 2024, Plaintiff, through counsel, filed the 19 Complaint, alleging three causes of action: discrimination based on race and gender 20 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law; retaliation under Title VII; and 21 violation of NRS § 613.330 for alleged discrimination based on her sexual orientation. 22 (ECF No. 1 at 4-6.) Defendant filed an Answer on January 9, 2025 (ECF No. 11), followed 23 by the Motion on January 23, 2025 (ECF No. 15). The Court granted the parties’ 24 stipulation to extend the response deadline to March 14, 2025 (ECF No. 21), and 25 subsequently granted Plaintiff’s motion to extend the deadline to April 15, 2025 (ECF No. 26 27
28 4UNR’s Equal Opportunity and Title IX Office. (ECF No. 15 at 4.) 2 requested that her attorney be terminated, and her attorney filed a motion to withdraw, 3 which was granted. (ECF Nos. 35, 37, 38.) Since then, Plaintiff has represented herself. 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 The Court first addresses the Motion, then the motion to seal, and then the motion 6 to change venue. 7 A. Motion for Summary Judgment 8 Defendant’s primary argument focuses on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. (ECF No. 15 9 at 14-18.) Defendant further argues that to the extent the Complaint asserts discrimination 10 claims, these claims are legally deficient on several grounds, including for failure to 11 exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 12(b)(6). (Id. at 18-20.) While Plaintiff’s response mostly alleges procedural defects, 13 Plaintiff does point out that the alleged retaliatory actions were not limited to her 14 termination. (ECF No. 46 at 8.) Because Plaintiff’s response raises allegations that are 15 not in her Complaint—and as further discussed below—the Court will deny the Motion 16 and grant leave for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The Court addresses below 17 Defendant’s arguments along with the arguments Plaintiff raises in her response. 18 Defendant relies on the McDonnell Douglas framework to argue that Plaintiff failed 19 to establish her prima facie case and Defendant had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 20 for its decision to terminate her employment that was not pretextual. (ECF No. 15 at 14- 21 18.) To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 22 retaliation by demonstrating: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an 23 adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity 24 and the adverse employment action. See Dawson v. Entek, 630 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 25 2011). “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for 26 cause of the challenged employment action.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 27
28 5Judge Baldwin subsequently granted Plaintiff’s pro se motion to extend the response deadline to May 15, 2025. (ECF No. 45.) 2 production shifts to the employer to present legitimate reasons for the adverse 3 employment action.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000) 4 (citation omitted). “Once the employer carries this burden, plaintiff must demonstrate a 5 genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason advanced by the employer was a 6 pretext.” Id. (citation omitted). “Only then does the case proceed beyond the summary 7 judgment stage.” Id. 8 Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a causal link between her 9 complaint about Professor X in 2021 and her employment termination in January 2024 10 because of the three year gap in time. (ECF No. 15 at 14-15.) In response, Plaintiff asserts 11 that retaliation “began with the Title IX investigation itself, which was triggered after 12 Plaintiff’s complaint and conducted in a manner that ignored exculpatory evidence, 13 fabricated interview notes, and denied Plaintiff meaningful access.” (ECF No.
