Fair v. King County

Opinion

1 2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 5 EMANUEL D. FAIR, 6 Plaintiff, 7 v. 8 KING COUNTY; CITY OF REDMOND; BRIAN 9 COATS; RON J. HARDING; LENWORTH G. C21-1706 JHC KNOWLES; GREG MAINS; GREG L. 10 PATRICK; LON SHULTZ1; DAVID SOWERS; ORDER ANN MARIE FEIN; SHAWN McCRILLIS; KRISTI WILSON2; TERRY MORGAN; JAN 11 FULLER; JEFF BAIRD; TODD CLARK; JOHN DIAZ; and JOHN DOES 1–20 12 Defendants. 13

I 14 INTRODUCTION 15 This matter comes before the Court on two motions to dismiss (Dkt. ## 43 & 67), each 16 brought by a different group of defendants. The City of Redmond and individual members of the 17 Redmond Police Department (collectively, the “Redmond Defendants”) move for dismissal 18 19 20 1 This defendant’s last name is spelled as “Shultz” in the caption of the operative pleading, as well as in his attorney’s notice of appearance (Dkt. # 42), but as “Schultz” in the body of the Amended 21 Complaint (Dkt. # 27), as well as in a pending motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 43). Given the lack of clarity, the Court uses the same spelling as in the caption of the operative pleading. 22 2 The operative pleading identifies this defendant as “Kristi Wilson” in the caption, but as “Kristi Miller” in the factual allegations. See Am. Compl. at ¶ 27 (Dkt. # 27). For purposes of the pending 1 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See Redmond’s Mot. (Dkt. # 43).3 King County, 2 supervisors in King County’s Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention (“DAJD”), and King

3 County Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (“DPA”) Jeff Baird (collectively, the “King County Defendants”) also move for dismissal, but they cite both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c). See King 4 Cnty.’s Mot. (Dkt. # 67). No party requested oral argument, and the Court does not believe that 5 oral argument would be beneficial. Having reviewed all papers filed in support of,4 and in 6 opposition to, the motions, the Court enters the following Order. 7 II 8 BACKGROUND 9 Plaintiff Emanuel D. Fair alleges that he was maliciously or negligently prosecuted for a 10 murder that he says he did not commit, and as to which he was acquitted by a jury in June 2019 11 after spending nine years in pretrial detention at the King County Correctional Facility, 12 colloquially known as King County Jail. He sues the Redmond Defendants and DPA Baird for 13 malicious prosecution under federal (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and state (common) law, as well as for 14 negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional 15 distress (outrage). He brings a § 1983 claim and state law negligence and intentional tort claims 16 17 3 Ann Marie Fein, Lenworth Knowles, Greg Mains, and Kristi Wilson are not among the individuals listed as moving parties in the Redmond Defendants’ motion. Fein, Mains, and Wilson, 18 however, later joined in the motion. See Notice (Dkt. # 55). Knowles separately joined. See Notice (Dkt. # 77). 19 4 The parties disagree concerning which materials the Court should consider in deciding the pending motions. The Redmond Defendants cite materials outside the pleadings submitted as appendices 20 to a motion filed and then withdrawn by King County. See Redmond’s Mot. at 2–3 (citing Apps. A–H (Dkt. # 16-1)). The King County Defendants have offered these same documents (and others) in support of their pending motion to dismiss. See Apps. A–L (Dkt. ## 67-1 – 67-12). Plaintiff agrees that the Court 21 may consider Appendix A, which contains certain charging documents, see Pl.’s Resp. at 5 (Dkt. # 59), but he objects to the other materials. Each of the documents, however, is a form of court record (i.e., 22 motions, orders, transcripts, and so on.), and the crux of Plaintiff’s opposition is not whether the Court may take judicial notice, which, of course, it may, see Fed. R. Evid. 201, but how the materials should be 1 against King County and DAJD personnel for alleged maltreatment during his time at King 2 County Jail. Plaintiff’s claims relate to the following events.

3 A. The Crime, the Suspects, and the Investigation In the early morning hours of November 1, 2008, Arpana Jinaga was murdered. Am. 4 Compl. at ¶ 33 (Dkt. # 27). Her body was discovered in her apartment in Redmond on 5 November 3, 2008, by a family friend, accompanied by one of Jinaga’s neighbors, Cameron 6 Johnson. Id. at ¶¶ 33 & 52; see Certification for Determination of Probable Cause (“PC 7 Certification”) at 2 (App. A). Jinaga had helped host a Halloween party the evening before her 8 death, which was attended by 40 to 50 people, including Plaintiff Emanuel Fair. Am. Compl. at 9 ¶¶ 37 & 42. During the party, the front door to Jinaga’s apartment was left open, and guests had 10 full access to her living space. Id. at ¶ 39. Plaintiff was inside the unit at various times during 11 the party; he used Jinaga’s bathroom and entered her bedroom while she was present with other 12 guests. Id. at ¶ 40. Plaintiff had not, however, previously known Jinaga or been at the apartment 13 complex. Id. at ¶¶ 38 & 41. 14 According to Plaintiff, after listening to music in Johnson’s apartment, he went to Leslie 15 Potts’s apartment sometime between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m. and slept in her bed until about 10:00 a.m., at which time he began helping clean up debris from the party, depositing some of it in the 16 complex’s dumpster. Id. at ¶¶ 45 & 48–49. The operative pleading seems to suggest that, during 17 murder-investigation interviews, Potts corroborated Plaintiff’s account. Id. at ¶ 46 & 49. The 18 PC Certification, however, states that Potts told detectives she went to bed before Plaintiff, left 19 the door unlocked for him, and did not know what time he came in. See PC Certification at 7. In 20 the morning, she found an empty condom package on the kitchen table, which had not been there 21 the previous evening, and assumed Plaintiff had had intercourse during the interim. Id. 22 1 Another resident of the apartment complex, Jeffrey Perras, did not attend the party but 2 returned home around 3:00 a.m. and observed a man wearing an orange fleece jacket, about

