3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 JESSE WAYNE FALLIN, JR., Case No. 3:23-cv-00512-ART-CLB
6 Plaintiff, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of v. Law 7 UNITED STATES, et al., 8 Defendants. 9
10 I. BACKGROUND 11 Plaintiff Jesse Wayne Fallin (“Fallin”) hit a United States Postal Service 12 (“USPS”) van while driving near Fernley, Nevada. Fallin sued the United States 13 for his medical damages, pain and suffering, and lost wages. Both parties 14 presented argument and testimony in a five-day bench trial before the Court. 15 In its closing, the Government conceded duty, breach, causation, and 16 damages up to the medical treatment that Fallin received between the start of 17 the accident and April 26, 2021. The Government also conceded that all medical 18 care provided to Fallin fell within the standard of care. The Government 19 contested comparative fault, proximate and legal cause for spinal procedures 20 that had serious complications, and medical and economic damages after April 21 26, 2021. The Court addresses facts and law relevant to these questions as 22 required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Any findings of fact set forth 23 are findings of fact even if stated as conclusions of law, and any conclusions of 24 law are conclusions of law even if stated as findings of fact. 25 II. FINDINGS OF FACT 26 On January 30, 2021, Fallin hit a USPS van driven by Tyler Barnes 27 (“Barnes”). Barnes had stopped at a stop sign on River Ranch Road before 28 2 he turned further left to avoid a head-on collision. The right corners of both 3 cars collided, damaging both vehicles. 4 The Court first considers the factual issues regarding the accident, 5 including whether Fallin was traveling at an unreasonable rate of speed before 6 Barnes turned into his lane of traffic and whether Fallin attempted to reduce 7 his speed before hitting Barnes. It then considers whether Fallin’s damages 8 were caused by the accident or independently caused by an unrelated 2018 9 accident. It then considers whether Fallin’s medical treatment was a natural 10 and probable consequence of the accident. It then considers whether Fallin’s 11 medical treatment arose out of secondary gain. It then considers whether Fallin 12 suffered economic damages, past pain and suffering, and future pain and 13 suffering. 14 A. Fallin Had No Fault in the Underlying Car Accident. 15 In light of the testimonies of the three witnesses to the accident—Barnes, 16 Fallin, and Fallin’s wife Stephanie—Barnes was entirely at fault in the 17 underlying accident. 18 Fallin did not have reason to expect that Barnes would turn onto US-50 19 when he did. Fallin credibly testified that he saw Barnes stopped at a stop sign 20 around one hundred yards away. Fallin credibly testified that Barnes turned 21 into the road before he had time to avoid a collision. (ECF No. 53 at 17.) Barnes 22 credibly testified that Fallin’s vehicle was in Barnes’s blind spot as he turned, 23 and he admitted fault for the accident. (ECF No. 54 at 77–78.) Officer Knoch, a 24 police officer who arrived on the scene after the accident, issued Barnes a 25 citation for turning when Fallin had the right of way. (See id. at 174:23–175:5.) 26 He did not issue Fallin a citation. (Id.) 27 Fallin was not driving unreasonably fast when he hit Barnes. The speed 28 limit on River Ranch Road was sixty-five miles per hour. Fallin credibly 2 Barnes stopped at the stop sign on River Ranch Road, around 100 yards away. 3 Fallin’s wife, Stephanie, credibly testified that modifications for off-roading 4 made to the Fallins’ Chevy Tahoe prevented the vehicle from reaching a speed 5 much beyond sixty-five miles per hour. (ECF No. 53 at 205:16–206:1.) An 6 intake form from the emergency room later that day, based on an interview 7 with Fallin, recorded that Fallin was “traveling approximately 70 miles per 8 hour” before the accident. (See ECF No. 53 at 72:5–25.) Fallin and Stephanie 9 testified, though, that they were driving at or below the speed limit before 10 Barnes turned onto US-50. The Court finds that Fallin and Stephanie’s 11 testimony that they were traveling around the speed limit more credible than 12 the intake form from the emergency room, which itself acknowledges that 13 Fallin provided an approximation. Fallin was not driving unreasonably fast 14 before the accident. 