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 FEI FEI FAN, Case No. 3:24-cv-00427-MMD-CLB
7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 STATE OF NEVADA EX REL. BOARD 9 OF REGENTS OF THE NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION, ON 10 BEHALF OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO, 11 Defendant. 12 13 I. SUMMARY 14 This dispute stems from Plaintiff Fei Fei Fan’s employment at the University of 15 Nevada, Reno (“UNR” or Defendant1) as an Assistant Professor. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) This 16 order addresses the following, pending motions: (1) Defendant’s motion for summary 17 judgment (ECF No. 15 (“Motion”));2 (2) Defendant’s motion to seal documents filed in 18 support of its Motion (ECF No. 16); and (3) Plaintiff’s motion to change venue, or in the 19 alternative, for judicial reassignment (ECF No. 49).3 Because Fan responds to the Motion 20
21 1The Complaint names State of Nevada ex. rel. Board of Regents of the Nevada System of Higher Education, on behalf of the University of Nevada, Reno. 22 2Defendant filed the Motion shortly after filing its Answer. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff 23 filed a response to the Motion after her counsel withdrew. (ECF No. 46.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 50.) Defendant objects to the length of Plaintiff’s response as exceeding 24 the page limit for a response to a dispositive motion. (ECF No. 50 at 5.) Local Rule 7-3(a) provides that motions for summary judgment and responses are limited to 30 pages. 25 Plaintiff filed a 22-page opposition but attached an appendix that is 21 pages in length to raise various objections and arguments in response to exhibits attached to Defendant’s 26 Motion. (ECF Nos. 46, 46-1.) The objections raised in the appendix contain arguments, so the Court considers the appendix part of the response for purposes of LR 7-3(a)’s limit 27 on the length of briefs. So considered, Plaintiff’s response exceeds the applicable page limit. While the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s response and considered all the arguments 28 raised in it, Plaintiff is admonished to comply with the Court’s Local Rules going forward. 2 relevant standards for transfer or recusal, and as further explained below, the Court will 3 deny the Motion, deny the motion to change venue, and grant Plaintiff leave to file an 4 amended complaint within 45 days. The Court will also grant Defendant’s motion to seal 5 because Defendant presented compelling reasons supporting sealing. 6 II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 7 Defendant hired Plaintiff, a Chinese national woman, as a tenure-track Assistant 8 Professor on July 1, 2015, and terminated her employment on January 19, 2024. (ECF 9 No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges she “filed a harassment complaint against Defendant in 2021.” 10 (Id. at 2.) Defendant asserts that, “[i]n January, 2021, Fan filed a complaint against 11 Professor X with EOTIX4, alleging sexual assault, harassment and misconduct.” (ECF 12 No. 15 at 4.) Plaintiff was awarded tenure in March 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges she 13 “received retaliation, discrimination and was eventually terminated as a result of making 14 the harassment complaint.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) After her employment termination on 15 January 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Nevada Equal Rights 16 Commission (“NERC”) and then this lawsuit after she received a NERC right to sue notice. 17 (Id.) 18 More specifically, on September 23, 2024, Plaintiff, through counsel, filed the 19 Complaint, alleging three causes of action: discrimination based on race and gender 20 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law; retaliation under Title VII; and 21 violation of NRS § 613.330 for alleged discrimination based on her sexual orientation. 22 (ECF No. 1 at 4-6.) Defendant filed an Answer on January 9, 2025 (ECF No. 11), followed 23 by the Motion on January 23, 2025 (ECF No. 15). The Court granted the parties’ 24 stipulation to extend the response deadline to March 14, 2025 (ECF No. 21), and 25 subsequently granted Plaintiff’s motion to extend the deadline to April 15, 2025 (ECF No. 26 27
