1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 AHMAD MUKHTAR FAIZI, Case No. 22-cv-04224-VKD
9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 10 v. DENYING IN PART FEE APPLICATION 11 BAKTASH TEMORI, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 56 Defendants. 12
13 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 On February 15, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Mr. Faizi’s motion for 16 an order finding defendants in contempt of the Court’s October 2022 preliminary injunction. Dkt. 17 No. 54. In that order, the Court found that “Falafel Flame may recover reasonable attorney’s fees 18 and costs incurred in connection with the present motion for contempt,” and set a briefing 19 schedule for counsel’s anticipated application for fees and costs. Id. at 9, 10-11. 20 Plaintiff’s counsel timely submitted their application, seeking $11,660.50 in fees for work 21 performed by the Emran Law Firm, $5,805.00 for work performed by the Law Office of Kenneth 22 Seligson, and $494.28 in costs incurred by the Emran Law Firm. Dkt. No. 56. Although they 23 were given an opportunity to respond, defendants have not filed any opposition or other response. 24 Briefing is closed, and the matter is deemed suitable for determination without oral argument. 25 Civil L.R. 7-1(b); see also Dkt. No. 54 at 11. Upon consideration of the papers presented, the 26 Court grants the application in part and denies it in part. 27 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Whether calculating attorney’s fees under California or federal law, courts follow the 4 lodestar approach. “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee 5 is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly 6 rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The party seeking an award of fees should 7 submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Id. 8 Preliminarily, the Court notes that the submitted timesheets indicate that the requested fees 9 include work performed by several timekeepers other than Messrs. Emran and Seligson, identified 10 by the initials “SN,” “MC,” and “AG.” See Dkt. Nos. 56-1, 56-2. Counsel does not identify these 11 timekeepers, much less provide any support for the hourly rates claimed for the work they 12 performed. Accordingly, to the extent the present application seeks fees incurred for work 13 performed by “SN,” “MC,” or “AG,” the application is denied. The remainder of this order 14 focuses on work performed by plaintiff’s counsel of record, Harris Emran and Kenneth Seligson. 15 B. Reasonable Hourly Rate 16 “In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the rate 17 prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, 18 experience, and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 19 1986), reh'g denied, amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Blum v. 20 Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). “Generally, the relevant community is the forum in 21 which the district court sits.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). The fee 22 applicant has the burden of producing evidence, other than declarations of interested counsel, that 23 the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by 24 lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11. 25 “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the 26 community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the 27 plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers 1 The present application seeks fees based on a $250 hourly rate for Mr. Emran and for Mr. 2 Seligson. Although Messrs. Emran and Seligson say that their customary rate is $350/hour, they 3 have reduced their rate for their work on this particular case to $250/hour. See Dkt. No. 56 at 2; 4 Dkt. No. 56-1 ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 56-2 ¶ 3. Mr. Emran avers that he was admitted to the California bar 5 in December 2019 and has been practicing in the areas of business and intellectual property 6 matters. Dkt. No. 56-1 ¶ 2. Mr. Seligson says that he was admitted to the California bar in June 7 2019 and that his practice “involves litigating business disputes among shareholders and 8 businesses.” Dkt. No. 56-2 ¶¶ 2, 3. Apart from their own attestations that they believe their fees 9 are reasonable (see Dkt. No. 56-1 ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 56-2 ¶ 3), neither Mr. Emran nor Mr. Seligson has 10 submitted any support for the reasonableness of their claimed hourly rate. Nor has the Court 11 found any decisions indicating that courts in this district have awarded Mr. Emran or Mr. Seligson 12 fees at the requested hourly rate. Nevertheless, decisions by other courts in this district suggest 13 that a $250 hourly rate is within the range of those prevailing in the community for similar 14 services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation. See Stockfood 15 Am., Inc. v. Sequoia Wholesale Florist, Inc., No. 20-cv-03507-DMR, 2021 WL 4597080, at *8 16 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2021) (observing that “[c]ourts in the Northern District of California generally 17 have determined that rates ranging from $225 to $600 are reasonable in an intellectual property 18 case.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Simon v. Maple Beach Ventures LLC, No. 21- 19 cv-01005-PJH, 2021 WL 1907821, at * (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2021) (in business dispute, awarding 20 fees at $300 hourly rate for attorney with three years of experience). 