15 Fallin made reasonable efforts to avoid the accident. Fallin had been 16 traveling at approximately forty-five miles per hour at the time of the incident, 17 according to Officer Knoch’s estimate based on surveying damage to the 18 vehicles at the scene of the accident. (See ECF No. 53 at 68:16–21.) The Court 19 also finds credible Officer Knoch’s testimony that he would have found Barnes 20 at fault even if Fallin had been driving seventy miles per hour upon seeing 21 Barnes one hundred yards away, because Barnes “did pull out in front of” 22 Fallin. (ECF 54 at 176:16-21.) Considered together with Fallin’s testimony that 23 he was driving around the speed limit when he saw Barnes, Knoch’s testimony 24 further supports finding that Fallin attempted to slow down before hitting the 25 postal van, and Barnes was entirely at fault. 26 B. Fallin’s Damages Were Caused by the Accident. 27 The factual issues to resolve regarding causation between the accident 28 and Fallin’s injuries are whether Fallin suffered any injury due to the accident, 2 independent to the accident in 2021, and whether Fallin’s injuries were 3 causally connected to his decision to seek medical treatment after the accident. 4 1. Fallin’s Injuries Were Not Solely Caused by a 2018 Accident. 5 In 2018, more than two years before the accident at issue in this case, 6 Fallin suffered a serious accident in which he did not seek extensive medical 7 care. The Government argues that the 2018 accident, and not the 2021 8 accident, caused Fallin’s injuries. 9 The 2021 accident was either the sole cause or a substantial 10 contribution to Fallin’s eventual injuries. Fallin’s injuries arose shortly after 11 the 2021 accident, and Fallin and his friends and family credibly testified that 12 he did not have severe back pain before the 2021 accident. (See EFC No. 56 at 13 143:17–144:5; 161:17–19; 164:15–20.) No evidence conclusively shows that 14 Fallin’s injuries arose only out of the 2018 accident. While the Government 15 points to facts suggesting that Fallin was drinking or using drugs before the 16 2018 accident and that he may have left a hospital after that accident against 17 medical advice, the Court finds that these facts do not undermine Fallin’s 18 otherwise credible testimony that the 2021 accident caused him enduring 19 physical pain. Fallin’s expert, Dr. Rappaport, testified that the 2021 accident 20 may have worsened Fallin’s injury from 2018. (See ECF No. 55 at 10:17– 21 11:17.) The Court finds Dr. Rappaport’s testimony credible. Accordingly, the 22 Court finds it more likely that Fallin’s injuries arose either solely out of the 23 2021 accident—or arose out of latent injuries from the 2018 accident 24 exacerbated by the 2021 accident—than the possibility that Fallin was only 25 injured in the 2018 accident. 26 2. The 2021 Accident Caused or Contributed to Fallin’s Injuries. 27 The 2021 accident caused or contributed to the pain which required 28 Fallin to seek medical treatment from January 2021 onward. Fallin and 2 during the collision. Fallin credibly testified that he told Officer Knoch at the 3 scene of the accident that he was experiencing back pain. Fallin and Stephanie 4 credibly testified that Fallin’s pain got worse throughout the day, eventually 5 requiring Fallin to go to the emergency room that night, instead of going 6 forward with their plans to sled with their children and friends. 7 Fallin credibly testified that his pain increased throughout the day and 8 in the weeks that followed. The Government points out that several witnesses 9 who saw Fallin immediately after the crash testified that Fallin said he was 10 “fine” and did not appear to be in debilitating pain. (See e.g., ECF No. 56 at 11 134:4–18.) These witnesses recalled Fallin answering that he was “OK,” 12 “alright,” or “fine” after the accident, and Stephanie posted photos of the 13 accident on Facebook with the caption: “The important part is everyone is 14 okay.” (ECF No. 53 at 210:17–22.) The Court interprets these statements, given 15 the seriousness of the accident, to mean that no one had died or been maimed 16 in the