F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States

3 Cust. Ct. 236, 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1796
United States Customs Court·Decided November 1, 1939·No. C. D. 244·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Evans, Judge:

This is an action against the United States wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover certain sums of money claimed to have been illegally collected and paid upon an importation of china novelties [237]*237whereon the collector of customs at the port of New York had assessed a countervailing duty under authority of the finding made by the Secretary of the Treasury as published in T. D. 48479. The merchandise is a product of Germany and was exported from that country under permits granted by governmental agencies which allowed the payment of 90 per centum of the purchase price in a stipulated amount of registered reichsmarks and the balance to be paid in so-called free reichsmarks. Payment was to be made upon exportation of the merchandise in question. No controversy exists concerning the proper dutiable classification made by the collector of the merchandise. The sole question involved is the legality of the countervailing duty assessed.

The Government claims in brief that Germany has adopted certain procedure required to be carried out by the purchaser and exporter which results in the payment or bestowal by Germany of a bounty or grant upon the production and/or exportation of the merchandise in question, and therefore it was required under the provisions of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 that countervailing duty should be assessed.

The plaintiff, the importer of the merchandise, contravenes this claim and alleges that there has been no bounty or grant paid or bestowed upon the manufacture or exportation of the merchandise in question.

Section 303, supra (46 Stat. 590, 687; U. S. C., title 19, sec. 1303), provides as follows:

SEC. 303. COUNTERVAILING DUTIES.
Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony, province, or other political sub-1 division of government, and such article or merchandise is dutiable under the provisions of this Act, then upon the importation of any such article or merchandise into the United States, whether the same shall be imported directly from the country of production or otherwise, and whether such article or merchandise is imported in the same condition as when exported from the country of production or has been changed in condition by remanufaeture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases, in addition to the duties otherwise imposed by this Act, an additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed. The Secretary of the Treasury shall from time to time ascertain and determine, or estimate, the net amount of each such bounty or grant, and shall declare the net amount so determined or estimated. The Secretary of the Treasury shall make all regulations he may deem necessary for the identification of such articles and merchandise and for the assessment and collection of such additional duties.

The court has had before it the question of assessing countervailing d uty on various occasions but in no case have the circumstances which [238]*238impelled the collection of such, duty been similar to the circumstances involved herein. On the general question of such duties the court in the case of Downs v. United States, T. D. 22984, G. A. 4912, Vol. 4, Treas. Dec. 405, in a well-considered opinion by Somerville, G. A., which was affirmed in 113 Fed. 144, and by the Supreme Court in 187 U. S. 496, 47 L. ed. 275, held: (we quote from the syllabus):

The question, whether a country pays or bestows a bounty or grant upon the exportation of an article, within the meaning of section 5, tariff act of 1897, lies, in its initiative with the Secretary of the Treasury.

It further stated, at p. 406:

It is conceded, however, that the decision of the Secretary as to whether the laws of Russia do, in fact, bestow such a bounty or grant, is reviewable by this Board, as it involves the construction of the laws of Russia relating to the precise subject-matter covered by said section 5, above cited.

Section 5 of the Tariff Act of 1897, there involved was the correlative section to 303, supra, although the language of the earlier act was much narrower than that now in effect, in that it provided only for the assessment of countervailing duty when any “country, dependency, or colony” paid or bestowed a bounty or grant, whereas the present law adds to those terms the following: “province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel,. or corporation. ’ ’

That opinion further stated that it seems that the decision of the Secretary as to the amount of any such bounty or grant is conclusive on the courts, citing cases.

Also that:

It is important to observe, in the consideration of this subject, that section 5 of the tariff act of 1897, under which this case arises, does not use the word “bounty” in any narrow or technical meaning. It embraces “any bounty or grant” bestowed •or conferred by the Government, whether directly or indirectly. The word “grant” is more comprehensive in meaning than the term “bounty.” It implies the conferring by the sovereign power of some valuable privilege, franchise, or other right of like character, upon a corporation, person, or class of persons.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, that court stated:

It is practically admitted in this case that a bounty equal to the value of these certificates is paid by the Russian government, and the main argument of the petitioner is addressed to the proposition that this bounty is paid, not upon exportation, but upon production. The answer to this is that every bounty upon exportation must, to a certain extent, operate as a bounty upon production, since nothing can be exported which is not produced, and hence a bounty upon exportation, by creating a foreign demand, stimulates an increased production to the extent of such demand.

In the case of Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. Appls. 97, T. D. 36426, the late Judge DeVries discussed the terms used in [239]*239the countervailing duty statute at length. Among other things he there stated:

“The law regards the substance, not the shadows, acts done, not the names by which these acts are designated.” Whether the thing done be characterized an “allowance” or “bonification” or “bounty” or “grant” or “drawback” or what matters not. The question for the court is whether or not it is within the class of results sought by Congress to be equalized by this paragraph of the tariff act. That construction must be given the paragraph by the court which will most effectually accomplish its manifest purpose. Arnold v. United States (147 U. S. 494, 497).

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion in the Nicholas case, supra, in 249 U. S. 34, 63 L. ed.

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F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 3 Cust. Ct. 236, 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1796 (cusc 1939).

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