Exela Pharma Scis., LLC v. REI Automation, Inc., 2026 NCBC 30.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION CALDWELL COUNTY 24CVS000158-130
EXELA PHARMA SCIENCES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER AND OPINION ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REI AUTOMATION, INC., PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendant.
1. This case arises out of a dispute over a contract for the development of an
intravenous (IV) bag filling system. Plaintiff Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC claims
that Defendant REI Automation, Inc. misrepresented its expertise and failed to
design and deliver the system as promised. REI denies the allegations and blames
Exela for the project’s failure. REI’s motion for partial summary judgment is now
pending, as are two related motions to strike certain evidence and to supplement the
record. (See ECF Nos. 61, 81, 105.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS
REI’s summary-judgment motion and DENIES as moot its motions to strike and
supplement.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by G. Gray Wilson and Linda L. Helms, and Chintapalli Law Firm, PLLC, by Satish Chintapalli, for Plaintiff Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC.
Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP, by Hope Garber, Christopher G. Smith, and Daniel Harrell, and Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, by David P. Fuad, for Defendant REI Automation, Inc.
Conrad, Judge. I. BACKGROUND
2. The Court does not make findings of fact when deciding motions for
summary judgment. The purpose of this background is to give context for the Court’s
analysis and ruling.
3. Exela makes and sells pharmaceuticals. For some products, Exela uses a
post-manufacturing process called terminal sterilization to reduce microbial
contamination. This is done by putting the finished pharmaceutical product into an
autoclave and using a combination of high pressure and high temperature to kill
microbes. For products that cannot survive high temperatures, Exela uses an aseptic
manufacturing process without terminal sterilization. In this context, an aseptic
process broadly means that the pharmaceutical manufacturing process itself is
designed to prevent or mitigate microbial contamination. (See 30(b)(6) Dep. P.
Koneru 17:4–10, 18:9–19:19, 38:3–11, ECF Nos. 62.2, 72.1.)
4. REI describes itself as a builder of special or custom machinery. Its
customers include pharmaceutical makers, as well as other businesses in fields as
varied as the nuclear, automotive, and consumer products industries. (See Dep. M.
Ahring 16:6–24, ECF Nos. 62.5, 72.11.)
5. In the summer of 2021, the parties began discussing a project to design and
build a robotic, aseptic IV bag filler machine. At that time, Exela was seeking
regulatory approval for a new product to be manufactured aseptically and delivered
through IV bags. But its existing IV bag filler was not automated and would not have
been suitable for this product. Ernest Shepard, who was then serving as Exela’s chief operating officer, had worked with REI in the past and recommended engaging it to
create an aseptic robotic bag filler that could operate at scale. A series of meetings
and communications followed in late July and early August 2021. During these
preliminary discussions, Exela’s representatives toured REI’s facilities, and REI told
Exela that it was in the process of building an aseptic IV bag filling system for another
company. (See 30(b)(6) Dep. P. Koneru 93:6–94:20, 135:2–136:17; Dep. E. Shepard
7:17–8:9, 71:4–72:22, ECF Nos. 62.3, 72.2; Dep. M. Pope 50:3–51:14, ECF Nos. 62.4,
72.5; Aff. E. Shepard ¶¶ 2, 3, ECF No. 72.6.)
6. At the end of October 2021, REI tendered a proposal in which it touted its
“core competencies” as its “ability to develop elegant, robust automation system
designs from fully automatic assembly lines to robotic cells to semi-automatic lean
assembly cells.” The proposal also contains a project description, various conceptual
sketches, price and payment terms, a summary of deliverables, and more. Exela
accepted the proposal and issued a purchase order just a few days later. Together,
the proposal and the purchase order make up the parties’ contract. (Aff. E. Shepard
Ex. A; 30(b)(6) Dep. P. Koneru Ex. 18; Dep. E. Shepard 110:2–7.)
