Fairview Hospital & Training Center v. Moore

560 P.2d 671, 28 Or. App. 637, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2698
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedFebruary 28, 1977
DocketNo. 346, CA 5383
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 560 P.2d 671 (Fairview Hospital & Training Center v. Moore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fairview Hospital & Training Center v. Moore, 560 P.2d 671, 28 Or. App. 637, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2698 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

SCHWAB, C. J.

Fairview Hospital and Training Center, a public employer, suspended respondent, one of its employes, for three days without pay based on a charge of "Misconduct, in accordance with ORS 240.555.”1 The letter of suspension to respondent stated the supporting facts to be:

"* * * Qn 5.10-75, a [psychiatric aide] on graveyard [shift] found you asleep in the linen room. On 5-12-75, a [psychiatric aide] on graveyard found you asleep on a resident’s bed in Ward III after looking for you for some 45 minutes.”

Respondent sought review by the Employment Relations Board which, after a hearing, ordered: "The suspension action is set aside.” Fairview appeals, seeking to have respondent’s suspension reinstated.

A minor issue involves a defect in ERB’s "findings of fact,” which recite:

"* * * ]y[rs> Nina Hill * * * was on duty the night of May 10, 1975 and testified that she found [respondent, Mrs. Moore] asleep in a rocking chair in the linen room of Ward 4 * * *.
"[Respondent, Mrs. Moore] denied having been found either asleep or in a rocking chair by Mrs. Hill on the night of May 10, 1975.”

The "findings” reach no conclusion about whose testimony was believed. This was error. Mere summaries of the testimony are not sufficient findings of fact. Graham v. OLCC, 20 Or App 97, 530 P2d 858 (1975).

We conclude, however, that this defect in the findings does not require remand because we agree with ERB’s analysis of the major issue — whether, on [640]*640the facts of this case, falling asleep at work constitutes "misconduct” within the meaning of ORS 240.555(1).

ERB did explicitly find that respondent fell asleep "or passed out” at work on May 12; we can assume for purposes of discussion that ERB made a similar finding as to the May 10 incident. ERB further found that during this period respondent "had a series of illnesses” for which she was taking medication, and that her falling asleep at work "was caused by a medical problem.”2

Against this factual background, the question before ERB became whether falling asleep at work due to a medical problem constitutes misconduct within the meaning of ORS 240.555. ERB concluded that it did not, apparently reasoning that misconduct connotes at least some degree of volitional conduct on an employe’s part.

We agree with ERB’s apparent interpretation of ORS 240.555(1) for three reasons. First, the plain meaning of misconduct includes the element of "intentional wrongdoing.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1443 (unabridged 1971). Second, under the statute misconduct is one of several grounds for employe discipline, others being, for example, "indolence” and "unfitness to render effective service”; if inability to perform due to a medical problem were misconduct, these additional enumerated grounds for discipline would be superfluous.3 Third, misconduct is not defined in the merit system statutes, and we tend to defer to ERB’s interpretation of the statutes it [641]*641administers absent evidence of legislative intent to the contrary.4 We perceive no such intent.

In this court, Fairview for the first time argues that respondent was guilty of misconduct, i.e., intentional wrongdoing, for going to work knowing that her medical problems and/or medication made it likely she would fall asleep at work. However, the charge that respondent was notified of and defended against was falling asleep at work. The change in Fairview’s theory comes too late. See also, n 3, supra.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Richardson v. Division of Employment Security
361 S.W.3d 425 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2011)
Steele v. Employment Department
923 P.2d 1252 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1996)
Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Services
275 N.W.2d 445 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1979)
Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands
581 P.2d 520 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1978)
WASCO CTY. v. Am. Fed. of S., Cty. & Mun. Emp.
569 P.2d 15 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1977)
Brusco Towboat Co. v. State Ex Rel. State Land Board
567 P.2d 1037 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1977)
Bienz v. City of Dayton
566 P.2d 904 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1977)
Smith v. Peet
564 P.2d 1083 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1977)
McCrae v. Wilson
564 P.2d 731 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1977)
Merrill v. Public Welfare Division
562 P.2d 583 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1977)
Fairview Hospital & Training Center v. Stanton
560 P.2d 667 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1977)
Appeal of Stanton
560 P.2d 667 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1977)
Appeal of Moore
560 P.2d 671 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
560 P.2d 671, 28 Or. App. 637, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2698, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fairview-hospital-training-center-v-moore-orctapp-1977.