F. S. Bowen Electric Co., Inc., Use v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, and Porter Construction Company, Inc., Third Party

256 F.2d 46, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 4290
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedJune 2, 1958
Docket7598
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 256 F.2d 46 (F. S. Bowen Electric Co., Inc., Use v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, and Porter Construction Company, Inc., Third Party) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
F. S. Bowen Electric Co., Inc., Use v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, and Porter Construction Company, Inc., Third Party, 256 F.2d 46, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 4290 (3d Cir. 1958).

Opinion

HAYNSWORTH, Circuit Judge.

In December 1955, Porter Construction Co., Inc., a Maryland corporation engaged in the business of a general construction contractor, made certain transfers which were challenged by its surety, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, as being in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which is incorporated in Article 39B of the Code of Maryland (1951).

The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia set aside certain of the questioned transfers, aggregating $32,-880.06, and F. S. Bowen Electric Co., Inc., the alleged transferee, has appealed. A notice of a cross-appeal directed to the failure of the District Court to set aside the transfer of another item was filed, but was dismissed with consent of all parties.

Bowen company here contends primarily that the transfer of the $32,880.06 did not render the Porter company insolvent within the meaning of § 4 of the Act *48 While the Porter company had a net worth,as of September 30, 1955, as shown by the report of its own accountant, of only $26,994.88, Bowen asserts that a balance sheet item of approximately $142,000, entitled “Reserve for Unearned Profit on Work in Progress,” 1 2*should be treated as part of the net worth.

Porter company kept its books on the completed contracts method. That method has come into widespread use because of the difficulty, or impossibility, of accurate determination of profit or loss on large construction projects until the work is substantially completed. Such work is subject to so many vicissitudes and unexpected expense that accruals of income, during the early stages of construction, were not infrequently found to be most unrealistic in the light of actual profit or loss as finally determined, with accuracy, upon completion of the contract.

Though use of the completed contracts method of accounting avoids the necessity of estimating interim profit or loss 2 on uncompleted contracts as of the date of each financial statement, it does not obviate credits and charges to other balance sheet items which inevitably result from current performance of the work. Wages paid must still diminish cash, and intermediate billings increase accounts receivable. Necessarily, therefore, use of the method requires offsetting balance sheet entries. If a temporary excess of accumulated cost over the aggregate of related intermediate billings is not to reduce net worth, it must be shown as an asset, while, conversely, a temporary excess of intermediate billings over accumulated cost must be shown as a liability on the balance sheet.

The ratio, at any given moment, between intermediate billings and accumulated cost is determined largely by billing practice and the initial rate of cost accrual. It has little, if any, relationship to interim, or ultimate, profit or loss. A contractor who agrees to construct a building for a financially responsible owner at a fixed price of $1,000,000 and who completes the work at an actual cost of $950,000 has suffered a loss at no stage of the work, though he submits no bill until the project is completed. Nor could he conceivably be said to have earned a profit of $1,000,000 if that amount was paid to him in full before he began his performance of the contract. Until, in the latter instance, he has discharged his obligation under the contract, that obligation — -measured, under the completed contracts method, by the excess of billings over accumulated cost — must be carried as a liability upon a financial statement.

Because the obligation of the contract is in every sense current, the Committee on Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of Accountants, in October 1955, issued its Bulletin No. 45, recommending that such excess of billings over related cost be shown as a current liability, rather than, as theretofore had been the practice, as a deferred liability. Such bulletins are generally recognized as setting the standards of practice in the accounting profession, but it is quite immaterial here whether the item is properly treated as a current, or a deferred, liability. It is, in any event, a liability, and, under no circumstances, could it be treated as a credit to earned surplus.

For the reasons suggested, the contention of the Bowen company that the “Reserve for Unearned Profit * * * ” is not a liability because it is not “owed” to anyone overlooks the actual obligation of the contractor and the inherent necessity of balancing a balance sheet without wanton distortion of apparent net worth.

In fairness to the principals involved, it may be stated that the record strongly *49 indicates they believed the Porter company.to have been worth much more than it was, and that they regarded the “Reserve for Unearned Profit * * * ” as something akin to realized profit, but as the president of the Porter company testified, “I didn’t understand the audit myself, had to have somebody to tell me.” The misconceptions of the principals may lead to imprudence occasioning insolvency, but they cannot support a finding of solvency where clearly there was insolvency.

Determination of the issue of solvency, under the statute, requires an appraisal of probable liabilities as well as the salable value of assets. A particular accounting method should not so circumscribe the inquiry that unsalable assets are treated as salable, or technical and contingent liabilities, as absolute and ascertained. The proof here, however, was that the uncompleted contracts ultimately resulted in tremendous losses. No engineering or other appraisal was offered which would justify a finding that there was a reasonable basis for current accrual of profit in the uncompleted contracts on the date of the transfers in question. There is general reference to increases in costs some six months later, but nothing to require a finding that, on the date of transfer, there was any reasonable basis to determine an interim, or ultimate, profit. Instead, primary reliance is placed upon the fortuitous circumstance that intermediate billings temporarily exceeded accumulated cost, a circumstance which we find to have no necessary relevance to the issue, or probative force. The District Court was clearly justified in finding no ascertainable profit in the contracts in process of completion.

Because it was contended that one of the transferred items was not reflected in the balance sheets and that the net worth was greater than the cash item transferred, the District Judge considered the salable value of the fixed assets of the Porter company, finding it to be no more than $15,000 to $20,000. The company had been organized in 1952. By September 1955 it had a gross fixed asset account of $43,937.97, of which $19,730.53 were “tools,” as distinguished from “construction equipment,” items which frequently, if not ordinarily, are not capitalized. Over the period, depreciation on all fixed assets of $7,880.84, or just under 18% of the cost, had been accumulated. As of November 30, 1955, the fixed asset account stood at $51,801.94, of which $21,-596.77 represented tools, and only $9,-266.78 was shown as depreciation against the total account.

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Bluebook (online)
256 F.2d 46, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 4290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/f-s-bowen-electric-co-inc-use-v-united-states-fidelity-guaranty-ca3-1958.