7. REI began working on the project soon after but never completed it. The
parties now blame each other for its failure. According to Exela, a third-party
consulting firm assessed REI’s progress and determined that its work was shoddy
and beyond salvaging. What this shows, Exela says, is that REI lacked the necessary
expertise and bit off more than it could chew. REI’s answer to that charge is that it
takes two to tango. As REI tells it, Exela derailed the project by withholding crucial input, repeatedly making design changes, and either firing or failing to retain most
of the staff members responsible for coordinating with REI. Whatever the true reason
may have been, it is undisputed that Exela terminated the project in 2023. (Compare,
e.g., Decl. W. McKinney ¶¶ 2, 3, ECF No. 72.7; Dep. M. Ahring 20:13–16, with, e.g.,
30(b)(6) Dep. P. Koneru 176:6–9, 191:16–192:4; Dep. G. Phillips 19:19–23, ECF No.
62.8.)
8. Exela then filed this action, complaining that it had paid REI more than $3
million with nothing to show for the effort. The complaint claims that REI breached
the parties’ contract and seeks damages and declaratory relief, as well as rescission
as an alternative remedy. The complaint also asserts claims for fraud and unfair or
deceptive trade practices under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 based on the allegation that REI’s
October 2021 “budget proposal . . . was false and fraudulent” because REI “knew that
it lacked the expertise to fabricate” the bag filler system “in a timely manner and
actively concealed . . . that it had never manufactured such products before.” By
counterclaim, REI asserts that Exela breached the parties’ contract. (See, e.g., Compl.
¶¶ 6–8, 11, 13, 16, 21, 23, ECF No. 3; Ans. & Countercl., ECF No. 7.)
9. Discovery is now closed. REI has moved for partial summary judgment on
Exela’s fraud and section 75-1.1 claims. During briefing on the summary-judgment
motion, REI also filed a motion to strike certain evidence attached to Exela’s response
brief, primarily on the ground that Exela had obtained the documents from a
nonparty and then neglected to produce them to REI during discovery. 10. Once briefing on these motions was complete, the Court held a hearing on
10 February 2026. Afterward, REI moved to supplement the record, contending that
Exela had mischaracterized certain evidence during the hearing. Briefing related to
the motion to supplement ended on 9 March 2026.
11. REI’s motions are now ripe for resolution.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
12. Summary judgment is proper when the record “show[s] that there is no
genuine issue at to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in its favor. See Vizant
Techs., LLC v. YRC Worldwide, Inc., 373 N.C. 549, 556 (2020); N.C. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co v. Sadler, 365 N.C. 178, 182 (2011).
III. ANALYSIS
13. REI’s motion targets Exela’s fraud claim. REI also contends that Exela’s
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Exela Pharma Scis., LLC v. REI Automation, Inc., 2026 NCBC 30.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION CALDWELL COUNTY 24CVS000158-130
EXELA PHARMA SCIENCES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER AND OPINION ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REI AUTOMATION, INC., PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendant.
1. This case arises out of a dispute over a contract for the development of an
intravenous (IV) bag filling system. Plaintiff Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC claims
that Defendant REI Automation, Inc. misrepresented its expertise and failed to
design and deliver the system as promised. REI denies the allegations and blames
Exela for the project’s failure. REI’s motion for partial summary judgment is now
pending, as are two related motions to strike certain evidence and to supplement the
record. (See ECF Nos. 61, 81, 105.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS
REI’s summary-judgment motion and DENIES as moot its motions to strike and
supplement.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by G. Gray Wilson and Linda L. Helms, and Chintapalli Law Firm, PLLC, by Satish Chintapalli, for Plaintiff Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC.
Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP, by Hope Garber, Christopher G. Smith, and Daniel Harrell, and Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, by David P. Fuad, for Defendant REI Automation, Inc.
Conrad, Judge. I. BACKGROUND
2. The Court does not make findings of fact when deciding motions for
summary judgment. The purpose of this background is to give context for the Court’s
analysis and ruling.
3. Exela makes and sells pharmaceuticals. For some products, Exela uses a
post-manufacturing process called terminal sterilization to reduce microbial
contamination. This is done by putting the finished pharmaceutical product into an
autoclave and using a combination of high pressure and high temperature to kill
microbes. For products that cannot survive high temperatures, Exela uses an aseptic
manufacturing process without terminal sterilization. In this context, an aseptic
process broadly means that the pharmaceutical manufacturing process itself is
designed to prevent or mitigate microbial contamination. (See 30(b)(6) Dep. P.