28 4UNR’s Equal Opportunity and Title IX Office. (ECF No. 15 at 4.) 2 requested that her attorney be terminated, and her attorney filed a motion to withdraw, 3 which was granted. (ECF Nos. 35, 37, 38.) Since then, Plaintiff has represented herself. 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 The Court first addresses the Motion, then the motion to seal, and then the motion 6 to change venue. 7 A. Motion for Summary Judgment 8 Defendant’s primary argument focuses on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. (ECF No. 15 9 at 14-18.) Defendant further argues that to the extent the Complaint asserts discrimination 10 claims, these claims are legally deficient on several grounds, including for failure to 11 exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 12(b)(6). (Id. at 18-20.) While Plaintiff’s response mostly alleges procedural defects, 13 Plaintiff does point out that the alleged retaliatory actions were not limited to her 14 termination. (ECF No. 46 at 8.) Because Plaintiff’s response raises allegations that are 15 not in her Complaint—and as further discussed below—the Court will deny the Motion 16 and grant leave for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The Court addresses below 17 Defendant’s arguments along with the arguments Plaintiff raises in her response. 18 Defendant relies on the McDonnell Douglas framework to argue that Plaintiff failed 19 to establish her prima facie case and Defendant had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 20 for its decision to terminate her employment that was not pretextual. (ECF No. 15 at 14- 21 18.) To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 22 retaliation by demonstrating: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an 23 adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity 24 and the adverse employment action. See Dawson v. Entek, 630 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 25 2011). “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for 26 cause of the challenged employment action.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 27
28 5Judge Baldwin subsequently granted Plaintiff’s pro se motion to extend the response deadline to May 15, 2025. (ECF No. 45.) 2 production shifts to the employer to present legitimate reasons for the adverse 3 employment action.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000) 4 (citation omitted). “Once the employer carries this burden, plaintiff must demonstrate a 5 genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason advanced by the employer was a 6 pretext.” Id. (citation omitted). “Only then does the case proceed beyond the summary 7 judgment stage.” Id. 8 Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a causal link between her 9 complaint about Professor X in 2021 and her employment termination in January 2024 10 because of the three year gap in time. (ECF No. 15 at 14-15.) In response, Plaintiff asserts 11 that retaliation “began with the Title IX investigation itself, which was triggered after 12 Plaintiff’s complaint and conducted in a manner that ignored exculpatory evidence, 13 fabricated interview notes, and denied Plaintiff meaningful access.” (ECF No. 46 at 8.) 14 She further asserts that after her complaint in 2021, “UNR escalated internal control, 15 restricted assess to records, and initiated disciplinary proceedings during a period when 16 Plaintiff lacked counsel, discovery, and rebuttal opportunity.” (Id.) Plaintiff thus contends 17 that her alleged adverse employment actions were not limited to her employment 18 termination but consisted of this other alleged conduct culminating with her employment 19 termination. In reply, Defendant correctly points out that the Complaint does not contain 20 these allegations. (ECF No. 50 at 9.) 21 But Plaintiff’s response includes a request for leave to amend under Fed. R. Civ. 22 P. 15. (ECF No. 46 at 13.) The Court cannot find that amendment is futile. Viewing the 23 alleged adverse actions leading to her employment termination raised in Plaintiff’s 24 response—i.e., the Title IX investigation, escalation of “internal control” and “restricted 25 access to records”—and depending on when these actions were taken over the course 26 of the three years between her complaint in 2021 and her employment termination in 27 2024, Plaintiff may plausibly allege the requisite causal connection to establish a prima 28 facie case of retaliation. Moreover, in deciding to grant Plaintiff leave to amend, the Court 2 not previously amended her Complaint at this early stage of the proceedings, and Plaintiff 3 is proceeding pro se. 4 Defendant’s arguments as to the legitimate reason for its termination decision and 5 absence of pretext are premised on termination as the sole adverse action. (ECF No. 15 6 at 15-18.) The Court declines to address these arguments because the Court grants leave 7 to amend for Plaintiff to assert that other adverse actions were allegedly taken against 8 her leading to her employment termination. 