Exeltis USA Inc. v. First Databank, Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided June 1, 2020·No. 4:17-cv-04810·Unknown

Opinion

EXELTIS USA INC., Case No. 17-cv-04810-HSG

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO v. SEAL

FIRST DATABANK, INC., Re: Dkt. Nos. 167, 179, Defendant.

Pending before the Court are the parties’ administrative motions to file under seal portions of documents in connection with motions for summary judgment and Daubert motions. The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motions for the reasons described below. Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. Civil Local Rule 79-5 supplements the “compelling reasons” standard. The party seeking to file under seal must submit “a request that establishes that the document, or portions thereof, are privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law . . . . The request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material . . . .” Civil L.R. 79- 5(b). Courts have found that “confidential business information” in the form of “license agreements, financial terms, details of confidential licensing negotiations, and business strategies” satisfies the “compelling reasons” standard. See In re Qualcomm Litig., No. 3:17-cv-0108-GPC- MDD, 2017 WL 5176922, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (observing that sealing such information “prevent[ed] competitors from gaining insight into the parties’ business model and strategy”); Finisar Corp. v. Nistica, Inc., No. 13-cv-03345-BLF (JSC), 2015 WL 3988132, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015). Records attached to nondispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). Because the parties seek to seal portions and documents which pertain to summary judgment motions, the Court applies the compelling reasons standard to these documents. The motions. As indicated in the table below, the only proffered justification for sealing many of the documents is that the information was designated as “confidential” or “confidential – attorneys’ eyes only” by either Plaintiff or Defendant pursuant to the parties’ protective order. But a designation of confidentiality is not sufficient to establish that a document is sealable. See Civ. L. R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). “Confidential” is merely the parties’ initial designation of confidentiality to establish coverage under the stipulated protective order. See Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 5117083, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (“But good cause ‘cannot be established simply by showing that the document is subject to a protective order or by stating in general terms that the material is considered to be confidential’”) (quoting Bain v. AstraZeneca LP, No. 09-cv-4147, 2011 WL 482767, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011)). Thus, many of the parties’ motions do not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(d)(1)(A). In addition, in many instances the designating party for the materials did not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(e)(1), because they did not file a declaration within four days of the motion. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1). The Court finds that sealing is not warranted as to those documents. The parties also appear to have omitted some exhibits, either as public or under seal versions, so the Court could not make a determination about whether sealing is warranted in those circumstances. Nevertheless, the Court finds that as to the remaining documents, the parties have narrowly tailored their requested redactions to confidential and proprietary business, sales, or licensing information, including the identities of the customers who subscribe to Defendant’s database and Defendant’s financial performance and company strategy. The public release of these documents could give non-party competitors an unfair advantage in the development or marketing of rival products. See In re Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 F. App’x 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (ordering sealing where documents could be used “‘as sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing’”) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). Thus, the Court finds that the parties have in those circumstances established either compelling reasons or good cause to grant the motions to file under seal. See, e.g., Linex Techs., Inc. v. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 6115623 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012). Docket No. Document Portion(s) Sought to be Ruling Public /(Sealed) Sealed Dkt. No. 167 – GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART Dkt. No. 168/ Defendant’s Motion for Excerpts DENIED (167-5) Summary Judgment (No supporting declaration filed. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1).) Dkt. No. 170/ Motion to Exclude the Excerpts DENIED (167-9) Purported Expert Report (No supporting and Testimony of Norman declaration filed. See Smith Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1).) Dkt. No. 169/ Motion to Exclude the Excerpts DENIED (167-7) Purported Testimony of (No supporting Kevin Gorospe declaration filed. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1).) Dkt. No. 171-8/ Exhibit H to the Entire Document DENIED (167-12) Declaration of Ravi V. (No supporting Sitwala in Support of declaration filed. See Defendant’s Motions for Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1).) Summary Judgment and to Strike Expert Testimony Dkt. No. 171-9/ Exhibit I to the Entire D

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Exeltis USA Inc. v. First Databank, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2020).

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