F. L. Smidth & Co. v. United States

59 Cust. Ct. 276, 273 F. Supp. 384, 1967 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2180
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedOctober 5, 1967
DocketC.D. 3141
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 59 Cust. Ct. 276 (F. L. Smidth & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
F. L. Smidth & Co. v. United States, 59 Cust. Ct. 276, 273 F. Supp. 384, 1967 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2180 (cusc 1967).

Opinion

Ford, Judge:

This action is brought by protest duly filed against the action of the appropriate customs officials at the port of Los Angeles in classifying an importation of certain “steel tires,” which are parts of rotary kilns used in the production of cement, under item 661.30 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) which provides as follows:

Industrial and laboratory furnaces and ovens, nonelectric, and parts thereof_ 19% ad val.

Plaintiff, in its protest, made various claims but has limited its case to the claim that the imported articles are properly dutiable at the rate [278]*278of 12.5 per centum ad valorem under item 661.70 which provides as follows:

Industrial machinery, plant, and similar laboratory equipment, whether or not electrically heated, for the treatment of materials by a process involving a change of temperature, such as heating, cooking, roasting, distilling, rectifying, sterilizing, pasteurizing, steaming, drying, evaporating, vaporizing, condensing, or cooling; instantaneous or storage water heaters, non-electrical; all the foregoing (except agricultural implements, sugar machineiy, and machinery or equipment for the heat-treatment of textile yarns, fabrics, or made-up textile articles) and parts thereof:
⅜{ ⅝ ⅜ ¾: ⅝ ⅝
Other_ 12.5% ad val.

The other claims not being urged are, therefore, deemed abandoned.

The record herein consists of the testimony of one witness called on behalf of plaintiff and-six exhibits received on behalf of plaintiff. Plaintiff’s exhibit 1 consists of a sketch of a typical rotary kiln while exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5 are actual photographs of the rotary kiln upon which the tires in question were installed. Plaintiff’s exhibit 6 is a brochure containing pictures and describing a typical rotary kiln.

Basically, the testimony adduced at the trial was to the effect that the imported steel tires are parts of a rotary kiln and were actually installed at the plant of Southwestern Portland Cement in Victorville, California. The steel tires involved weigh over 100,000 pounds each and the kiln without the imported steel tires weighs over 2,000,000 pounds. The kiln itself is used for the production of cement. The steel tires form part of the kiln and are necessary in order for the kiln to rotate. The. kiln itself, while not involved herein, is described to be gasfired. The rotation of the kiln is accomplished by means of a motor — in this instance a 700 horsepower electric motor — which provides its power to a gear rim and drive which consists of two speed reducers and two electric motors. The steel tires involved herein rest upon rollers to permit the rotation of the kiln. They are necessary because of the heavy weight of the kiln. The witness further explained that without the tires, the rotary kiln would collapse.

The evidence also indicates that, in addition to the driving motor, there are other electric motors used for fans for combustion and for blowing cool air through the “hot clinker” and that the cooler itself has a drive for moving the clinker through the cooler. The evidence also establishes that, in addition to the driving motor, an emergency gasoline engine is placed with the unit but used only in the event of an emergency to permit the kiln to rotate temporarily since an interruption during production would cause the kiln to become “crooked.”

[279]*279The witness also testified that tbe rotary kiln does not have any crucibles, retorts, fire beds, or shelves and that, in the operation, a chemical change of the materials fed into the kiln is caused by the heating, that there is a change of temperature in the kiln, and that said kiln accomplishes cooking, roasting, drying, and evaporating. In further explanation of this, the witness stated that cooking is drying out the C02, roasting is diffusing into the clinker the calcined material, and that drying is preheating of the material and the evaporation of moisture.

On cross-examination, a number of questions were directed to the witness relative to the question of substitution of other forms of power for the electric motors. The sum and substance of this testimony was to the effect that the substitution could be readily accomplished but would not be practical because it would require too large a gasoline engine. The balance of the testimony relates to the terminology and understanding of the terms furnace, oven, and kiln.

This is the first case submitted to this court involving item numbers 661.30 or 661.70 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States. Counsel for the respective parties, in well prepared briefs, have brought a number of issues to the attention of the court.

Basically, plaintiff contends that an electrically operated rotary kiln cannot fall within the purview of item 661.30 of said tariff schedules by virtue of the language “non-electric” contained in said item number. In addition thereto, plaintiff contends that a kiln is not a furnace or oven and, in any event, not the kind or class of items intended or contemplated to be covered by said item 661.30, supra.

Defendant on the other hand contends that the term “non-electric” contained in said item 661.30 refers to the source of heat rather than to some secondary or mechanical function of the kiln operated by electricity. It is also contended that a kiln falls within the common meaning of the terms furnaces and ovens.

The initial impression of the language “non-electric” contained in item 661.30, based upon “grammatical construction” and previous experience in customs litigation under the Tariff Act of 1930, would lead to the conclusion that the Government’s position is untenable. However, the prime function of the court in interpreting the statutory language is to carry out the intent of Congress in enacting such legislation. In this instance by virtue of Public Law 768, 69 Stat. 1136, Congress delegated authority to the Tariff Commission to review the customs tariff schedules and improve procedures for tariff classification. The Tariff Commission, in following this mandate, did in fact prepare the present tariff schedules for final adoption by Congress. Said schedules were made effective by Presidential proclamation 3548. [280]*280In its course of studies, the Tariff Commission, in addition to preparing the proposed tariff schedules, prepared a number of volumes entitled “Tariff Classification Study” which included a submitting report and 7 supplemental reports. In the submitting report at page 8, under the heading “Influence of other classification systems,” said report states:

The first task which confronted the Commission in the preparation of the revised and consolidated tariff schedules was that of developing a logical, orderly, and systematic outline of provisions. To this end, a number of existing tariff, commodity, and industrial classification systems were carefully studied.

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Bluebook (online)
59 Cust. Ct. 276, 273 F. Supp. 384, 1967 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2180, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/f-l-smidth-co-v-united-states-cusc-1967.