Koneru 17:4–10, 18:9–19:19, 38:3–11, ECF Nos. 62.2, 72.1.)
4. REI describes itself as a builder of special or custom machinery. Its
customers include pharmaceutical makers, as well as other businesses in fields as
varied as the nuclear, automotive, and consumer products industries. (See Dep. M.
Ahring 16:6–24, ECF Nos. 62.5, 72.11.)
5. In the summer of 2021, the parties began discussing a project to design and
build a robotic, aseptic IV bag filler machine. At that time, Exela was seeking
regulatory approval for a new product to be manufactured aseptically and delivered
through IV bags. But its existing IV bag filler was not automated and would not have
been suitable for this product. Ernest Shepard, who was then serving as Exela’s chief operating officer, had worked with REI in the past and recommended engaging it to
create an aseptic robotic bag filler that could operate at scale. A series of meetings
and communications followed in late July and early August 2021. During these
preliminary discussions, Exela’s representatives toured REI’s facilities, and REI told
Exela that it was in the process of building an aseptic IV bag filling system for another
company. (See 30(b)(6) Dep. P. Koneru 93:6–94:20, 135:2–136:17; Dep. E. Shepard
7:17–8:9, 71:4–72:22, ECF Nos. 62.3, 72.2; Dep. M. Pope 50:3–51:14, ECF Nos. 62.4,
72.5; Aff. E. Shepard ¶¶ 2, 3, ECF No. 72.6.)
6. At the end of October 2021, REI tendered a proposal in which it touted its
“core competencies” as its “ability to develop elegant, robust automation system
designs from fully automatic assembly lines to robotic cells to semi-automatic lean
assembly cells.” The proposal also contains a project description, various conceptual
sketches, price and payment terms, a summary of deliverables, and more. Exela
accepted the proposal and issued a purchase order just a few days later. Together,
the proposal and the purchase order make up the parties’ contract. (Aff. E. Shepard
Ex. A; 30(b)(6) Dep. P. Koneru Ex. 18; Dep. E. Shepard 110:2–7.)
7. REI began working on the project soon after but never completed it. The
parties now blame each other for its failure. According to Exela, a third-party
consulting firm assessed REI’s progress and determined that its work was shoddy
and beyond salvaging. What this shows, Exela says, is that REI lacked the necessary
expertise and bit off more than it could chew. REI’s answer to that charge is that it
takes two to tango. As REI tells it, Exela derailed the project by withholding crucial input, repeatedly making design changes, and either firing or failing to retain most
of the staff members responsible for coordinating with REI. Whatever the true reason
may have been, it is undisputed that Exela terminated the project in 2023. (Compare,
e.g., Decl. W. McKinney ¶¶ 2, 3, ECF No. 72.7; Dep. M. Ahring 20:13–16, with, e.g.,
30(b)(6) Dep. P. Koneru 176:6–9, 191:16–192:4; Dep. G. Phillips 19:19–23, ECF No.
62.8.)
8. Exela then filed this action, complaining that it had paid REI more than $3
million with nothing to show for the effort. The complaint claims that REI breached
the parties’ contract and seeks damages and declaratory relief, as well as rescission
as an alternative remedy. The complaint also asserts claims for fraud and unfair or
deceptive trade practices under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 based on the allegation that REI’s
October 2021 “budget proposal . . . was false and fraudulent” because REI “knew that
it lacked the expertise to fabricate” the bag filler system “in a timely manner and
actively concealed . . . that it had never manufactured such products before.” By
counterclaim, REI asserts that Exela breached the parties’ contract. (See, e.g., Compl.
¶¶ 6–8, 11, 13, 16, 21, 23, ECF No. 3; Ans. & Countercl., ECF No. 7.)