21 C. Reasonable Hours 22 The party seeking fees “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and 23 documenting the appropriate hours expended[.]” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. “Where the 24 documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Id. at 25 433. A district court should also exclude from the lodestar fee calculation any hours that were not 26 “reasonably expended,” such as hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. 27 See id. at 433-34; see also Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210 (“Those hours may be reduced by the court 1 duplicated; if the hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.”). 2 The Court has reviewed the respective timesheets submitted by Messrs. Emran and 3 Seligson. For the most part, the hours claimed by Mr. Emran are reasonable; however, the Court 4 finds that the following deductions are warranted: 0.3 hours (i.e., $75.00) for time spent on 5 February 10, 2023 on a “[c]all w/SN & MD re: initial disclosures” (see Dkt. No. 56-1 at ECF 8), 6 as it is not apparent that this activity represents fees incurred in connection with the motion for 7 contempt. Similarly, there are several block billing entries, in which Mr. Emran bills time for a 8 group of tasks, some of which appear to pertain to the contempt motion, and others that do not 9 (namely, time spent working on a “discovery plan.”).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 AHMAD MUKHTAR FAIZI, Case No. 22-cv-04224-VKD
9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 10 v. DENYING IN PART FEE APPLICATION 11 BAKTASH TEMORI, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 56 Defendants. 12
13 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 On February 15, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Mr. Faizi’s motion for 16 an order finding defendants in contempt of the Court’s October 2022 preliminary injunction. Dkt. 17 No. 54. In that order, the Court found that “Falafel Flame may recover reasonable attorney’s fees 18 and costs incurred in connection with the present motion for contempt,” and set a briefing 19 schedule for counsel’s anticipated application for fees and costs. Id. at 9, 10-11. 20 Plaintiff’s counsel timely submitted their application, seeking $11,660.50 in fees for work 21 performed by the Emran Law Firm, $5,805.00 for work performed by the Law Office of Kenneth 22 Seligson, and $494.28 in costs incurred by the Emran Law Firm. Dkt. No. 56. Although they 23 were given an opportunity to respond, defendants have not filed any opposition or other response. 24 Briefing is closed, and the matter is deemed suitable for determination without oral argument. 25 Civil L.R. 7-1(b); see also Dkt. No. 54 at 11. Upon consideration of the papers presented, the 26 Court grants the application in part and denies it in part. 27 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Whether calculating attorney’s fees under California or federal law, courts follow the 4 lodestar approach. “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee 5 is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly 6 rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The party seeking an award of fees should 7 submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Id. 8 Preliminarily, the Court notes that the submitted timesheets indicate that the requested fees 9 include work performed by several timekeepers other than Messrs. Emran and Seligson, identified 10 by the initials “SN,” “MC,” and “AG.” See Dkt. Nos. 56-1, 56-2. Counsel does not identify these 11 timekeepers, much less provide any support for the hourly rates claimed for the work they 12 performed. Accordingly, to the extent the present application seeks fees incurred for work 13 performed by “SN,” “MC,” or “AG,” the application is denied. The remainder of this order 14 focuses on work performed by plaintiff’s counsel of record, Harris Emran and Kenneth Seligson. 15 B. Reasonable Hourly Rate 16 “In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the rate 17 prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, 18 experience, and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 19 1986), reh'g denied, amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Blum v. 20 Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). “Generally, the relevant community is the forum in 21 which the district court sits.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). The fee 22 applicant has the burden of producing evidence, other than declarations of interested counsel, that 23 the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by 24 lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11. 