car crash. These witnesses—including Officer Knoch, Tyler Barnes, 17 USPS supervisor Jackey Wagner, and friends of Fallin’s family, Justin Gardner, 18 Savannah Murgia-Alarcon, and Chelsea Gardner—did not contradict Fallin and 19 Stephanie’s testimony that Fallin’s back and side hurt and that this pain 20 continued and got worse throughout the day. (See EFC No. 56 at 143:17- 21 144:5; 161:17-19; 164:15-20.) Finally, Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Rappaport credibly 22 testified that a person who had just been in a serious car accident may not 23 immediately feel pain because of adrenaline or shock. (ECF No. 55 at 8:18–9:6.) 24 C. Fallin’s Medical Treatment After April 26, 2021, Was a 25 Natural and Probable Consequence of His Injuries from the Accident. 26 The factual issues to resolve related to Fallin’s medical treatment are 27 whether Fallin attempted conservative treatment before seeking surgery and 28 2 out of those procedures were proximately caused by the accident. 3 Fallin attempted conservative treatment for his back pain. He attended 4 either four or five of twelve prescribed physical therapy sessions before being 5 prescribed a discogram. Though reports from physical therapy documented 6 improvements in Fallin’s condition, Fallin himself credibly testified that 7 physical therapy did not adequately reduce his pain. Fallin also received an 8 epidural injection and trigger-point injections as conservative treatment to 9 reduce back pain, and while Fallin reported that these were somewhat 10 effective, he credibly testified that these procedures failed to address pain over 11 time. Fallin’s friend and occasional supervisor Justin Gardner credibly testified 12 that he knew that Fallin was in serious pain at work and assigned him lighter 13 tasks after the accident. Gardner testified that even with a reduced workload, 14 Fallin experienced pain beyond what he could tolerate while working. 15 Fallin’s treating physicians decided to place Fallin on track for surgery 16 three months after the accident, which, while not as long as some doctors 17 might wait before undertaking an invasive surgery, was based on Fallin’s 18 presentation of pain and inability to work. Fallin’s expert, Dr. Rappaport, 19 testified that he typically recommends that surgery only be considered after six 20 months of conservative care. (ECF No. 55 at 84:19.) Dr. Jones, Fallin’s treating 21 physician, however, credibly testified that he considered Fallin a candidate for 22 surgery after three months of conservative care because Fallin’s pain kept him 23 from working. (See ECF No. 55 at 176:25–177:14.) Additionally, Dr. Jones did 24 not want to prescribe Fallin opioid painkillers, which Fallin and his wife also 25 wanted to avoid because of Fallin’s past struggles with addiction. (Id. at 209; 26 see ECF No. 53 at 32:14.) Additionally, Fallin and his wife testified that Fallin’s 27 pain kept him from working, doing household tasks, playing with his children, 28 and performing chores like gardening and mowing the lawn. (See ECF No. 53 2 The discogram ordered by Dr. Jones on May 13, 2021, and performed by 3 Dr. Sullivan in June 2021 was a natural and probable consequence arising out 4 of the accident. According to Drs. Rappaport, Bjerke, Chavez, Goode, and 5 Jones, discograms are a controversial medical procedure that were widely used 6 in the early 2000s to isolate specific spinal discs before undertaking surgeries 7 to fuse spinal disks. Though use of discograms is now less widespread, some 8 practitioners still use the procedure. The Court lacks a sufficient evidentiary 9 basis to decide whether discograms are within the standard of care, and the 10 Court need not decide this to resolve the case.1 11 Dr. Jones’s spinal fusion surgery, and all complications arising out of it, 12 were natural and probable consequences of the 2021 crash. Dr. Jones credibly 13 testified that he spoke with Dr. Sullivan, who worked in the same building, 14 about the results of Fallin’s discogram. (See ECF No. 55 at 230:7–18.) Dr. 15 Jones fused Fallin’s L3-4 disks on September 14, 2021, and Fallin experienced 16 complications—likely from anesthesia—which required an additional 17 emergency room visit. Months after the surgery, Fallin developed left-leg pain, 18 possibly due to the surgical route undertaken by Dr. Jones. Fallin also 19 underwent an MRI and radiofrequency ablations to address the newly 20 occurring pain, including treatment by Dr. Randall Goode, who credibly 21 testified as to the need for these additional procedures to address 22 complications from surgery. (See ECF No. 54 at 15–18.) By 2022, Fallin had 23 returned to work and believed that the surgery and related procedures 24