9. Discovery is now closed. REI has moved for partial summary judgment on
Exela’s fraud and section 75-1.1 claims. During briefing on the summary-judgment
motion, REI also filed a motion to strike certain evidence attached to Exela’s response
brief, primarily on the ground that Exela had obtained the documents from a
nonparty and then neglected to produce them to REI during discovery. 10. Once briefing on these motions was complete, the Court held a hearing on
10 February 2026. Afterward, REI moved to supplement the record, contending that
Exela had mischaracterized certain evidence during the hearing. Briefing related to
the motion to supplement ended on 9 March 2026.
11. REI’s motions are now ripe for resolution.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
12. Summary judgment is proper when the record “show[s] that there is no
genuine issue at to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in its favor. See Vizant
Techs., LLC v. YRC Worldwide, Inc., 373 N.C. 549, 556 (2020); N.C. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co v. Sadler, 365 N.C. 178, 182 (2011).
III. ANALYSIS
13. REI’s motion targets Exela’s fraud claim. REI also contends that Exela’s
section 75-1.1 claim is predicated on the fraud claim, so that the two claims rise or
fall together.
14. Fraud has five “essential elements”: (a) a false representation or
concealment of a material fact, (b) calculated to deceive, (c) made with intent to
deceive, (d) that did in fact deceive, and (e) that resulted in damage to the injured
party. Rowan Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 332 N.C. 1, 17 (1992). The
plaintiff must show not only that it actually relied on the misrepresentation or omission but also that its reliance was reasonable. See Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519,
527 (2007).
15. Because “silence is fraudulent only when there is a duty to speak,” a claim
based on “concealment or nondisclosure” requires the plaintiff to show that the
defendant “had a duty to disclose material information.” Lawrence v. UMLIC-Five
Corp., 2007 NCBC LEXIS 20, at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 18, 2007) (citing Griffin v.
Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 198 (1976)). A duty to disclose arises when the
parties are in a fiduciary relationship, when one party “has taken affirmative steps
to conceal material facts from the other,” or when “one party has knowledge of a latent
defect in the subject matter of the negotiations about which the other party is both
ignorant and unable to discover through reasonable diligence.” Harton v. Harton, 81
N.C. App. 295, 297–98 (1986).
16. Simple notice pleading is insufficient for fraud claims; particularity is
required. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(b). If the claim is based on a misrepresentation, the
plaintiff must allege the “time, place and content” of the misrepresentation, the
“identity of the person making the representation,” and “what was obtained as a
result.” Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 85 (1981). If the claim is based on concealment,
the plaintiff must allege:
(1) the relationship between plaintiff and defendant giving rise to the duty to speak; (2) the event or events triggering the duty to speak and/or the general time period over which the relationship arose and the fraudulent conduct occurred; (3) the general content of the information that was withheld and the reason for its materiality; (4) the identity of those under a duty who failed to make such disclosures; (5) what the defendant gained by withholding information; (6) why plaintiff’s reliance on the omission was both reasonable and detrimental; and (7) the damages proximately flowing from such reliance.
Lawrence, 2007 NCBC LEXIS 20, at *9 (citation and alterations omitted).
17. Exela’s complaint pleads both misrepresentations and concealment. REI
allegedly misrepresented its “design and manufacturing expertise” and its ability to
provide an IV bag filling system “in several months.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) REI also allegedly
concealed that “it had never attempted to build an aseptic bag filling system.”
(Compl. ¶ 7.) These allegations define and delimit the scope of the fraud claim. (See
Compl. ¶ 16 (alleging fraud on the grounds that REI “knew that it lacked the
expertise to fabricate such products in a timely manner and actively concealed from
plaintiff that it had never manufactured such products before”).)
18. REI contends that these allegations lack particularity, thus entitling it to
summary judgment. Exela’s response brief says nothing about particularity and
makes no attempt to show that the complaint’s allegations satisfy Rule 9(b). Asked
to address the issue at the hearing, Exela’s counsel argued that insufficient
particularity in the complaint is not a valid basis for summary judgment.
19. Thus, a threshold question arises: is summary judgment appropriate if a
complaint does not state a claim for fraud with particularity?