9 Defendant additionally argues that to the extent the Complaint asserts 10 discrimination claims, they fail for the same reason and for additional reasons—that 11 Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the claims are time barred and the 12 allegations are too conclusory to state a claim. (ECF No. 15 at 18-20.) As to the first 13 argument, the Complaint does assert two claims for discrimination in the first cause of 14 action (discrimination based on race and gender) and the third cause of action 15 (discrimination based on sexual orientation). (ECF No. 1 at 4-6.) While Plaintiff did not 16 respond to Defendant’s arguments, the Court declines to address them at this time 17 because the Court is granting leave for Plaintiff to amend her Complaint. She many assert 18 claims for discrimination based on race, gender and/or sexual orientation in her amended 19 complaint to the extent she has a factual basis for them. 20 Plaintiff’s response also raises several arguments about procedural defects that 21 the Court will briefly address. First, Plaintiff generally makes sweeping arguments about 22 structural defects to suggest inherent unfairness and due process violations because 23 Defendant filed the Motion.6 (See e.g. ECF No. 46 at 1 (alleging “structural imbalance”), 24 2 & 4 (making statements like “structural exclusion,” “structurally invalid”), 5 (“structural 25 deprivation,” and “structural asymmetry” because Defendant sought summary judgment 26 before providing discovery). But Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 permits the filing of a motion for 27
28 6Plaintiff also discusses other alleged conduct, but the Court declines to address it because it is unrelated to the issues raised in the Motion. 2 Rule 56(b) provides that “[u]nless a different time is set . . . a party may file a motion for 3 summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.” Here, the 4 Court adopted the parties’ proposed date of November 14, 2025 as the deadline for filing 5 dispositive motions. (ECF No. 31 at 10.) In fact, that order acknowledged that Defendant 6 had filed the Motion. (Id. at 7.) 7 Second, Plaintiff asks for relief under Rule 56(d), claiming “procedural ambush.” 8 (ECF No. 46 at 14.) Rule 56(d) is explicit as to what a party opposing summary judgment 9 must show to obtain relief: “the nonmovant [must show] by affidavit or declaration that, 10 for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Plaintiff 11 did not file such an affidavit or declaration. Plaintiff instead references Rule 56(d) in 12 generally asking for relief, suggesting Rule 56(d) relief is warranted when “one party 13 monopolizes evidentiary access and seeks summary judgment.” (ECF No. 46 at 5.) 14 Plaintiff’s general allegations that Defendant has a monopoly over the records is 15 insufficient to meet Rule 56(d)’s requirements. Indeed, beyond failing to file a declaration 16 in support of her request, Plaintiff was required to explain in that declaration, “the specific 17 facts that further discovery would have revealed or explain[ed] why those facts would 18 have precluded summary judgment.” Singh v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 925 F.3d 1053, 1076 19 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Plaintiff did not do so. 20 Finally, Plaintiff claims that she “was systemically denied access to the procedural 21 tools required to litigate,” citing to Defendant’s filing of sealed exhibits, “CM/ECF denial,” 22 and her former counsel’s failure to timely transmit materials to her. (ECF No. 46 at 3.) 23 Understandably, there is a transition period from being represented by counsel to self- 24 representation,7 but the docket records the Court has reviewed do not support the 25 contention that Plaintiff was “systemically denied access.” (Id.) On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff’s 26
27 7In fact, at Plaintiff’s request, the Court extended the deadline for her to respond to the Motion given that she was newly proceeding pro se. (ECF No. 45 at 1 (extending 28 response deadline from April 15, 2025, to May 15, 2025).) Plaintiff filed her response on April 14, 2025, before the expiration of the former deadline. (ECF No. 46.) 2 of the Early Neutral Evaluation Plaintiff requested that her attorney be terminated).) The 3 Court granted the motion the next day, on April 2, 2025. (ECF No. 38.) On April 3, 2025, 4 Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file documents electronically. (ECF No. 40.) The Court 5 granted her motion the next day, on April 4, 2025. (ECF No. 42.) There was no delay in 6 Plaintiff gaining access to the Court’s electronic filing system to access the docket for this 7 case. The Court rejects her argument to the contrary. 8 B. Defendant’s Motion to Seal 9 Defendant seeks leave to file some exhibits to its Motion under seal because these 10 exhibits discuss Plaintiff’s sexual relationship with non-party Professor X, along with 11 Professor X’s family. (ECF No. 16.) Defendant further explains it seeks leave to file these 12 materials under seal consistent with its internal regulations, which deem personnel files 13 confidential. (Id. at 3.) And Defendant notes some of these exhibits contain personal 14 information. (Id.) Defendant also addresses the correct legal standard in its motion. (Id.) 15 Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion. 16 Defendant has presented compelling reasons supporting filing these exhibits 17 under seal. “[C]ourts have recognized the significant interest of non-party employees in 18 keeping their employment files ... secret.” Kalberer v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:13- 19 CV-02278-JCM, 2014 WL 5780383, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 5, 2014) (citation omitted) 20 (granting motion to seal an exhibit containing the personnel records of two non-party 21 employees under the compelling reasons standard). The Court will accordingly grant the 22 motion to seal. 23 However, Defendant filed the motion to seal itself under seal. (ECF No. 16.) The 24 motion—unlike the exhibits attached to it—does not contain any sensitive or personal 25 information that should be maintained under seal. (Id.) The Court will accordingly direct 26 the Clerk of Court to unseal the motion itself. 