3 5’11” to 6’3” in height, with an olive complexion and light stubble, standing in Jinaga’s doorway, talking to someone inside the unit. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 47 & 59. This description 4 allegedly matches Johnson (Jinaga’s neighbor) more than Plaintiff, who is a short, Black man, 5 and was not wearing an orange jacket. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 34, 47 & 77. Jinaga was apparently alive and 6 on her computer at 3:29 a.m.; her time of death was estimated to be between 3:30 and 8:00 a.m. 7 on November 1, 2008. Id. at ¶¶ 60–61. 8 The medical examiner opined that Jinaga died from asphyxiation caused by strangulation. 9 Id. at ¶ 62; see PC Certification at 2. When discovered, her naked body was covered in motor 10 oil, and her fingers and fingernails had been cleaned and then covered with toilet bowl cleaner. 11 Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 55–56. Burn marks in the vicinity suggested a failed attempt to set a fire to 12 cover up the murder. Id. Jinaga’s oil-soaked, bloodstained, and torn underpants were found on 13 the kitchen counter, and a roll of black tape, with a length extended, was discovered on a sofa in 14 the living room. See PC Certification at 4. Saliva containing Jinaga’s DNA was collected from 15 the underpants, and long, dark hairs, which were likely Jinaga’s, as well as fragments of elastic from the torn underpants, were on a length of the black tape, suggesting that the underpants and 16 tape were used to gag Jinaga. Id. at 4 & 8. In the apartment complex’s dumpster, investigators 17 found Jinaga’s bed sheets and a bag containing a bottle of motor oil, a boot lace believed to be 18 the ligature used to strangle Jinaga, and a red terry-cloth bathrobe. Am. Compl. at ¶ 69; see PC 19 Certification at 4–5. 20 The PC Certification stated that Plaintiff’s DNA was discovered (i) mixed with Jinaga’s 21 bloodstains on the bathrobe, (ii) on the length of black tape recovered from Jinaga’s sofa, and 22 (iii) on a swab taken from Jinaga’s neck during her autopsy. See PC Certification at 8. The PC 1 Certification further indicated that Plaintiff made or received 20 calls between 1:54 a.m. and 4:48 2 a.m. on November 1, 2008, seven of which were with a number associated with an ad for sexual

3 services, and three of which were with Potts, during the period when Plaintiff indicated he was in bed with her. Id. at 6–7. 4 According to the operative pleading, neighbor Johnson’s DNA was found on the motor 5 oil bottle and in a section of wet carpet near Jinaga’s body. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 84 & 86. On 6 November 1, 2008, Johnson apparently attempted to cross the Canadian border without a 7 passport. Id. at ¶ 74. He also hurt himself, while at a post-Halloween party, in “a way that 8 seemed fake and odd” in an apparent effort to create an explanation for his injuries, which were 9 consistent with those that would have been sustained during a sexual assault of Jinaga. Id. at 10 ¶ 75. In addition, on November 1, 2008, Johnson visited a pawn shop, which was suspicious 11 because Jinaga’s phone and digital camera were missing from her apartment and never 12 recovered. Id. at ¶ 76. 13 Along with Johnson, the Amended Complaint lists a number of possible suspects, 14 including Aaron Gurtler, one of Jinaga’s former sexual partners, whose DNA was found at the 15 crime scene, id. at ¶ 92, and Josiah Lovett, another apartment complex resident, whose DNA was found on the boot lace and the bathrobe found in the bag with the motor oil, id. at ¶ 96. In the 16 operative pleading, Redmond police personnel are accused of failing to investigate these other 17 persons of interest “with any tenacity,” id. at ¶ 100, and they are alleged to have focused on 18 Plaintiff because he was “the only African American at the party” and an “outsider,” id. at ¶ 101. 19 Plaintiff’s 2004 statutory rape conviction was also a likely factor, see id. at ¶ 102, but the 20 Amended Complaint also alludes to Redmond’s retention of a “psychic medium” named Allison 21 DuBois, which allegedly coincided with Plaintiff being deemed the “prime suspect,” id. at 22 ¶¶ 104–05. 1 B. The Detention, the Prosecution & the Prior Litigation 2 On October 29, 2010, almost two years after Jinaga was killed, Plaintiff was charged with

3 murder and booked into King County Jail. Id. at ¶ 125; see Information (App. A). Plaintiff’s first trial started on February 14, 2017, and ended on April 19, 2017, with a hung jury. Am. 4 Compl. at ¶¶ 126–27; see Order Declaring Deadlock (App. E). After a second trial in 2019, 5 Plaintiff was acquitted. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 128–29; see Verdict (App. H). 6 During eight of the nine years of his pretrial detention at King County Jail, Plaintiff was 7 housed in the Protective Custody Unit (“PCU”); the operative pleading alleges that this decision 8 was based on assumptions about Plaintiff’s non-existent gang affiliations. Am. Compl. at 9 ¶¶ 131-32. Plaintiff alleges that, while in PCU, he would often be on “lockdown” in a solitary 10 confinement cell, without access to a shower or exercise, for weeks at a time. Id. at ¶ 133. 11 Plaintiff further alleges that he asked for medical and psychiatric services but did not receive any 12 treatment for conditions that he says he developed while in custody: severe sleep apnea, 13 depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Id. at ¶¶ 135–36. Plaintiff also accuses 14 unnamed King County Jail staff of sexually harassing and humiliating him. Id. at ¶ 137. 15 In February 2016, about a year before his first trial began, Plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Fair v. King Cnty., Case No. C16-273 JLR (W.D. 16 Wash.). Based on a stipulation of the parties, the matter was dismissed with prejudice. See 17 Apps. J–L. King County and DAJD Major Todd Clark were parties to the previous lawsuit, but 18 DAJD Director John Diaz was not.5 See App. I. The parties disagree about the extent to which 19 Plaintiff is barred by the dismissal of his earlier claims from bringing his current action. 20 21 22 5 According to the King County Defendants, Diaz succeeded Claudia Balducci as DAJD Director in mid-April 2019, shortly before Plaintiff was acquitted and released from pretrial detention. See King 1 III 2 DISCUSSION

3 A. Applicable Standard Although the Redmond Defendants and the King County Defendants refer to Rule 12(c), 4 they do not ask for judgment on the pleadings, and so the Court construes their motions as 5 seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court 6 must assume the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the 7 plaintiff’s favor. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). A complaint 8 challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion need not provide detailed factual allegations, but it must 9 offer “more than labels and conclusions” and contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the 10 elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The 11 complaint must show more than mere speculation of a right to relief. Id. A complaint may be 12 lacking for one of two reasons: (i) absence of a cognizable legal theory, or (ii) insufficient facts 13 under a cognizable legal claim. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 14 (9th Cir. 1984). The question for the Court is whether the facts in the complaint sufficiently state 15 a “plausible” ground for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. If the Court dismisses the complaint or portions of it, it must consider whether to grant leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 16 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 17 B. Individual Defendants 18 With a couple exceptions—Redmond Detective Brian Coats and DPA Baird—the 19 operative pleading does not allege with particularity what each individual defendant did or failed 20 to do in connection with Plaintiff’s prosecution and/or pretrial detention. Ron J. Harding is 21

22 Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that the relevant subset of parties in the current case are identical to or 1 alleged only to have retrieved Jinaga’s bedsheets. Am. Compl. at ¶ 70. Terry Morgan 2 supposedly initiated contact with Allison DuBois, the psychic medium. Id. at ¶ 104. Jan Fuller

3 was “tasked with recovering information from Johnson’s scrubbed phone,” but “was unsuccessful.” Id. at ¶ 90. Greg Mains was originally assigned as the lead detective, but then 4 replaced by Detective Coats. See id. at ¶¶ 65–66. Plaintiff fails to explain how these activities 5 were negligent, outrageous, malicious, or motivated by racial animus. As for Lenworth 6 Knowles, Greg Patrick, Lon Shultz, David Sowers, Ann Marie Fein, Shawn McCrillis, and Kristi 7 Wilson/Miller, the operative pleading alleges only that they were assigned to the murder 8 investigation and “therefore responsible for implementing proper policies, procedure, and other 9 decisions as delegated to [them]” by the Redmond Police Department. Id. at ¶¶ 20 & 22–27. 10 As to DAJD Director Diaz and Major Clark, the Amended Complaint indicates that they 11 “supervised, administrated, and managed all King County employees and corrections facilities at 12 the time of [Plaintiff’s] injuries, and [were] responsible for ensuring the presence and 13 implementation of proper policies, procedures, and training.” Id. at ¶¶ 15–16. Although Diaz 14 and Clark are sued only in their personal capacities, no allegation is made concerning how they 15 themselves were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical, mental health, or other needs. Nor has Plaintiff pleaded any facts to support a plausible claim that Diaz or Clark acted 16 negligently or outrageousness in connection with Plaintiff’s pretrial detention. The Court 17 therefore GRANTS both the Redmond Defendants’ motion and the King County Defendants’ 18 motion with respect to all individual defendants except Detective Coats and DPA Baird, and 19 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against Harding, Knowles, Mains, Patrick, Shultz, Sowers, Fein, 20 21 22 1 McCrillis, Wilson/Miller, Morgan, Fuller, Clark, and Diaz6 without prejudice and with leave to 2 amend.

3 1. Prosecutorial Immunity DPA Baird invokes prosecutorial immunity as an absolute bar to all of Plaintiff’s claims 4 against him. The existence of absolute prosecutorial immunity is evaluated based on “the nature 5 of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 6 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)). DPA Baird 7 bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to such immunity because he was “acting in a 8 prosecutorial role.” See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012); see also id. 9 (“absolute immunity is an extreme remedy, and it is justified only where ‘any lesser degree of 10 immunity could impair the judicial process itself’” (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 127)). DPA 11 Baird cannot meet his burden because Plaintiff does not challenge actions that he took in his role 12 as an advocate for the State of Washington. 13 Nothing in the operative pleading suggests that DPA Baird is being sued for making a 14 charging decision, seeking a high amount of bail ($5 million), or otherwise performing the 15 “traditional functions” of a prosecuting attorney. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125 & 129 (with regard to both common law and statutory claims, absolute immunity applies when prosecutors are 16 “performing traditional functions,” including “the preparation and filing” of “charging 17 documents” like an “information” and a “motion for an arrest warrant”). Rather, the Amended 18 19 20 6 In light of its ruling, the Court need not address whether DAJD personnel are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff’s claims against Director Diaz, Major Clark, and Does 11–20 relate to the conditions of confinement, not the duration or fact of 21 confinement, see Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 165–76, and thus, Plaintiff does not make the type of claim that would be barred by quasi-judicial immunity. See Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 22 2013). As for quasi-judicial immunity, the King County Defendants’ motion is DENIED, but without prejudice to renewing the argument if Plaintiff amends his pleading to allege claims against DAJD 1 Complaint alleges that DPA Baird engaged in investigative or administrative activities during the 2 murder investigation, including providing advice to police officers, questioning residents of the

3 apartment complex, processing the crime scene, and making himself “an integral part of the investigative team.” Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 30, 64, 68 & 163; see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 4 492–96 (1991) (absolute immunity does not extend “to the prosecutorial function of giving legal 5 advice to the police”). To the extent DPA Baird asserts that the Amended Complaint does not 6 provide with sufficient particularity the details of his investigative or administrative conduct, 7 such argument does not warrant dismissal with prejudice on absolute immunity grounds; at most, 8 it would support a dismissal with leave to amend. The motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial 9 immunity is DENIED. 10 2. Qualified Immunity 11 Qualified immunity has been asserted on behalf of DPA Baird and Detective Coats with 12 respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. Qualified immunity is “an 13 immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 14 526 (1985) (emphasis in original). As for a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an individual 15 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if either of the following criteria is satisfied: (i) the alleged facts do not show a constitutional violation; or (ii) the constitutional right allegedly 16 violated was not “clearly established” at the time of the events at issue. Saucier v. Katz, 533 17 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 18 (2009). 19 a. Constitutional Violation 20 In arguing that Plaintiff has not pleaded a constitutional violation, Defendants cavalierly 21 summarize Plaintiff’s allegations as merely nit-picking how the murder investigation was 22 performed. Such grievances would not, of course, support a § 1983 claim, but Plaintiff pleads 1 far more than has been credited by Defendants. To prevail on a § 1983 claim for malicious 2 prosecution, Plaintiff must show that a defendant “prosecuted [him] with malice and without

3 probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.” See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 4 2004) (alterations in original, quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th 5 Cir. 1995)). Awabdy reiterates the principle that no substantive due process right exists under the 6 Fourteenth Amendment to be free from prosecution without probable cause. Id. at 1069. Thus, 7 to succeed on a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that “the 8 defendants acted for the purpose of depriving him of a ‘specific constitutional right,’” albeit not 9 necessarily one protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. In Awabdy, the Ninth Circuit 10 concluded that the Plaintiff had stated a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim by alleging that the 11 defendants conspired to deprive him of his First Amendment free speech rights by unlawfully 12 interfering with his campaign for reelection to the City Council of Adelanto, as well as his right 13 to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by intentionally causing the prosecutor to 14 bring an unfounded embezzlement charge against him because of racial animus against Arab 15 Americans. Id. at 1065 & 1069–70. Awabdy supports the conclusion that the facts set forth in the Amended Complaint state a 16 plausible § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Plaintiff alleges that DPA Baird and Detective 17 Coats caused him to be prosecuted without probable cause based on racial animus, thereby 18 depriving him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.7 According to the 19

20 7 Contrary to DPA Baird’s contention, Plaintiff does not raise a “negligent” investigation claim 21 under § 1983. In addition, although the authorities cited by DPA Baird support the proposition that negligence is not actionable under § 1983, they are factually and procedurally distinguishable, and do not 22 support dismissal with prejudice. In both Goodwyn v. Kincheloe, No. 85-7046, 1986 WL 17850 (4th Cir. Oct. 14, 1986), and Carter v. Bone, No. C/A No. 309-779, 2010 WL 558598 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2010), the 1 Amended Complaint, when interviewing witnesses, detectives asked about or focused on race 2 only when discussing Plaintiff, and they treated more generously than Plaintiff various White

3 suspects like Johnson,8 Gurtler, and Lovett. Id. at ¶¶ 156(a)–(h). Detective Coats, who signed the PC Certification, is accused of saying that Plaintiff was the target of the investigation because 4 he was “the only African American at the party” and an “outsider.” Id. at ¶ 101 & 110. 5 Detective Coats, who “had never worked, much less led, a case of this complexity before,” is 6 alleged to have developed his hypothesis about the motive for Jinaga’s murder: that Plaintiff 7 wanted sex from her, after consulting a “psychic medium.” Id. at ¶¶ 66 & 111. When asked 8 about the significance of Plaintiff’s prior conviction for statutory rape, Detective Coats 9 supposedly indicated, “If you’ve done it before, you’ll do it again.” Id. at ¶ 158. 10 Plaintiff further criticizes Detective Coats for omitting the following potentially 11 exculpatory information from the PC Certification: (i) Lovett’s DNA was found on the boot lace 12 believed to be the ligature used to strangle Jinaga, (ii) Johnson’s DNA was found on the motor 13 oil bottle found in the dumpster and a wet area of carpet near Jinaga’s motor-oil-covered body, 14 (iii) the DNA of unidentified males was found on a tampon discovered near Jinaga’s body, as 15 well as on the roll of tape associated with gagging Jinaga, and (iv) the presence of Plaintiff’s DNA might be innocently explained by his attendance at the party preceding her death and his 16 17

18 City of Albany, 936 F.2d 1256 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Circuit did not clearly describe the procedural posture, but the negligent investigation claim appears to have been dismissed on a motion for 19 summary judgment involving qualified immunity. Id. at 1258 & 1260–61. Finally, in Bryant v. City of Goodyear, No. CV-12-319, 2013 WL 1897129 (D. Ariz. May 6, 2013), although the § 1983 negligent 20 investigation claim and four other federal claims were dismissed, the Plaintiffs were given leave to amend. Id. at *13-15. 21 8 Plaintiff contrasts how investigators questioned him (in an “unmarked car” without advising him of his constitutional rights) with how they interviewed Johnson, who was accompanied in the 22 interrogation room by his father and attorney, was offered immunity during certain sessions, and was allowed at times to provide crucial information while the camera was turned off. See Am. Compl. at 1 assistance with party clean-up efforts the following morning. Id. at ¶¶ 118–24. Finally, Plaintiff 2 reproaches Detective Coats for misrepresenting,9 in the PC Certification, the DNA evidence

3 linking Plaintiff to the crime, which the operative pleading characterizes as being “in such trace amounts that the samples had to be sent to specialized labs for analysis” and “not an exact 4 match” or “not a match at all,” but indicating merely that Plaintiff’s DNA could not be excluded 5 as a match. Id. at ¶¶ 116–17 (emphasis in original). Neither DPA Baird nor Detective Coats 6 argue that, assuming the truth of these allegations, Plaintiff could not establish a constitutional 7 violation for purposes of the first prong of the Saucier test. 8 Rather, DPA Baird and Detective Coats contend that Plaintiff cannot establish the 9 requisite lack of probable cause because he is precluded by collateral estoppel from challenging 10 these rulings of the King County Superior Court: (i) Judge Palmer Robinson’s order granting 11 DPA Baird’s motion for a finding of probable cause and fixing bail (App’x B); (ii) Judge 12 Mariane Spearman’s oral ruling denying a motion to dismiss that was brought during the first 13 criminal trial (App’x D); and (iii) Judge Douglass North’s oral ruling denying a “halftime” 14 motion in the second criminal trial (App’x F). In making this argument, Defendants do not cite 15 16 9 DPA Baird argues that Plaintiff’s allegations must meet the heightened pleading standard for fraud. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Neither of the cases cited by DPA Baird are factually analogous. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing the district court’s denial of leave to 17 amend a fraud claim relating to a failed tax shelter scheme, which the defendants allegedly sold to the Plaintiff even though they knew it would be considered unlawful by the Internal Revenue Service); 18 Aquilina v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s Syndicate #2003, 407 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (D. Haw. 2019) (dismissing, with leave to amend, putative class action claims brought under Hawaii’s deceptive trade 19 practices acts that arose out of an allegedly deceptive scheme of “steering” homeowners into purchasing worthless “surplus lines” insurance policies). At least one district court has rejected the notion that, when a malicious prosecution claim alleges false reporting, it must comply with Rule 9(b). See Holland v. City 20 of San Francisco, No. 19-cv-2545, 2020 WL 1322925, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2020). To the extent, however, that Rule 9(b) applies, Plaintiff has pleaded with the requisite particularity how the PC 21 Certification was allegedly misleading and who participated in crafting it: Detective Coats, allegedly with the advice of DPA Baird. Unlike with Detective Coats, Plaintiff has not attributed to DPA Baird any 22 expression of racial animus, but Plaintiff need not prove a race-based motive to prevail on his common law claims. As for his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff may plead malice, intent, and “other conditions of a 1 or acknowledge Awabdy,10 which contradicts their position. In Awabdy, the Ninth Circuit 2 observed that a prima facie finding of probable cause may be rebutted by a showing that the

4 10 Instead, they rely on Washington law, asserting that state law on collateral estoppel applies when deciding, in a federal action involving a § 1983 claim, the preclusive effect of a prior state court 5 ruling. None of the cases they cite, however, relied on a preliminary finding of probable cause (rather than a conviction, final judgment, or decision on appeal) to bar a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim involving an equal protection violation. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983); Ayers v. City of 6 Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1990); Davis v. Clark Cnty., 966 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2013); see also Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1994); Thompson v. Copeland, No. C14-1769, 7 2015 WL 6738861 (W.D. Wash. July 24, 2015); Fontana v. City of Auburn, No. C13-245, 2014 WL 4162528 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2014). Even if Washington law applies, the showing necessary for 8 collateral estoppel has not been made. See Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wn.2d 552, 562, 852 P.2d 295 (1993) (indicating that collateral estoppel requires identical parties or privity, identical issues, a previous final judgment on the merits, and a finding that application of the doctrine would not work an 9 injustice). First, the issues are not identical. In ruling on “halftime” motions, Judges Spearman and North were assumed the truth of the State’s allegations and drew all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. 10 See App’x D (Dkt. # 67-4 at 18); App’x F (Dkt. # 67-6 at 7). In contrast, in deciding the pending motions to dismiss, the Court must assume the truth of plaintiff’s allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in 11 his favor. Usher, 828 F.2d at 561. Plaintiff pleads that the State’s allegations were false or misleading, and thus, the Court cannot treat as collaterally binding decisions that presumed the State’s allegations were true. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing that “deliberately or 12 recklessly” misstating or omitting facts material to probable cause is “not objectively reasonable,” and that courts are “not equipped at [the Rule 12(b)(6)] stage” to resolve disputes about whether 13 misrepresentations were made). Judges Spearman and North made their rulings almost seven and nine years, respectively, after Plaintiff was charged with Jinaga’s murder, based on a different quantum of evidence than when the prosecution began. See id. (recognizing that the timing of a state court’s probable 14 cause determination is an important factor in deciding whether to give it preclusive effect (citing Haupt, 17 F.3d at 289)). Judge Robinson’s finding of probable cause was closer to the relevant time, but it was 15 based entirely on the PC Certification, which Plaintiff criticizes as exaggerating the quality of the DNA evidence linking him to the crime and failing to disclose exculpatory information that might have caused 16 Judge Robinson to form a different opinion. Second, the previous probable cause rulings were not “final.” See Cunningham v. State, 61 Wn. App. 562, 567, 811 P.2d 225 (1991) (adopting the following test for finality: (i) whether the prior decision was adequately deliberated; (ii) whether it was firm, rather 17 than tentative; (iii) whether the parties were fully heard; (iv) whether the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion; and (v) whether the decision was subject to appeal or in fact was reviewed on appeal 18 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. g (Am. L. Inst. 1982))). None of the rulings at issue were set forth in a written, reasoned opinion, and the denial of a “halftime” motion may not be appealed, 19 see Wash. Sup. Ct. Cr. R. 8.3(c)(3). Both Judges Spearman and North were essentially “outvoted” as to what a “rational juror” could find “beyond a reasonable doubt” from the evidence adduced at trial; the first jury was deadlocked 11-to-1 to acquit, and the second jury found Plaintiff not guilty. See App’x D 20 (Dkt. # 67-4 at 19); App’x F (Dkt. # 67-6 at 7); App’x H (Dkt. # 67-8); Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 127 & 129 (Dkt. # 27). Finally, application of the collateral estoppel doctrine would work an injustice. The 21 Redmond Defendants’ view that Plaintiff has twice had an opportunity to challenge probable cause and twice failed is myopic, and their assertion that Plaintiff would suffer no injustice is unsupported by the 22 authorities they cite. Indeed, Rickert v. City of Poulsbo, No. C07-5477, 2008 WL 271643 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2008), contradicts their position. See id. at *6–8 (concluding that the plaintiff was “not 1 criminal prosecution was “induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other 2 wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith.” 368 F.3d at 1067. The Awabdy Court further held

3 that, to the extent a judge’s preliminary probable cause ruling was premised on fabricated evidence or other wrongful conduct by state or local officials, the doctrine of collateral estoppel 4 does not bar a § 1983 Plaintiff from relitigating probable cause. Id. at 1068. In light of Awabdy, 5 the Court must conclude that Plaintiff is not collaterally estopped by the decisions of Judges 6 Robinson, Spearman, or North from asserting that he was prosecuted without probable cause. 7 b. “Clearly Established” Right 8 A constitutional right is “clearly established” if existing controlling precedent, i.e., a 9 decision of the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit, has “placed the . . . constitutional question 10 beyond debate.” See Russell v. Lumitap, 31 F.4th 729, (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Kisela v. 11 Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)). Qualified immunity ensures that, before individuals face 12 suit under § 1983, they had notice (or “fair warning”) of the unlawfulness of their conduct, and 13 thus, a constitutional right is considered “clearly established” only if the contours of the right are 14 “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 15 right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). This “fair warning” does not require that the “very action” at issue be 16 previously deemed unlawful, but that the unlawfulness be “apparent” given the preexisting law. 17 Id. at 739 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640); see Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 18 657, 680 (9th Cir. 2021) (“State ‘[o]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates 19

20 adjudication did not end in a final judgment on the merits” (emphasis added)). Another way to summarize events is that Plaintiff was twice tried and essentially twice acquitted, which substantially 21 undermines the persuasive effect of the state court’s probable cause rulings. This analysis also applies to Plaintiff’s common law claim of malicious prosecution, as to which Washington law governs. See United 22 Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (observing that a federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims must apply state law to them, citing Erie R. Co. v. 1 established law even in novel factual circumstances’―i.e., even without a prior case that had 2 ‘fundamentally similar’ or ‘materially similar’ facts.” (alteration in original, quoting Wilk v.

3 Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2020))). Awabdy was decided in 2004, before Jinaga’s murder and before the prosecution at issue 4 began, and in Awabdy, the Ninth Circuit applied the guidance of a Supreme Court decision 5 issued in 1994. See 368 F.3d at 1068–69 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)). 6 Awabdy, which Defendants failed to mention in their briefs even though it is cited in the 7 operative pleading, see Am. Compl. at ¶ 161, is the type of controlling precedent envisioned in 8 Saucier and its progeny, and it provided the requisite notice to DPA Baird and Detective Coats, 9 more than four years before they engaged in the claimed actions at issue, that their alleged 10 conduct constituted a constitutional violation. Both pending motions are DENIED with respect 11 to qualified immunity, but without prejudice to raising the issue again in a motion for summary 12 judgment or at trial in a manner consistent with this Order. 13 C. Governmental Defendants 14 1. King County 15 King County accuses Plaintiff of bringing another lawsuit against the same defendants for the same incarceration and argues that Plaintiff is barred by the dismissal of his earlier lawsuit 16 from pursuing the claims pleaded against it (and its personnel) in this action. This contention 17 lacks merit. Res judicata refers to the preclusive effect of former litigation. Robi v. Five 18 Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1988). Res judicata has two conceptual categories: 19 (i) claim preclusion; and (ii) issue preclusion, also called “collateral estoppel.” Robi, 838 F.2d at 20 321 & n.2; see also Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 850 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) 21 (“Rather than using the terms ‘res judicata’ and ‘collateral estoppel,’ the Supreme Court has 22 generally used the terms ‘claim preclusion’ and ‘issue preclusion.’”); Ross v. Alaska, 189 F.3d 1 1107, 1110 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999). The key distinction between the two types of preclusion is that 2 matters never litigated may be barred by claim preclusion, while only matters actually litigated

3 may be barred by issue preclusion. See Frank, 216 F.3d at 850 n.4; Ross, 189 F.3d at 1110 n.2. King County invokes claim preclusion. Plaintiff’s previous lawsuit concerned King 4 County Jail’s use of waist restraints and handcuffs, the combination of which Plaintiff believed 5 had exposed him to the risk of attack from other inmates, and the tightness of which Plaintiff 6 asserted had injured his wrists, for which he received allegedly deficient medical care. See 7 App’x I. In the pending action, Plaintiff does not repeat the waist restraint and handcuff 8 grievances; his current claims relate to solitary confinement, cold cell conditions, failure to treat 9 his sleep apnea and mental health conditions, and alleged sexual harassment. King County 10 suggests that Plaintiff should be prevented from pursuing these claims because Plaintiff could 11 have, but failed to, raise them in the earlier litigation. This contention concerns the preclusive 12 effect of a decision by a federal court exercising federal-question jurisdiction, and it is therefore 13 governed by federal common law. See Media Rts. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 922 F.3d 14 1014, 1021 n.6 (2019). 15 Under federal common law, claim preclusion bars a party from pursuing claims that “were raised or could have been raised in [a] prior action.” Id. at 1020. In the Ninth Circuit, 16 however, claim preclusion “does not apply to claims that accrue after the filing of the operative 17 complaint” in the previous suit. Id. at 1021 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1022 n.8 (clarifying 18 that the filing of the operative complaint, not the entry of judgment, is the relevant date for 19 purposes of claim preclusion). In other words, Plaintiff is not barred from pursuing in this action 20 “claims that were not in existence and could not have been sued upon―i.e., were not legally 21 cognizable―when the allegedly preclusive action was initiated.” Id. at 1021. In addition, as 22 recognized by the Ninth Circuit, “[a] substantially single course of activity may continue through 1 the life of a first suit and beyond,” and “[t]he basic claim-preclusion result is clear: a new claim 2 or cause of action is created as the conduct continues.” Id. at 1022 (quoting 18 Edward H.

3 Cooper, FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4409 (3d ed. 2022 update)). Plaintiff remained in pretrial detention for more than two additional years after the 4 previous case was dismissed with prejudice. See Judgment in C16-273-JLR (Apr. 7, 2017) 5 (App’x L); Verdict (June 11, 2019) (App’x H). King County has offered no evidence that 6 Plaintiff waived or somehow released it or its corrections officials from future claims. Plaintiff 7 may proceed on his claims relating to the conditions of confinement continuing, and events 8 occurring, after August 1, 2016, when the operative pleading in Case No. C16-273 JLR was 9 filed. See App’x I. In arguing to the contrary, King County cites no supporting authority.11 The 10 King County Defendants’ motion is DENIED with respect to res judicata. 11 2. City of Redmond 12 a. Monell Liability 13 The City of Redmond may not be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior 14 theory. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Ulrich v. City & 15 Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002). Instead, governmental Section 1983 liability must turn on one of four theories: (i) a policy or longstanding practice or custom from 16 which the alleged constitutional violation resulted; (ii) an unconstitutional action by an official 17 with final policy-making authority; (iii) ratification by an official with final policy-making 18 authority of a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct; or (iv) a failure to adequately train 19 employees that amounts to “deliberate indifference” about the constitutional right at issue. 20 21 22 11 Indeed, in the most recent decision cited in the King County Defendants’ reply, the Ninth Circuit rejected a res judicata argument. See Grondal v. United States, 21 F.4th 1140, 1164 (9th Cir. 1 See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005); see also City of Canton 2 v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). The Amended Complaint attempts to plead the first (policy or

3 practice), third (ratification), and fourth (failure to train) theories of Monell liability. The operative pleading identifies policies or practices that the Redmond Police 4 Department (“Redmond PD”) did not have or allegedly did not follow; Redmond PD apparently 5 did not require the changing of gloves between sample collections or locations, the securing of 6 evidence like the apartment complex’s dumpster or neighbor Johnson’s phone, or any partnering 7 with agencies more experienced in homicide investigation.12 See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 67, 70–71, 8 89, 147, 149 & 151. The Amended Complaint further asserts that acts or omissions consistent 9 with Redmond PD’s practices were ratified by policymakers. Id. at ¶ 160. Plaintiff does not, 10 however, explain how the alleged deficiencies in the way Redmond PD handled this or any other 11 murder investigation stemmed from racial animus or had a purpose of denying equal protection 12 of the law, and he has not sufficiently pleaded the first (policy or practice) or third (ratification) 13 grounds for a Monell claim against the City of Redmond. 14 In contrast, in alleging a failure to train, the operative pleading speaks directly about the 15 equal protection component of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. The Amended Complaint states that the City of Redmond and Redmond PD’s supervisory personnel “failed to properly 16 train and supervise employees on how to conduct racially unbiased investigations.” Id. at ¶ 156. 17 It accuses Redmond PD personnel of referencing race only when questioning witnesses about 18 Plaintiff and of treating White suspects more favorably than Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 156(a)–(h). It 19 20

21 12 The City of Redmond denies that it had a policy or practice of not partnering with other law enforcement organizations, referencing its Answer for support. Redmond’s Mot. at 8 (citing Answer at 22 ¶ 67 (Dkt. # 34) (indicating that Washington State Patrol and Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel assisted with the investigation at issue)). Conflicting facts contained in a responsive pleading cannot, 1 also contends that the “disparate treatment” Plaintiff received resulted from a failure to 2 adequately train Redmond PD employees to perform racially unbiased investigations, and that

3 such failure amounted to “deliberate indifference” concerning Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See id. at ¶ 157. 4 The City of Redmond argues that Plaintiff has not alleged a pattern of violations that 5 would have provided notice of a need for further training. Plaintiff responds that no pattern is 6 required because “the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train” were “patently obvious.” 7 Pl.’s Resp. at 14 (Dkt. # 59) (quoting Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874–75 (9th Cir. 8 2022) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64 (2011))). When viewed in the light most 9 favorable to Plaintiff, the operative pleading sufficiently pleads a plausible claim that the lack of 10 training about how to conduct racially unbiased investigations had “patently obvious” 11 unconstitutional consequences. See Ross v. City of Oakland, No. 14-cv-800, 2014 WL 4744191, 12 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 22, 2014) (finding “plausible that the City’s failure to train was so 13 obviously deficient that it could be subject to liability under § 1983 as a result of a single 14 incident,” namely the erroneous attempted-murder conviction of the Plaintiff, which resulted 15 from inter alia an officer’s direction to the victim to identify the plaintiff in a photo montage). The City of Redmond’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the policy-or-practice and 16 ratification claims, and those theories of Monell liability are DISMISSED without prejudice and 17 with leave to amend; the motion is DENIED with respect to failure to train. 18 b. Public Duty Doctrine 19 A plaintiff may not base a claim of negligence on an intentional act but may sue for 20 negligent acts leading up to the intentional tort. See Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma, 193 21 Wn.2d 537, 546, 442 P.3d 608 (2019). For example, in Beltran-Serrano, the plaintiff, who was 22 shot multiple times by a police officer, could proceed on a negligence claim against the City of 1 Tacoma for the officer’s alleged failure to use reasonable care during the interaction with the 2 plaintiff that preceded the shooting. Id. at 544–48. To maintain an action for negligence, a

3 plaintiff must first demonstrate that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. See, e.g., Honcoop v. Wash., 111 Wn.2d 182, 188, 759 P.2d 1188 (1988). In the context of claims against 4 governmental entities, Washington courts use a “focusing tool” known as the public duty 5 doctrine, which recognizes that governments are tasked with certain duties that are not actionable 6 in tort, and which ensures that “governments do not bear greater tort liability than private 7 actors.” Beltran-Serrano, 193 Wn.2d at 549. 8 The public duty doctrine defines four instances in which a governmental entity may be 9 found to owe a statutory or common law duty to a particular member of the public: (i) legislative 10 intent, (ii) failure to enforce, (iii) the rescue doctrine, or (iv) a special relationship. See Cummins 11 v. Lewis Cnty., 156 Wn.2d 844, 853 & n.7, 133 P.3d 458 (2006). If one of these four 12 “exceptions” does not apply, then no liability may be imposed for a public officer’s negligent 13 conduct, based on the reasoning that a duty was not owed specifically to the individual plaintiff, 14 rather than the public in general. Id. at 852. The Redmond Defendants contend that Plaintiff has 15 not pleaded facts to support one of the four “exceptions” to the public duty doctrine, and that, as a result, Plaintiff cannot further pursue his negligence claim. Plaintiff argues that the public duty 16 doctrine does not apply, but Beltran-Serrano seems to contradict his assertion, and the Court will 17 analyze the negligence claim through the lens required by the public duty doctrine. 18 The first three “exceptions” do not apply, and the only “exception” on which Plaintiff 19 might rely is a “special relationship.” In cases predating Beltran-Serrano, Washington courts 20 articulated these requirements for establishing a “special relationship” that would create an 21 actionable duty on the part of a governmental entity: (i) the plaintiff had direct contact or privity 22 with a public official, thereby setting the plaintiff apart from the public; (ii) the public official 1 gave “express assurances” to the plaintiff; and (iii) the plaintiff justifiably relied on such express 2 assurances to his or her detriment. See Cummins, 156 Wn.2d at 854. In Beltran-Serrano,

3 however, the Washington Supreme Court appeared to loosen the standard, and required merely that the defendant have an “affirmative interaction” with the plaintiff. 193 Wn.2d at 551. The 4 Beltran-Serrano court reasoned that “every individual owes a duty of reasonable care to refrain 5 from causing foreseeable harm in interactions with others.” Id. at 550 (citing Restatement 6 (Second) of Torts § 281, cmt. e (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). Such “duty applies in the context of law 7 enforcement and encompasses the duty to refrain from directly causing harm to another through 8 affirmative acts of misfeasance,” rather than nonfeasance. See id. (citing Robb v. City of Seattle, 9 176 Wn.2d 427, 295 P.3d 212 (2013)). In Beltran-Serrano, the negligence claims at issue arose 10 out of the officer’s “direct interaction” with the plaintiff, rather than a “breach of a generalized 11 public duty” to, for example, “provide police services, enforce the law, and keep the peace.” Id. 12 at 551–52. 13 In Mancini v. City of Tacoma, 196 Wn.2d 864, 479 P.3d 656 (2021), the Washington 14 Supreme Court extended tort liability to negligence in the execution of a search warrant. Id. at 15 880. In Mancini, officers executed a search warrant at the wrong apartment, which belonged to the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiff’s negligence claim was not based 16 on “the City’s duty [running] solely to the public at large” or on “an abstract duty to the nebulous 17 public,” but on a “specific duty enforceable by [the plaintiff] in tort.” Id. at 885–86. Relying on 18 Mancini and Beltran-Serrano, the court in Gill v. Magan, No. C19-860, 2021 WL 928174 19 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2021), concluded that a plaintiff, who was subjected to an erroneous 20 21 22 1 forced-entry search of her home and arrested at gunpoint, could sue for negligence in applying 2 for the search warrant. Id. at *8–9.13

3 Beltran-Serrano, Mancini, and Gill support the conclusion that the public duty doctrine does not prevent Plaintiff from pursuing a negligence claim. The Redmond Defendants contend 4 they did not have the requisite “affirmative interaction” with Plaintiff, but that assertion runs 5 contrary to the allegations of the operative pleading. One or more members of Redmond PD is 6 alleged to have interrogated Plaintiff in “an unmarked car” without giving him Miranda 7 warnings. Am. Compl. at ¶ 156(g). One or more members of Redmond PD somehow obtained 8 Plaintiff’s DNA. See App’x A. And, one member of Redmond PD, Detective Coats, prepared 9 the PC Certification used to seek bail in the amount of $5 million and keep Plaintiff in custody 10 for almost nine years. Id. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that the murder investigation was 11 performed in a negligent manner (rather than with race-based malice), he has plausibly pleaded 12 that a duty was owed specifically to him, as distinct from the public. The Redmond Defendants’ 13 motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence,14 intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage),15 14

15 13 The Redmond Defendants contend that Gill is “an overextension of Mancini,” and that “no Washington court has endorsed the rule Gill ascribes to Washington state law claims.” Redmond’s 16 Reply at 11. In affirming other rulings in Gill, the Ninth Circuit noted that the plaintiff proceeded to trial on a common law negligence claim, but the jury found against her. Gill v. City of Seattle, No. 21-35635, 2022 WL 4546918, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022). The subsequent history of Gill reflects the proper 17 functioning of the adversarial process, and the Redmond Defendants’ conclusory criticism of Gill does not warrant disregard of the decision. 18 14 The King County Defendants do not seek dismissal based on the public duty doctrine. A 19 related question, which none of the parties have addressed, is which entities are the proper defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s negligence claims. To the extent Plaintiff’s theory of liability is negligence (rather than willfulness, malice, or intent), the individual Defendants were arguably acting within the 20 scope of their employment. Thus, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to show cause why his negligence claim should not be dismissed without prejudice as to all individual Defendants, leaving the City of Redmond 21 and King County as the sole defendants, sued for vicarious liability under a respondeat superior theory. 22 15 The Redmond Defendants assert that, “[a]bsent a direct interaction, the public duty doctrine bars individual tort claims (including negligence and outrage claims) based on an alleged duty owed to 1 and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, based on the public duty doctrine, is 2 DENIED.

3 IV CONCLUSION 4 For all these reasons, the Court ORDERS: 5 (1) The Redmond Defendants’ (Dkt. # 43), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in 6 part as follows: 7 (a) All claims against individual defendants Harding, Knowles, Mains, 8 Patrick, Shultz, Sowers, Fein, McCrillis, Wilson/Miller, Morgan, and Fuller are 9 DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend; 10 (b) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution against the City of Redmond is DISMISSED with respect to the policy-or-practice and ratification 11 theories of Monell liability, but without prejudice and with leave to amend; and 12 (c) The motion is otherwise DENIED. 13 (2) The King County Defendants’ motion (Dkt. # 67), is GRANTED in part and 14 DENIED in part as follows: 15 (a) All claims against individual defendants Clark and Diaz are DISMISSED 16 without prejudice and with leave to amend; and 17 (b) The motion is otherwise DENIED. 18 19

20 torts like outrage. See Osborn v. Mason Cnty., 157 Wn.2d 18, 134 P.3d 197 (2006); see also Fuller v. Lee, No. C13-563, 2014 WL 6982519, at *11–12 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 9, 2014). The public duty doctrine is 21 a means for determining whether an actionable duty exists to establish negligence, and it has no relevance with respect to intentional torts. Aside from any applicability of the public duty doctrine, neither the 22 Redmond Defendants nor the King County Defendants have addressed, and thus the Court need not decide, whether Plaintiff has adequately pleaded facts to support his negligence, outrage, or negligent 1 (3) Plaintiff must show cause within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order why 72 || his negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims should not be treated as

3 asserted solely against the City of Redmond and King County based on the doctrine of

4 respondeat superior. Any amended pleading must be electronically filed within fourteen (14)

5 days of the date of this Order. Any responsive pleading or motion must be filed in accordance

‘ with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(3). (4) The stay of discovery imposed by the Order entered January 23, 2023 (Dkt. # 82), ' is LIFTED. The trial date and related deadlines set forth in the Minute Order entered August 17, 2022 (Dkt. # 66), remain in effect. Plaintiff shall ether identify and join, or voluntarily dismiss, 9 Doe defendants by May 15, 2023. 10 (5) The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record. 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Dated this 13th day of April, 2023. 8 CJok. 4. Chas 14 John H. Chun United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23