Fairfield v. Internatl. Union of Operating Engs., Local 20

2024 Ohio 2850, 248 N.E.3d 410

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 29, 2024
• Docket: CA2023-07-085
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Fairfield v. Internatl. Union of Operating Engs., Local 20, 2024-Ohio-2850.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

BUTLER COUNTY

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, OHIO, :

Appellant, : CASE NO. CA2023-07-085

: OPINION - vs - 7/29/2024 :

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF : OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 20, : Appellee.

CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CV 2023 04 0865

Stephen J. Wolterman, City of Fairfield Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Law Office of Robert Mitchell, and Robert H. Mitchell, for appellee.

HENDRICKSON, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, City of Fairfield, Ohio ("the City"), appeals the decision of the

Butler County Common Pleas Court that overruled its motion to vacate an arbitrator's

award in favor of appellee, International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 20 ("the

Union"). Instead, the court entered an order confirming the award. Finding no error in

the court's decision, we affirm. Butler CA2023-07-085

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} This case arises from a dispute between the City and the Union over the

interpretation of their collective bargaining agreement. At its core, the disagreement

centers on the scope of information the City must provide to an Employee/Management

Health and Dental Benefits Plan Committee ("the Committee").

{¶ 3} The City employs approximately 288 individuals, some of whom are

represented by various unions. The Union's bargaining unit comprises roughly 21

employees. Additionally, three other unions represent bargaining units of employees: the

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME"), the

Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP"), and the International Association of Fire Fighters

("IAFF").

{¶ 4} The collective bargaining agreements between the City and these unions

contain identical language establishing the Committee. This body comprises

representatives from each union, exempt employees, and the City. Its purpose is to make

decisions about employee health benefits. Article 14, Section 3(B) of the collective

bargaining agreement between the City and the Union ("CBA") delineates the

Committee's authority:

The Committee shall have the authority to alter or reduce health and/or dental benefits once annually . . . The Committee and the City Manager shall both have the authority to select the Plan Provider, membership in the Center for Local Government Benefits Cooperative, and/or the Third Party Administrator and to determine appropriate levels of reinsurance for any plan, except that both the Committee and the City Manager shall have the authority to veto any change in the Plan Provider, membership in the Center for Local Government Benefits Cooperative, and/or the Third Party Administrator or the levels of reinsurance proposed by the other. The Finance Director will provide the pertinent information in and available to his office to the Committee to assist them in their decisions and recommendations.

-2- Butler CA2023-07-085

This provision grants the Committee significant power, including the ability to modify

benefits and select insurance providers. Importantly, it also obligates the City's Finance

Director to furnish "pertinent" information to aid the Committee's decision-making

process.

{¶ 5} In 2020, the City transitioned some of its employees— exempt employees

and those represented by AFSCME—to the Butler Health Plan (BHP), a public-entity pool.

Other employees, including those represented by IAAF, FOP, and the Union, remained

on the City's self-insured plan. This bifurcation set the stage for the present controversy.

{¶ 6} On May 6, 2022, during a Committee meeting, the Union requested claims

data from BHP. This information, according to the Committee's insurance advisor, was

necessary to obtain quotes for fully insured plans that could potentially cover all City

employees again. Initially, the City's representatives at the meeting did not object to this

request. However, the City subsequently refused to provide the data, asserting that it

was neither pertinent to the Committee's responsibilities nor available to the Finance

Director.

{¶ 7} This refusal prompted the Union to file a grievance, alleging a violation of

Article 14, Section 3(B). The matter proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator, finding

that the essential facts of the case were undisputed, ruled in favor of the Union, ordering

the City to provide the requested information. The arbitrator found that the BHP claims

data was both pertinent to the Committee's duties and available to the Finance Director.

{¶ 8} The City then sought to vacate the arbitration award in the Butler County

Court of Common Pleas, while the Union moved to confirm it. On June 29, 2023, the

common pleas court denied the City's motion to vacate and granted the Union's motion

to confirm the award.

{¶ 9} The City appealed.

-3- Butler CA2023-07-085

II. Analysis

{¶ 10} The City presents three assignments of error arguing why the common

pleas court should have vacated the arbitration award under R.C. 2711.10(D).

A. The statutory framework and standard of review

{¶ 11} Ohio law strictly limits when courts can vacate arbitration awards. Under

R.C. 2711.10, a court may do so only in four specific circumstances. See Assn. of

Cleveland Fire Fighters v. Cleveland, 2003-Ohio-4278, ¶ 20. We are concerned with just

one circumstance here: when "[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly

executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted

was not made." R.C. 2711.10(D). This provision sets a high bar. We do not vacate

awards just because an arbitrator got the facts wrong or misread the collective bargaining

agreement. See Cedar Fair, L.P. v. Falfas, 2014-Ohio-3943, ¶ 6. Even a "serious error"

is not enough. Id., quoting Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Internatl. Corp., 559 U.S.

662, 671 (2010). Instead, courts can intervene only when arbitrators venture beyond the

authority given to them by the parties' agreement or by law. Id. at ¶ 7.