25 1 Additionally, whether a discogram was properly performed is not a relevant question in this case. Nevada law holds that tortfeasors are responsible for 26 subsequent negligence proximately related to the original tort. See Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc. v. Cash, 478 P.3d 362, 365 (Nev. 2020) (permitting a tortfeasor 27 to indemnify itself via contribution). The correct procedure to challenge 28 subsequent medical negligence is a cross-claim against the allegedly negligent successive tortfeasor or to seek contribution following judgment. 2 D. Fallin’s Medical Care Did Not Arise Out of Secondary 3 Gain or Medical Build-Up. 4 The Court lacks a basis to find that Fallin faked pain to receive invasive 5 spinal surgery. In its closing, the Government argued that Fallin was engaged 6 in “secondary gain,” meaning that he exaggerated symptoms in order to miss 7 work or obtain financial compensation. Fallin and his wife credibly testified 8 that Fallin was in severe pain following the car accident, and though Fallin was 9 hesitant about getting surgery, he credibly testified that he believed his 10 treating doctors when they said surgery would address the root cause of his 11 pain. Fallin’s colleague and occasional supervisor Justin Gardner credibly 12 testified that he witnessed Fallin in pain before the surgery. Fallin’s treating 13 physicians testified that they and their staff observed Fallin was in pain during 14 clinical encounters. (See e.g., ECF No. 54 at 14:24-15:11; ECF No. 55 at 153:9- 15 17, 169:5-8.) The Government points to notes from physical therapy sessions 16 which recorded that Fallin was progressing and feeling less pain, but these 17 notes, which themselves contain copy-pasted summaries of Fallin’s progress 18 and status, do not convince the Court that Fallin was engaging in secondary 19 gain. Several credible percipient witnesses testified to Fallin’s pain in the weeks 20 following the accident. (See EFC No. 56 at 143:17-144:5; 161:17-19; 164:15- 21 20.) Dr. Jones also explained that despite some pain relief during treatment, 22 Fallin’s pain symptoms were persisting, not improving, during this period. 23 Similarly, the Court lacks evidence to find that Fallin’s lawyers directed 24 his treatment in order to maximize damages in this lawsuit. The sole evidence 25 allowing the Court to infer that Fallin’s lawyers directed his treatment is a May 26 6, 2021, note in records from Tahoe Fracture saying that “Benson Bignham 27 [sic] called stating what is the next step for [Fallin].” (See ECF No. 53 at 149:8– 28 2 witnesses who testified about Fallin’s lawyers directing treatment or any 3 scheme to artificially inflate Fallin’s damages. Fallin’s doctors credibly testified 4 that a law firm operating as a payor for medical billings communicates with 5 medical providers in the same way an insurance company would. (ECF No. 54 6 at 27–28, 34, 56–57.) The fact that Fallin received treatment based on medical 7 liens instead of insurance does not by itself show that Fallin was receiving 8 unnecessary care, and at least one of Fallin’s treating doctors, Dr. Jones, 9 credibly testified that he was not aware at the time he provided care that 10 Fallin’s source of payment was a lien. (See ECF No. 55 at 179–80, 195:12; see 11 also id. at 275.) The Government did not provide evidence—beyond the 12 statements of Government’s counsel—showing a pattern or practice of inflated 13 billing, law-firm-directed treatment, or diagnosis of unnecessary, medically 14 unjustified procedures. (See ECF No. 57 at 162:5–11.) Without this sort of 15 evidence, the Court cannot find that Fallin’s lawyers directed him to 16 unnecessary medical treatment or inflated costs. 17 E. The Court Grants Plaintiff’s Request for Medical Damages. 