Eye Care of Maine, P.A. v. Bell-Necevski

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedFebruary 2, 2022
DocketKENcv-20-91
StatusUnpublished

This text of Eye Care of Maine, P.A. v. Bell-Necevski (Eye Care of Maine, P.A. v. Bell-Necevski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eye Care of Maine, P.A. v. Bell-Necevski, (Me. Super. Ct. 2022).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, SS. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-20-91

EYE CARE OF MAINE, P.A., Plaintiff DECISION AND ORDER ON v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HELEN BELL-NECEVSKI and LORIE PARKS, Defendants

INTRODUCTION The matter before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Helen Bell-Necevski (Bell-Necevski) and Lorie Parks (Parks). The Plaintiff, Eye Care of Maine, P.A. (ECOM) opposes the motion. ECOM commenced this action on June 22, 2020, with the filing of a Verified Complaint and Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction against Bell­ Necevski and Parks, both of whom are optometrists who had been employed at ECOM (and its predecessor entity, Maine Eye Care Associates {MECA}) for many years until their termination effective June 30, 2020. Bell-Necevski and Parks were planning to open their own optometry practice on July 1, 2020, approximately one mile away from ECOM's place of business in Waterville and in direct competition with ECOM. ECOM alleges that Bell-Necevski and Parks were, and are, in violation of their employment contracts, which contained a non-compete provision prohibiting them from practicing optometry within a 30-mile radius of any ECOM office for a period of 18 months from the date of termination. Both Bell-Necevsk and Parks contend that their employment contracts with ECOM were superseded by new contracts signed in 2013 that did not contain a non-competition provision. On June 26, 2020, the court granted ECOM's request for an expedited hearing on its' motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent Bell-Necevski and Parks from opening their competing optometry practice. The expedited hearing was held remotely on June 30, 2020, and the court issued its order denying the requested TRO the same day. ECOM's original complaint was brought in two counts, one for breach of contract and the other seeking injunctive relief. Bell-Necevski and Parks filed timely answers to the complaint and each asserted counterclaims against ECOM for breach of contract. ECOM subsequently moved to amend its complaint to add a second breach of contract count (Count III). That motion was granted without objection on March 11, 2021. Count I of the amended complaint alleges that Bell-Necevski and Parks breached their employment contracts with ECOM by engaging in the practice of optometry in violation of the non-competition clauses in their respective contracts. Count II seeks injunctive relief to enforce the non-compete provision. Count III alleges that Bell-Necevski and Parks breached their employment contracts with ECOM by engaging in conduct, during the terms of their employment, that violated the "duty of loyalty" clauses in their contracts. Bell-Necevski and Parks filed timely amended answers. On September 2, 2021, Bell-Necevski and Parks moved for summary judgment on all counts of ECOM' s amended complaint. ECOM has opposed the motion for summary judgment. The summary judgment record was closed on December 8, 2021, with the filing by Bell-Necevski and Parks of their reply to ECOM's opposition.

2 LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, based on the parties' statements of material fact and the cited record, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Levine v. R.B.K. Caty Corp., 2001 ME 77, 14, 770 A.2d 653. It follows that to survive a moving party's motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must establish a prima facie case for each of their claims and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. Key Trust Co. ofMaine v. Nasson College, 1997 ME 145, , 10, 697 A.2d 408; see also M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). As the Law Court has recently stated: when a defendant moves for summary judgment, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating "that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts" entitle the defendant to judgment as a matter of law. Toto v. Knowles, 2021 ME 51, 19. It then becomes the plaintiffs responsibility to make out a prima facie case and show that there are disputed facts. Id. A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the suit. Id. To be considered "genuine," there must be sufficient evidence offered to raise a factual contest requiring a fact finder to choose between competing versions of the truth. Rainey v. Langden, 2010 ME 56,, 23, 998 A.2d 342; Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, 16, 750 A.2d 573. Further, this showing "requires more than effusive rhetoric and optimistic surmise." Hennessy v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 251 (1st Cir. 1999). The Court must ignore "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 237 (1st Cir. 2002). "Evidence 'submitted in opposition to summary judgment[] need not be persuasive at that stage,' but it 'must be sufficient to allow a fact-finder to make a factual determination without speculating.'" Toto v. Knowles, 2021 ME 51,111, citing and quoting Est. ofSmith, 2013 ME 13, 118, 60 A.3d 759.

3 FACTS

The following facts are drawn from the parties' statements of material fact, viewed in the light most favorable to ECOM as the nonmoving party. Kurtz & Perry, P.A. v. Emerson, 2010 ME 107, ,r 15, 8 A.3d 677. As a preliminary matter, Bell­ Necevski and Parks have submitted objections to several of the responses made by ECOM to their statements of material fact. The court will address the objections as necessary in the context of determining what material facts are undisputed, and what material facts have been properly controverted. M.R.Civ.P. 56(h)(4) & (i)(l).

Bell-Necevski is an optometrist who was employed by MECA beginning in 1994. Parks is an optometrist who was employed by MECA beginning in 2000. In 2013, MECA merged with Eye Center of Central Maine and became ECOM. Bell­ Necevski and Parks continued to work for ECOM until their terminations in 2020.

Although she does not recall signing an Employment Agreement in 2003, and no signed copy has been produced to the court, Bell-Necevski acknowledges that she worked for MECA "with the understanding I was subject to a non-competition agreement." The unsigned Employment Agreement dated February 1, 2003, and marked Exhibit A to Bell-Necevski's Affidavit, contains several "Whereas" clauses at the beginning of the agreement, one of which states: "WHEREAS, the Corporation has agreed to employ the Doctor subject to the express condition that the Doctor enter into a noncompetition agreement with the Corporation." Paragraph l l(a) of this Employment Agreement of February 1, 2003, provides:

(a)Doctor's Covenants. As an inducement to cause the Corporation to enter into this Agreement, the Doctor hereby expressly covenants, which covenant is a material provision of this Agreement that in the event the Doctor ceases to be employed by the Corporation for any reason (including, but not limited to, termination by either party with or without

4 cause), either during the term of this Agreement or thereafter, she shall not, for herself or on behalf of any other person, partnership, corporation, association or any other entity, directly or indirectly practice optometry within a radius of thirty (30) miles of any office of the Corporation for a period of eighteen ( 18) months from the date of termination or dismissal. Other provisions in paragraph 11 provided for the parties' acknowledgement that the "restrictive covenant" is reasonable and enforceable and established a mechanism for calculating liquidated damages.

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Related

Hennessy v. City of Melrose
194 F.3d 237 (First Circuit, 1999)
Carroll v. Xerox Corp.
294 F.3d 231 (First Circuit, 2002)
Steelstone Industries, Inc. v. North Ridge Ltd. Partnership
1999 ME 132 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1999)
Burdzel v. Sobus
2000 ME 84 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2000)
MacQuinn v. Patterson
85 A.2d 183 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1951)
Key Trust Co. of Maine v. Nasson College
1997 ME 145 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)
Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp.
2001 ME 77 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)
Kurtz & Perry, P.A. v. Emerson
2010 ME 107 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2010)
Estate of Patrick P. Smith v. Cumberland County
2013 ME 13 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2013)
Paul Remmes v. The Mark Travel Corporation
2015 ME 63 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2015)
Rainey v. Langen
2010 ME 56 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2010)
Christopher Toto v. Raelyn Knowles
2021 ME 51 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2021)

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Bluebook (online)
Eye Care of Maine, P.A. v. Bell-Necevski, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eye-care-of-maine-pa-v-bell-necevski-mesuperct-2022.