{¶ 12} In short, arbitration is all about the parties' choices. They picked this

process to resolve their disputes, with its informality and speed. They selected these

decision makers, with their specialized knowledge. Courts cannot second-guess those

choices without undermining the entire arbitral system. That said, arbitrators do not have

carte blanche. They must stay within the lanes marked out by the parties' agreement and

the law. When they do not—when they exceed their powers—courts can and should step

in.

{¶ 13} Turning to the question of when courts should step in—the standard of

appellate review—we note that the parties here disagree. Until recently, Ohio's appellate

courts were divided on this question too. But in 2018, the Ohio Supreme Court in Portage

-4- Butler CA2023-07-085

Cty. Bd. of Dev. Disabilities v. Portage Cty. Educators' Assn. for Dev. Disabilities, 2018-

Ohio-1590, resolved this split by holding that appellate courts should review these cases

de novo. The Court held that "when reviewing a decision of a common pleas court

confirming, modifying, vacating, or correcting an arbitration award, an appellate court

should accept findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous but decide questions of law

de novo." Id. at ¶ 26.

{¶ 14} It is important to emphasize, however, that this de novo review is narrowly

focused on the common pleas court's application of the statutory grounds for vacatur. It

does not invite a reexamination of the merits of the underlying dispute as presented to

the arbitrator. Cuyahoga Cty. v. Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent, Assn., 2024-Ohio-1055,

¶ 18 (8th Dist.). The reviewing court's task is to determine whether the common pleas

court correctly applied the limited statutory bases for overturning an arbitration award, not

to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator on the substantive issues in contention.

B. The arbitration award is sufficiently definite

{¶ 15} The first assignment of error alleges:

The Arbitrator, as a matter of law, so imperfectly executed his powers that a mutual, final, and definite award on the subject matter submitted was not made.

{¶ 16} The City's first challenge to the arbitration award is that it lacks the clarity

and definiteness required by R.C. 2711.10(D). Specifically, the City argues that the award

leaves ambiguous whether the Finance Director or some other City official must request

the claims data from BHP. We disagree.

{¶ 17} The arbitrator's award states plainly:

The City violated Article 14, Section 3(B) by failing to provide requested information by the Health and Dental Benefits Plan Committee. As a remedy, the City shall immediately request BHP to provide the requested claims data and quote, both in regard to the initial request drafted by MMA and provided to

-5- Butler CA2023-07-085

the City on May 9, 2022 relative to the now-commenced 2022- 2023 plan year, as well as any future requests in regard to soliciting quotes for fully-insured plans covering all City employees. The City shall provide to the Committee the BHP claims data to which it is entitled.

This language leaves no room for genuine confusion. The award directs "the City" to take

the specified actions. It is true that the underlying CBA assigns certain responsibilities to

the Finance Director. But the City—not the Finance Director—was the party to this

arbitration. And it is elementary that a municipality acts through its officers and

employees. The City has ample authority to instruct its Finance Director, or any other

appropriate official, to carry out the arbitrator's directive.

{¶ 18} The City's protestations of confusion ring hollow. An arbitration award need

not spell out every minute detail of its implementation to be considered "definite" under

R.C. 2711.10(D). It need only provide clear guidance on what must be done and by

whom. This award does precisely that. Moreover, we note that adopting the City's

position would create perverse incentives. It would encourage losing parties to

manufacture ambiguity where none exists, all in an effort to escape the binding nature of

arbitration. Such a result would undermine the finality and efficiency that are hallmarks

of the arbitration process.

{¶ 19} The arbitration award satisfies R.C. 2711.10(D) as "a mutual, final, and

definite award upon the subject matter submitted." The statute requires a precise

assessment of whether the arbitrator addressed the submitted issue. Whaley v. Mills,

1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4178, *3 (12th Dist. Aug. 17, 1992). It applies only when an award

is so flawed that it fails to address the submitted issue. Cleveland v. Cleveland Police

Patrolmen's Assn., 2016-Ohio-702, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.). In this case, the arbitrator was tasked

with determining if the City violated the CBA by refusing to provide requested information.

The arbitrator ruled that the City had violated the CBA and ordered the City to hand over

-6- Butler CA2023-07-085

the information, thus fully addressing the submitted issue. Consequently, the common

pleas court was correct in refusing to vacate the award on these grounds.

{¶ 20} The first assignment of error is overruled.

C. The arbitrator did not shift the burden of proof

{¶ 21} The second assignment of error alleges:

The Arbitrator improperly shifted the burden of proof to the City on the issue of whether the information requested was in and available to the office of the finance director.

{¶ 22} The City's second challenge is that the arbitrator improperly shifted the

burden of proof. Specifically, the City argues that the arbitrator required the City to prove

that the requested BHP claims data was not available to the Finance Director, rather than

requiring the Union to prove that it was available. This argument mischaracterizes the

arbitrator's analysis and, even if correct, would not justify vacating the award.

