Fa'atiliga v. Lutali

3 Am. Samoa 2d 139
High Court of American Samoa·Decided December 24, 1986·No. CA. NO. 103-86·Published

Opinion

This case arose out of an effort by the territorial government (A.S.G.> to "privatize" the ownership of the only hotel in American Samoa.

Early in 1985 A.S.G. made a public announcement that it would offer far- sale 87,796 shares in the American Samoa Development Corporation (ASDC), the corporation that owns the Rainmaker Hotel. These shares comprise a large majority of the shares in ASDC. They are held in the name of the Development bank of American Samoa, an enterprise established by territorial statute and wholly owned by A.S.G. See A.S.C.A. § 28.0101 et seq. Two bids were submitted, and in October-[141]*1411985 A.S.G. entered into a one-year option contract with Aiga Tasi, Inc., a Texas corporation. According to the option contract Aiga Tasi had the right to purchase the shares for $1 million provided that it also assumed $690» OOO in ASDC debts and made a commitment to invest $38 million in improvements to the hotel and related facilities. The agreement was entered into by A.S.G., and the sale of the hotel was later endorsed by the Board of Directors of the Development Bank, whose members are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.

In July 28 of 1986 eleven persons brought a shareholders' derivative action seeking an injunction against the sale of the shares, as well as other relief including a declaratory judgment that A.S.G. owns no shares in ASDC. Two of the shareholders were dismissed from the action on the ground that they had purchased their shares after most of the events of which they complained had already happened (apparently with the principal purpose of participating in the lawsuit) and therefore had no standing to claim that they had been damaged by these events. The parties then agreed that the suit be dismissed without prejudice, and the remaining nine plaintiffs brought this- action. In addition to A.S.G.» the Development Bank, the members o£ the Board of Directors of ASDC, and various government officials, the new action named Aiga Tasi, Inc., and Li'a Afuvai, an Aiga Tasi employee who had been serving without pay as general manager of the hotel, as defendants.

The lawsuit became even more complicated when on October 15, .1986, in the midst of extensive discovery and about a month before the scheduled trial date, the option contract expired without Aiga Tasi having purchased the shares. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint, shifting its primary focus from an attempt to enjoin the sale to requests for declaratory relief concerning the ownership of the shares and damages for alleged mismanagement of the hotel during the period surrounding the option contract and the employment of Li'a Afuvai. Various cross-claims and counterclaims ensued. The most noteworthy of these were claims by Aiga Tasi that A.S.G. had breached the option contract by refusing to consummate the sale of the shares and that the plaintiffs had tortiously interfered with the option contract. All claims involving Aiga Tasi were then severed [142]*142from the action, and the remainder of the claims finally went to trial on December 9, 1986.

The presentation of the plaintiffs' case took two days, at the conclusion of which all defendants moved to dismiss the action. The Court granted the motion to dismiss, except with regard to certain claims involving an ultra vires personal loan made by ASDC and the forgiveness of debts alleged to be owed ASDC by ASG, an ASS official, and Aiga Tasi. The defendants involved in these transactions then agreed to the entry of a consent judgment against them on these claims. The parties have requested this written opinion.

Although the ¡plaintiffs' amended complaint is a voluminous document alleging many improprieties over the years, the claims on which relief might conceivably have been granted and on which plaintiffs attempted to present some evidence can be summed up as followsi

{1) The plaintiffs claimed that the Development Bank owned no shares in ASDC, and that the four certificates representing 37,769 shares in the name of the Development Bank had been "illegally and/or improperly issued." ÍAt trial the plaintiffs acknowledged that two of the certificates represented shares that were genuinely owned by the Development Bank, but contested the 60,072 shares evidenced by the other two certificates. )
(2) The plaintiffs claimed that the By-Laws of ASDC had not been lawfully enacted, thus calling into question the legality of many corporate acts including the ©lection of the current Board of Directors.
(3) The plaintiffs asserted -improprieties in the election at which most of the current Directors were elected.
Í4) The plaintiffs asserted that the current directors had been "appointed* by the Governor rather than elected by the shareholders as provided by law and by the ASDC Articles of Incorporation.
<5) The plaintiffs claimed that the Option Agreement with Aiga Tasi was part of a deliberate attempt to sell the hotel for far less than it was worth to an enterprise composed of close associates and supporters of territorial government officials; [143]*143that the Option Agreement violated certain provisions of the ASDC Articles of Incorporation; and that ASDC had suffered a consequent diminution in value.
<!6> Finally, plaintiffs alleged various acts of corporate mismanagement including the unjustified forgiveness of debts_ to ASDC, a personal loan made by ASDC in violation of its Articles of Incorporation, excessive compensation of directors, and access by defendant Afuvai to corporate records during his employment by Aiga Tasi

Defendants introduced other legal issues into the case by way of affirmative defenses. Motions for partial summary judgment and to strike parties were filed a few days before trial urging that plaintiffs were barred by the statute of limitations, estoppel, and laches fro» denying that the Development Bank owned the ASDC stock 5 that the individual defendants were not liable in their personal capacities because they had acted in good faith and within the discretionary duties of their offices^ and that A.S.G. cannot be sued at all Cejccept in tort in accordance with the provisions of the Government Tort Liability Act, A.S.G.A. S' 43.1201 et sea.> because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

The statute of limitations, estoppel, laches, and good-faith immunity questions all depended on evidence that was not submitted to the Court prior to the trial, and were therefor© deferred until the trial. Our decision on this motion Makes it unnecessary to reach those questions. The broader claim by A.S.G. of. absolute- immunity from any non-tort suits amounts in this case to the assertion that the government created a bank, made loans, took mortgages, acquired stock in a corporation whose other shareholders were private persons, substantially assumed the management of the corporation with its attendant fiduciary duties to those persons, voted on behalf of the bank in corporate elections, and undertook to sell the bank's majority interest in the corporation, all without any implicit agreement to be held responsible for any breach it might commit of the obligations thus undertaken. Although any holding by this Court on the contours of sovereign immunity in the Territory should issue only after plenary briefing and argument in a case in which the issue is crucial, and our decision on the merits on this motion to dismiss makes sovereign immunity [144]

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Fa'atiliga v. Lutali, 3 Am. Samoa 2d 139 (amsamoa 1986).

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