Ezra v. Life Insurance Co. of North America

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Ezra v. Life Insurance Co. of North America

298 A.D.2d 267, 748 N.Y.S.2d 481, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10050

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 22, 2002

StatusPublished

This text of 298 A.D.2d 267 (Ezra v. Life Insurance Co. of North America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ezra v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 298 A.D.2d 267, 748 N.Y.S.2d 481, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10050 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marylin Diamond, J.), entered on or about July 9, 2001, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by plaintiffs brief, denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment seeking retrospective long-term disability payments for the period from May 9, 1998 to April 3, 2001, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The divergence of opinion expressed by the parties’ experts precludes summary judgment. Contrary to plaintiffs argument, the facts that defendant’s first expert did not examine plaintiff’s medical records until August 1999, and that defendant’s second expert did not examine plaintiff until April 2001, do not entitle plaintiff to summary judgment as to either of the corresponding time periods. Defendant’s expert affidavits raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff remained disabled, pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, for any period of time subsequent to May 8, 1998, the date when her disability payments terminated. Concur — Tom, J.P., Ellerin, Lerner, Rubin and Gonzalez, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marylin Diamond, J.), entered on or about July 9, 2001, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by plaintiffs brief, denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment seeking retrospective long-term disability payments for the period from May 9, 1998 to April 3, 2001, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The divergence of opinion expressed by the parties’ experts precludes summary judgment. Contrary to plaintiffs argument, the facts that defendant’s first expert did not examine plaintiff’s medical records until August 1999, and that defendant’s second expert did not examine plaintiff until April 2001, do not entitle plaintiff to summary judgment as to either of the corresponding time periods. Defendant’s expert affidavits raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff remained disabled, pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, for any period of time subsequent to May 8, 1998, the date when her disability payments terminated. Concur — Tom, J.P., Ellerin, Lerner, Rubin and Gonzalez, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

298 A.D.2d 267, 748 N.Y.S.2d 481, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10050, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ezra-v-life-insurance-co-of-north-america-nyappdiv-2002.