{¶ 23} First, a careful review of the arbitrator's opinion reveals no improper burden-

shifting. Instead, the arbitrator engaged in a thorough evaluation of the evidence

presented by both parties. He noted several key facts supporting the conclusion that the

information was available. One, at the May 6, 2022 Committee meeting, when the need

for BHP claims data was discussed, neither the Finance Director nor the HR Manager—

both present—indicated any difficulty in obtaining this information. Two, the City later

published a summary of the very information it claimed was unavailable, strongly

suggesting its accessibility. And three, the City never actually requested the information

from BHP, therefore undermining any claim of unavailability. These facts, taken together,

led the arbitrator to conclude that the information was indeed available to the Finance

Director. This is not burden-shifting; it is simply weighing the evidence presented.

{¶ 24} Moreover, even if we were to accept the City's characterization of the

arbitrator's analysis—which we do not—it would not provide grounds for vacating the

-7- Butler CA2023-07-085

award. As the Ohio Supreme Court has held, "An arbitrator's improper determination of

the facts or misinterpretation of the contract does not justify reversal of an award by a

reviewing court." Cedar Fair, 2014-Ohio-3943 at ¶ 6. This principle reflects the

considerable deference we afford to arbitrators' decisions, recognizing the unique role

they play in resolving labor disputes.

{¶ 25} The CBA does not specify who must prove information availability. It states

only that "The Finance Director will provide the pertinent information in and available to

his office to the Committee to assist them in their decisions and recommendations."

Therefore, the arbitrator's assignment of the burden of proof—however he assigned it—

does not conflict with any explicit CBA terms. Interpreting the agreement and deciding

this issue falls within the arbitrator's authority. See N. Royalton v. Urich, 2013-Ohio-2206,

¶ 23 (8th Dist.) (arbitrator applied clear and convincing burden of proof where the

agreement was silent as to the burden to be applied). The arbitrator's conclusion was

based on a reasonable interpretation of the available facts. It is not the court's role to

second-guess these determinations.

{¶ 26} For these reasons, we find no merit in the City's second assignment of error.

The arbitrator did not improperly shift the burden of proof, and even if he had, such an

error would not justify vacating the award under the stringent standards set forth in R.C.

2711.10. The common pleas court correctly declined to vacate the award on this basis.

{¶ 27} The second assignment of error is overruled.

D. The arbitrator's interpretation of "pertinent"

{¶ 28} The third assignment of error alleges:

The Arbitrator and the Court of Common Pleas made a material mistake in determining as a matter of law that the information requested by the Union was pertinent.

{¶ 29} The City's final challenge is that the arbitrator erred in his interpretation of

-8- Butler CA2023-07-085

the term "pertinent" as used in Article 14, Section 3(B) of the CBA. The City maintains

that information about employees not covered by the self-insured plan cannot be

"pertinent" to the Committee's responsibilities.

{¶ 30} The relevant language in the CBA is familiar by now: "The Finance Director

will provide the pertinent information in and available to his office to the Committee to

assist them in their decisions and recommendations." The arbitrator, after considering

the evidence presented, determined that the BHP claims data was indeed "pertinent" to

the Committee's duty to determine appropriate medical insurance.

{¶ 31} In reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator relied on several key factors. First,

he noted that the insurance advisor had told the Committee that the BHP claims data was

necessary to obtain quotes from insurers for fully insured plans. The arbitrator found the

Committee's reliance on this professional advice to be reasonable. Second, he

considered that while the AFSCME and exempt employees were not covered by the self-

insured plan, they continued to have representation and voting rights on the Committee

and might potentially choose to change plans. Finally, he observed that at the May 6,

2022 Committee meeting, when the information was initially requested, the City's

representatives raised no objections.

{¶ 32} The City's argument here appears to stem from a concern, as expressed by

the City Manager in his testimony, that the Committee might be attempting to expand its

influence over city-wide policy decisions. However, this concern, while perhaps valid from

a management perspective, does not directly address the question of whether the

requested information is "pertinent" under the terms of the CBA.

{¶ 33} A court's limited role in reviewing an arbitration award means that it does

not second-guess an arbitrator's interpretation of a bargaining agreement: so long as the

arbitrator's award "draws its essence" from the agreement and is not unlawful, arbitrary,

-9- Butler CA2023-07-085

or capricious it must be upheld. Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters, 2003-Ohio-4278 at ¶

13. The arbitrator here provided a reasoned explanation for his interpretation, grounded

in the language of the CBA and the factual context of the dispute. His determination that

the requested information was "pertinent" to the Committee's CBA authority to select

health insurance plans falls well within the bounds of a permissible interpretation of the

agreement.

{¶ 34} The common pleas court, cognizant of the deference owed to arbitration

awards, correctly declined to vacate the award on this basis. We find no error in its

decision.

{¶ 35} The third assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 36} We have overruled each of the assignments of error presented. The City

has not demonstrated a basis for vacating the arbitration award under R.C. 2711.10(D).

Therefore we conclude that the common pleas court did not err in denying the City's

motion to vacate.

The court's judgment is affirmed.

S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.

- 10 -