18 Fallin seeks damages for special medical damages that he incurred and 19 future medical damages for continued back pain stemming from the accident 20 and subsequent care. The Court grants the request for special medical 21 damages and future recommendations as follows: 22 (1) Medical Special Damages: 23 Nevada Emergency Physicians $1,266.00 Northern Nevada Medical Center $18,731.00 24 The Swift Institute $60,963.25 Tahoe Carson Radiology $1,375.00 25 Fernley Physical Therapy, Inc. $3,273.00 26 Carson Tahoe Hospital $90,368.31 Ortho Spine and Rehab $1,720.00 27 Central Lyon County Fire Protection District $3,340.32 The Swift Institute – Spine Nevada MRI $2,750.00 28 James J. Lynch, MD, Ltd. $34,943.00 2 TOTAL $219,529.88
3 (See ECF No. 55 at 63:21-67:24.) 4 (2) Future Recommendations: 5 Selective Nerve Root Block $7,600.00 Sympathetic Branch Block $10,000.00 6
7 TOTAL $17,600.00 (See ECF No. 55 at 68:1-7 and 68:24-69:9) 8 9 The Court finds credible Dr. Rappaport’s testimony that these future 10 treatments are medically necessary and reasonably related to Fallin’s injuries 11 from the accident. 12 F. Plaintiff’s Economic Damages Expert Testimony 13 Applies to Fallin’s Economic Loss Claim. 14 Both parties offered economic analyses to estimate Fallin’s economic 15 damages from time spent not working. The Government’s expert, Mr. Partin, 16 stated that his analysis was based on expert reports from Drs. Chavez and 17 Bjerke that found that Fallin should have been able to work within three 18 months of the accident. Mr. Partin stated that he would be unable to estimate 19 economic damages based on different assumptions. Fallin’s expert, Mr. Simms, 20 used a different methodology involving calculating Fallin’s wages from his W-2s 21 and applying that wage to the time he spent not working. 22 Mr. Partin’s analysis depends on finding that Fallin would have been 23 able to work within several weeks of the accident. Because the Court finds 24 otherwise, and because Dr. Partin has not offered an expert analysis that takes 25 into account the much longer period during which Fallin was unable to work, 26 the Court is left with Mr. Simm’s analysis. The Court finds Mr. Simm’s analysis 27 credible and adopts it. Accordingly, the Court finds the following for Fallin’s 28 2 Wage Loss: $69,934.00 3 (ECF No. 54 at 135:17-22, 135:23-137:20)
4 G. Past Pain and Suffering 5 The Court finds that damages of Fallin’s medical specials and wage loss 6 multiplied by two sufficiently compensate Fallin for past pain and suffering. 7 General Damages: 8 Past Pain and Suffering $614,127.76
9 H. There is No Award for Future Pain and Suffering. 10 The Court lacks a basis in the evidence to find future pain and suffering. 11 III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 12 Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 1402(b), 13 2401(b), 2402, 2671-2680 (“FTCA”), the Court has subject matter jurisdiction 14 over Fallin’s negligence claim against the United States. Nevada law applies to 15 this claim. See Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 1985); 28 16 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. Under Nevada law, to prove negligence, a plaintiff 17 must show that: (1) the defendant had a duty to exercise due care towards the 18 plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached the duty; (3) the breach was the actual 19 and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury; and (4) the plaintiff incurred 20 damages. Lawrence v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 451 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 21 1172 (D. Nev. 2020); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 590-91 (Nev. 22 1991). 23 A. Duty 24 In Nevada, courts determine duty by deciding whether “such a relation 25 exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation 26 upon one for the benefit of the other.” PHWLV, LLC v. House of CB USA, LLC, 27 554 P.3d 715, 719 (Nev. 2024) (citing Lee v. GNLV Corp., 22 P.3d 209, 212 28 2 under a twofold duty” that includes both compliance with traffic laws and to 3 “exercise the care of the ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances.” 