Ezor v. Yee

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 28, 2026
• Docket: 24-2435
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 28 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARTHUR EDWARD EZOR, AKA A. No. 24-2435 Edward Ezor, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-00094-JVS-AGR Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM * 0F

BETTY T. YEE; STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA; LEAH WILSON; JORDAN N. WRIGHT; MELANIE O. JAY; JOSEPH DIMINO; FENGLAN LIU; KRISTEN POFAHL; ELLIN DAVTYAN, General Counsel; VANESSA HOLTON; SUZANNE GRANDT; DOES 1-10, inclusive; MALIA M. COHEN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 22, 2026 **1F

Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Arthur Edward Ezor, a disbarred California attorney, appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action contesting

California’s assessment and collection of debt related to misappropriated client

funds. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the

district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the

basis of claim preclusion. V.V.V. & Sons Edible Oils Ltd. v. Meenakshi Overseas,

LLC, 946 F.3d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 2019). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Ezor’s federal claims as barred by

claim preclusion because Ezor raised identical claims in a prior federal action,

which involved the same parties and resulted in a final judgment on the merits.

See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 322 F.3d 1064,

1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of claim preclusion under federal law).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend

because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,

Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and

explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would

be futile).

We reject as unsupported by the record Ezor’s contentions that the district

court was biased and acted without jurisdiction.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

2 24-2435 in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-2435