25 “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the 26 community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the 27 plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers 1 The present application seeks fees based on a $250 hourly rate for Mr. Emran and for Mr. 2 Seligson. Although Messrs. Emran and Seligson say that their customary rate is $350/hour, they 3 have reduced their rate for their work on this particular case to $250/hour. See Dkt. No. 56 at 2; 4 Dkt. No. 56-1 ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 56-2 ¶ 3. Mr. Emran avers that he was admitted to the California bar 5 in December 2019 and has been practicing in the areas of business and intellectual property 6 matters. Dkt. No. 56-1 ¶ 2. Mr. Seligson says that he was admitted to the California bar in June 7 2019 and that his practice “involves litigating business disputes among shareholders and 8 businesses.” Dkt. No. 56-2 ¶¶ 2, 3. Apart from their own attestations that they believe their fees 9 are reasonable (see Dkt. No. 56-1 ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 56-2 ¶ 3), neither Mr. Emran nor Mr. Seligson has 10 submitted any support for the reasonableness of their claimed hourly rate. Nor has the Court 11 found any decisions indicating that courts in this district have awarded Mr. Emran or Mr. Seligson 12 fees at the requested hourly rate. Nevertheless, decisions by other courts in this district suggest 13 that a $250 hourly rate is within the range of those prevailing in the community for similar 14 services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation. See Stockfood 15 Am., Inc. v. Sequoia Wholesale Florist, Inc., No. 20-cv-03507-DMR, 2021 WL 4597080, at *8 16 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2021) (observing that “[c]ourts in the Northern District of California generally 17 have determined that rates ranging from $225 to $600 are reasonable in an intellectual property 18 case.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Simon v. Maple Beach Ventures LLC, No. 21- 19 cv-01005-PJH, 2021 WL 1907821, at * (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2021) (in business dispute, awarding 20 fees at $300 hourly rate for attorney with three years of experience). 21 C. Reasonable Hours 22 The party seeking fees “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and 23 documenting the appropriate hours expended[.]” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. “Where the 24 documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Id. at 25 433. A district court should also exclude from the lodestar fee calculation any hours that were not 26 “reasonably expended,” such as hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. 27 See id. at 433-34; see also Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210 (“Those hours may be reduced by the court 1 duplicated; if the hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.”). 2 The Court has reviewed the respective timesheets submitted by Messrs. Emran and 3 Seligson. For the most part, the hours claimed by Mr. Emran are reasonable; however, the Court 4 finds that the following deductions are warranted: 0.3 hours (i.e., $75.00) for time spent on 5 February 10, 2023 on a “[c]all w/SN & MD re: initial disclosures” (see Dkt. No. 56-1 at ECF 8), 6 as it is not apparent that this activity represents fees incurred in connection with the motion for 7 contempt. Similarly, there are several block billing entries, in which Mr. Emran bills time for a 8 group of tasks, some of which appear to pertain to the contempt motion, and others that do not 9 (namely, time spent working on a “discovery plan.”). The Court deducts 0.1 hours ($25.00) from 10 each of those entries as follows: January 3, 2023 entry for “Phone Meeting w/KS to discuss 11 discovery plan, strategy for motion for contempt, research for sanctions”; January 4, 2023 entry 12 for “Call w/KS re: motion and discovery”; and a February 20, 2023 entry for “Call with MC to 13 discuss granted motion for contempt; discuss initial disclosures; discovery plan strategy.” The 14 Court also deducts 0.4 hours (i.e., $100) for time spent on January 13, 2023 on “[c]all w/KS 15 meeting prep,” as this entry is entirely generic and counsel have not met their burden to establish 16 that any of that time was incurred in connection with the motion for contempt. The total fees 17 awarded for work performed by Mr. Emran is $6,212.50. 18 With respect to Mr. Seligson, the hours claimed are also reasonable, with some exceptions. 19 The Court deducts the following amounts for time spent reviewing the case management order and 20 discussing mediation and discovery, as it is not apparent that those activities represent fees 21 incurred in connection with the motion for contempt: 0.3 hours (i.e., $75.00) on November 27, 22 2022; 0.1 hours (i.e., $25.00) on November 28, 2022; 0.3 hours (i.e., $75.00) on January 5, 2023; 23 0.2 hours ($50.00) on January 10, 2023; 0.6 hours (i.e., $150.00) on January 11, 2023; and 0.2 24 hours (i.e., $50.00) on February 15, 2023. Similarly, the Court deducts 0.1 hours ($25.00) from a 25 January 3, 2023 block billing entry for time spent on “discovery plan” and 0.1 ($25.00) hours from 26 a February 22, 2023 entry for time spent on “M[ediation] B[rief].” The total fees awarded for 27 work performed by Mr. Seligson is $4,650.00. 1 D. Costs 2 With respect to costs requested by the Emran Law Firm, the receipts and invoice 3 documents submitted in support of the application support only a total of $434.28. Accordingly, 4 || the Court awards this amount in costs. 5 || I. CONCLUSION 6 Based on the foregoing, the Court awards plaintiff Falafel Flame a total of $10,862.50 in 7 attorney’s fees and $434.28 in costs in connection with the motion for contempt. Defendants must 8 deposit $11,296.78 in the escrow account established by Mr. Faizi for the benefit of Falafel Flame 9 || by May 5, 2023. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: April 21, 2023 12
VIRGINIA K. DEMARCH United States Magistrate Judge
2 16
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28