4 Johns v. McAteer, 85 Nev. 477, 483 (1969); accord Glover-Armont v. Cargile, 134 5 Nev. 361, 362 (Nev. App. 2018). Barnes and Fallin both had a duty to exercise 6 the care of an ordinarily prudent driver. 7 B. Breach 8 Whether a defendant breached their duty of care is a question of fact. 9 PHWLV, 554 P.3d at 720 (citing Lee, 22 P.3d at 212). If a defendant asserts 10 comparative negligence as a defense, the trier of fact must find the relevant 11 percentage of fault of the parties and award damages according to that 12 percentage. N.R.S. 41.141; Café Moda v. Palma, 128 Nev. 78, 80 (2012). 13 Tyler Barnes, acting in his capacity as an employee of Defendant United 14 States, breached his duty to Fallin by failing to yield to Fallin’s right of way. 15 Fallin, who was traveling around the speed limit and attempted to slow down 16 upon seeing Barnes turn, did not breach his duty to Barnes. Applying the law 17 to the facts, for the reasons discussed in the Findings of Fact, the Court finds 18 Barnes 100% at fault. 19 C. Causation 20 To establish causation, a plaintiff must prove that their damages were 21 actually and proximately caused by the defendant’s breach. See Goodrich & 22 Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc. v. J.R. Woolard, Inc., 101 P.3d 792, 797 (Nev. 23 2004) (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 107 (Nev. 1998)). 24 Actual cause is but-for causation. Proximate cause “limits a defendant’s 25 liability to foreseeable consequences that have a reasonably close connection 26 with both the defendant’s conduct and the harm which that conduct created” 27 (i.e., conduct “produces the injury complained of and without which the result 28 would not have occurred”). Id. Medical expert testimony regarding causation 2 Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc., 111 P.3d 1112, 1116) (Nev. 2005). 3 Under Nevada law, a tortfeasor is “liable for any physical injury” it 4 causes, “no matter how unforeseeable,” once it inflicts “harm on a plaintiff’s 5 body.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002), 6 overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 7 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Matlock v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-0051- 8 KJD-GWF, 2010 WL 3171262, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2010). Applying the law 9 to the facts, as discussed supra 1.B.2, 1.B.C, the Court concludes that Fallin’s 10 injuries were actually and proximately caused by the accident. 11 D. Damages 12 A successful tort plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all the natural 13 and probable consequences of the tortfeasor’s breach. Lerner Shops of Nev., Inc. 14 v. Marin, 423 P.2d 398, 401 (Nev. 1967). Compensatory damages awards are 15 reasonable under Nevada law if they are supported by substantial evidence, 16 and they are not “given under the influence of passion or prejudice” or 17 otherwise shock the conscience. Wyeth v. Rowatt, 244 P.3d 765, 782 (Nev. 18 2010) (internal citations omitted). 19 1. Past Medical Damages 20 As the Government only contests Fallin’s medical damages after April 26, 21 2021, the Court only considers these damages. (See ECF No. 57 at 156, 160.) 22 The Government contends that Fallin must show that both past and future 23 damages must be medically necessary and reasonably related to the accident. 24 (See id. at 160:3.) Fallin argues that even if past treatment was contraindicated 25 or the result of negligent diagnosis or treatment, it still must be compensated if 26 it was causally related to the accident. (Id. at 162.) 27 Contrary to the Government’s position, under Nevada law, a plaintiff 28 need only show that past medical damages were the “natural and probable 2 a plaintiff to show that treatment is “reasonably necessary.” Compare Hall v. 3 SSF, Inc., 930 P.2d 94, 97 (Nev. 1996) and Lerner, 423 P.2d at 401. This is 4 because Nevada’s “well-settled law” holds “that the original tortfeasor is liable 5 for the malpractice of the attending physicians.” Republic Silver State Disposal, 6 478 P.3d at 365 (citing Hansen v. Collett, 380 P.2d 301, 304 (Nev. 1963); 7 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 457). An attending physician may commit 8 malpractice by providing inappropriate treatment or an inappropriate 9 diagnosis. See Szymborski v. Spring Mountain Treatment Ctr., 403 P.3d 1280, 10 1284, 1286 (Nev. 2017) (malpractice includes claims of negligent diagnosis and 11 treatment). Inappropriate treatment and diagnoses are never reasonably 12 necessary. Applying the “reasonably necessary” standard to past medical 13 damages would therefore allow an original tortfeasor to avoid liability for 14 medical malpractice arising out of an accident, contrary to Nevada law. 15 The Court finds that Fallin received a discogram as a part of his medical 16 treatment for the injuries he suffered because of the 2021 accident. The fact 17 that the discogram is a controversial procedure does not affect Fallin’s 18 damages, since the relevant standard is whether the procedure performed on 19 Fallin was the natural and probable consequence of Fallin’s injuries. The 20 precedential cases the Government cites do not dispute this view, and instead 21 disallow damages based on credibility findings about damages. See Quintero v. 22 McDonald, 14 P.3d 522, 524 (Nev. 2000) (upholding jury verdict finding liability 23 but no damages because “a reasonable jury could have disbelieved Quintero's 24 testimony concerning her alleged pain and suffering and . . . inferred that she 25 was not injured as a proximate result of the accident”); Fox v. Cusick, 533 P.2d 26 466, 468 (upholding jury verdict finding liability without damages on basis that 27 jury believed that defendant either did not proximately cause accident or 28 plaintiffs did not “truly sustain personal injuries as a result of the collision”); 2 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Fallin’s medical treatment, 3 including treatment after April 26, 2021, were natural and probable 4 consequences of the accident. 5 2. Future Medical Damages 6 A plaintiff must show that future medical expenses are “reasonably 7 necessary” and supported by substantial evidence. See Wilson v. Biomat USA, 8 Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1657-GMN-RJJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126853, at *6 (D. Nev. 9 Oct. 31, 2011) (citing Hall, 930 P.2d at 97). The Court holds that testimony 10 from Dr. Rappaport and Fallin’s treating physicians justifying the two Selective 11 Nerve Root Block and Sympathetic Branch Root Block constituted substantial 12 evidence that such treatments are reasonably necessary. 13 3. Pain and Suffering 14 Because of the subjective nature of pain and suffering, “a determination 15 of their monetary compensation falls peculiarly within the province” of the 16 finder of fact. Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Co., 686 P.2d 925, 932 (Nev. 1984); 17 See also Harrah's Laughlin, Inc. v. Swanson, 129 Nev. 1121 (2013) 18 (unpublished disposition) (rejecting “analogous award” and “multiples test” for 19 calculating pain and suffering damages). Applying the law to the facts, the 20 Court holds that an amount equal to two times Fallin’s special medical 21 damages and economic damages would sufficiently and not overly compensate 22 Fallin for his pain and suffering incurred in the years following the accident. 23 4. Economic Damages 24 Because Mr. Partin’s report relies on assumptions that the Court does 25 not agree with, and because Mr. Simms was qualified as an expert and testified 26 credibly as to his methodology and conclusions regarding Fallin’s lost wages, 27 the Court adopts Simms’s report for Fallin’s economic damages. 28 1 5. Summary of Damages 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendant's negligence 3 || resulted in Plaintiffs damages as detailed above in the amounts of $219,539.88 4 || in medical special damages, $17,600 in future medical damages, $614,127.76 in 5 || general damages for pain and suffering, and $69,934 for loss of wages, totaling 6 || $921.191.64. 7 IV. CONCLUSION 8 THEREFORE, in light of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 9 || Law, 10 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Judgment is 11 || entered against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff is 13 || awarded damages in the amount of $921,191.64. 14 15 DATED THIS 9t day of September, 2025. 16 en 17 Aru / ANNE R. TRAUM 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28