27 /// 28 /// 2 Plaintiff seeks to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), arguing in gist that due 3 to a “confluence of institutional entanglement, procedural asymmetry, and adverse 4 framing dynamics” this case cannot be fairly adjudicated in this venue. (ECF No. 49 at 3.) 5 Her reference to “institutional entanglement” appears to be based on her assertion that 6 UNR is “a governance anchor” within a system that includes “the Governor’s Office, and 7 judicial appointments throughout this District.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s claim of structural unfairness 8 appears to be grounded on the incorrect understanding that the State of Nevada and its 9 officials are involved in the appointment of federal judicial officers. To be clear, they are 10 not. Federal judges are nominated by the President of the United States and confirmed 11 by the United States Senate. See UNITED STATES COURTS, Types of Federal Judges (last 12 visited June 24, 2025), https://perma.cc/5VPN-YP7N (stating that federal judges “are 13 nominated by the president and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.”). 14 As to “procedural asymmetry” and “adverse framing dynamics,” Plaintiff cites to 15 objections that have not been addressed and rulings that purportedly favor Defendant. 16 But Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s rulings and the time it takes to resolve 17 motions and objections cannot serve as a basis to transfer venue. See In re Complaint of 18 Jud. Misconduct, 838 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Adverse rulings are not proof of bias or 19 fraud.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff also argues that “structural concerns” were raised in 20 two other cases, one involving Plaintiff, in which the United States Court of Appeals for 21 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal orders. (ECF No. 49 at 5.) But 22 these decisions addressed dismissal on the merits, and the appellate process is the 23 proper avenue for Plaintiff to challenge the Court’s decisions. 24 Plaintiff finally asks for “judicial reassignment within the District of Nevada” in the 25 alternative. (ECF No. 49 at 5-6.) She accordingly appears to seek the Court’s recusal. 26 But Plaintiff does not address the correct standard or articulate any argument regarding 27 the Court’s bias or perceived bias. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) mandates disqualification if the 28 judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Section 1 || 455(b)(1) compels recusal where a judge has personal bias or prejudice towards the 2 || moving party. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). The substantive standard for recusal under 28 3 || U.S.C. § 455 is: “[W]hether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would 4 || conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. 5 || Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). As to the Court specifically, 6 || Plaintiff does not address this standard, much less show recusal is warranted. 7 In sum, Plaintiff's motion to transfer venue is denied. 8 || IV. CONCLUSION 9 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 10 || cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 11 || determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 12 || issues before the Court. 13 It is therefore ordered that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14 || 15) is denied without prejudice as discussed herein. 15 It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint consistent 16 || with this order, she must file it within 45 days. 17 It is further ordered that if Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within 45 18 || days, the Court may dismiss her claims against Defendant without prejudice and close 19 || this case without further notice to Plaintiff. 20 It is further ordered that Defendant’s motion to seal (ECF No. 16) is granted. The 21 || exhibits attached to it will remain under seal. 22 However, the Clerk of Court is directed to unseal the motion to seal (ECF No. 16) 23 || itself—but not, for clarity, the exhibits attached to it. 24 It is further ordered that Plaintiff's motion to change venue (ECF No. 49) is denied. 25 DATED THIS 24" Day of June 2025.
27 MIRANDA M. DU 28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE