Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc. v. United States

97 F.2d 115, 26 C.C.P.A. 95, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 206
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMarch 28, 1938
DocketNo. 4109
StatusPublished

This text of 97 F.2d 115 (Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc. v. United States, 97 F.2d 115, 26 C.C.P.A. 95, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 206 (ccpa 1938).

Opinion

Hatfield, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:2

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States Customs Court, Third Division, overruling appellant’s protest against the assessment of duty by the collector at the port of New York on cigars imported from Cuba and entered for consumption on October 16, 1934.

The cigars were assessed with duty at $2.25 per pound and 12% per centum ad valorem under paragraph 605 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by a proclamation by the President of the United States on August 24, 1934. The proclamation was issued in accordance with a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba (66 Treas. Dec. 190), entered into on August 24, 1934, pursuant to the provisions of an act of Congress, approved June 12, 1934, entitled “An Act to amend the Tariff Act of 1930.” 48 Stat. part 1, p. 943, Public, No. 316.

The correctness of the duties so assessed by the collector is not challenged by appellant in this appeal.

[97]*97Before the cigars were released from customs custody, and prior to the collector’s liquidation of the entry, revenue stamps were purchased by the importer in payment of the tax provided by section 400 of the Revenue Act of 1926 (U. S. C. title 26, section 832) and affixed to the imported merchandise in accordance with the provisions of section 845, U. S. C. title 26.

The sole issue in the case is the claim made by counsel for appellant; that is, that, by virtue of the provisions of the reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba, appellant is entitled to a 20 per centum reduction of the tax represented by the revenue stamps.

It is conceded by counsel for both parties, and it was so held by this court in the case of Faber, Coe & Gregg v. United States, 19 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 8, T. D. 44851, that the so-called internal-revenue tax provided for in sections 832 and 845, supra, is a customs duty.

In our decision in the Faber, Coe & Gregg case, supra, we held that, “although additional to and separate from the regular or primary duties provided by the Tariff Act of 1922,” revenue taxes assessed on imported merchandise in accordance with sections 832 and 845, supra, were customs duties; that, without regard to how they might be designated by the Congress, “taxes imposed on imported merchandise while it retains its 'distinctive character’ as an import are customs duties, whether they be imposed at the time of importation or subsequent thereto”; and that the importer of cigars from Cuba was not entitled to a 20 per centum reduction of such revenue taxes or additional duties under the provisions of the treaty of commercial reciprocity concluded between the United States and the Republic of Cuba, December 11, 1902, approved by the Congress, December 17, 1903 (33 Stat. 3; U. S. C. title 19, sections 124 and 125). [Italics not quoted.]

It is conceded by counsel for appellant that our decision in the Faber, Coe & Gregg case, supra, is decisive of the questions there raised and determined. Counsel contend, however, that, by virtue of the reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba of August 24, 1934, appellant is entitled to a reduction of 20 per centum of such revenue taxes ■or additional duties on the cigars here involved. It is argued that the language in the reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba differs greatly from that contained in the treaty of commercial reciprocity concluded between the United States and Cuba, supra, and clearly indicates an intention on the part of the high contracting parties to meet our ■decision in the Faber, Coe & Gregg case, supra, and make it ineffective as to future importations of Cuban cigars, so far as it held that the preferential reduction of 20 per centum did not apply to the taxes or additional duties imposed by virtue of the provisions of section 832, supra.

[98]*98The pertinent parts of tbe treaty of commercial reciprocity between the United. States and Cuba read:

Article I
During the term of this convention, all articles of merchandise being the product of the soil or industry of the United States which are now imported into the Repub-lie of Cuba free of duty, and all articles of merchandise being the product of the-soil or industry of the Republic of Cuba which are now imported into the United States free of duty, shall continue to be so admitted by the respective countries free of duty.
Article II
During the term of this convention, all articles of merchandise not included in the foregoing Article I and being the product of the soil or industry of the Republic of Cuba imported into the United States shall be admitted at a reduction of twenty per centum of the rates of duty thereon as provided by the Tariff Act of the United States approved July 24, 1897, or as may be provided by any tariff law of the United States subsequently enacted.
Article VIII
The rates of duty herein granted by the United States to the Republic of Cuba are and shall continue during the term of this convention preferential in respect to all like imports from other countries, and, in return for said preferential rates of duty granted to the Republic of Cuba- by the United States, it is agreed that the concession herein granted on the part of the said Republic of Cuba to the products of the Unite'd States shall likewise be, and shall continue, during the term of this convention, preferential in respect to all like imports from other countries.
Article IX
In order to maintain the mutual advantages granted in the present convention by the United States to the Republic of Cuba and by the Republic of Cuba to the United States, it is understood and agreed that any tax or charge that may be imposed by the national or local authorities of either of the two countries upon the articles of merchandise embraced in the provisions of this convention, subsequent to importation and prior to their entering into consumption in the respective countries, shall he imposed and collected without discrimination upon like articles whencesoever imported. [Italics ours.]

Section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1930 reads:

SEC. 316. CUBAN RECIPROCITY TREATY NOT AFFECTED.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to abrogate or in any manner impair or affect the provisions of the treaty of commercial reciprocity concluded between the United States and the Republic of Cuba on December 11, 1902, or the provisions of the Act of December 17, 1903, chapter 1.

No question being raised here as to the authority of the President to enter into the reciprocal trade agreement of August 24, 1934, with Cuba, and it being conceded by counsel for the parties that, under the provisions of the act to amend the Tariff Act of 1930, supra, the [99]*99President bad the power to provide in such trade agreement for a preferential reduction of 20 per centum of the revenue taxes or additional duties provided for in section 832, supra, we deem it unnecessary to quote the provisions of that act.

The pertinent parts of the reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba read:

ARTICLE III

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97 F.2d 115, 26 C.C.P.A. 95, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 206, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/faber-coe-gregg-inc-v-united-states-ccpa-1938.