20. Yes, it is. Appellate precedent is crystal clear on this point. A complaint
must allege fraud “with particularity,” and “[i]f it does not, summary judgment is
proper.” Trull v. Cent. Carolina Bank & Tr. Co., 117 N.C. App. 220, 224 (1994); see
also, e.g., Leake v. Sunbelt Ltd. of Raleigh, 93 N.C. App. 199, 205 (1989) (affirming
grant of summary judgment due to failure to allege fraud with particularity); In re Se. Eye Center-Pending Matters, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 29, at *47 (N.C. Super. Ct. May
7, 2019) (collecting cases holding that “summary judgment is appropriate . . . where
a plaintiff has failed to plead fraud with particularity”).
21. This leads to a second question: does Exela’s complaint allege fraud with the
particularity required by Rule 9(b)?
22. No, it does not. Starting with the allegations of fraudulent concealment, the
complaint does not allege, even in a conclusory way, that REI had a duty to speak.
Nor does it allege facts that might give rise to a duty to speak, such as affirmative
acts of concealment. This is a glaring defect, especially so given the usual rule that
parties negotiating a commercial transaction at arm’s-length have no duty of
disclosure. See, e.g., Comput. Decisions, Inc. v. Rouse Office Mgmt. of N.C., Inc., 124
N.C. App. 383, 389 (1996) (observing that parties had “no duty of disclosure” when
negotiating a commercial transaction). REI is therefore entitled to summary
judgment as to the allegations of fraudulent concealment.
23. The allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation are also deficient. To be
sure, the complaint does say when and where the misrepresentations were
supposedly made (“a budget proposal dated October 12, 2021”), as well as who made
them (REI’s “employee, Graham Chapman”). (Compl. ¶ 6.) But it does not
adequately allege a fraudulent representation in other respects.
24. Consider, first, the allegation that REI misrepresented its “design and
manufacturing expertise” in the proposal. (Compl. ¶ 6.) What did REI say about its
expertise? The complaint provides no detail. As our Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]here is a requirement of specificity as to the element of a representation made by
the alleged defrauder.” Rowan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 332 N.C. at 17. Were it otherwise,
courts could not distinguish “mere puffing” and other nonactionable statements from
true “misrepresentations of material facts.” Id. The complaint’s vague allegation
that REI misrepresented its expertise is not “definite and specific” and therefore
cannot support a fraud claim. See Charlotte Motor Speedway, LLC v. Cnty. of
Cabarrus, 230 N.C. App. 1, 10 (2013) (concluding that defendant’s alleged
representation about its “ability to fund the promised amounts” was not “definite and
specific”).
25. Rather than defend the claim as alleged, Exela shifts gears in its response
brief and offers a new theory. According to Exela, REI represented in a slide deck in
August 2021 that it had “expertise in designing and building a turnkey aseptic IV Bag
filler” and that it “had already designed and built an aseptic IV bag filler for another
customer.” (Resp. Br. 11, ECF No. 72 (emphases added).) Note the material
differences in time, place, and content. This is not what Exela alleged in its
complaint, and the Court will not entertain a novel theory presented for the first time
at summary judgment. See, e.g., Fund 19-Miller, LLC v. Isbill, 2021 N.C. App. LEXIS
624, at *11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021) (unpublished) (“Litigants are unable to assert new
theories of recovery that were not alleged in the complaint at summary judgment
. . . .”); Window World of Baton Rouge, LLC v. Window World, Inc., 2024 NCBC LEXIS
153, at *114 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2024) (concluding that it “would be
fundamentally unfair” to allow a party to raise a “new theory . . . at this late date”); B&D Software Holdings, LLC v. Infobelt, Inc., 2024 NCBC LEXIS 103, at *17–18
(N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2024) (“A basic tenet of our civil justice system is that a
claimant’s initial pleading must adequately inform the responding party of what it is
alleged to have done wrong so that it can defend itself accordingly.”).
26. That leaves the allegation that REI promised that it could finish the job “in
several months.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) “An unfulfilled promise is not actionable fraud . . .
unless the promisor had no intention of carrying it out at the time of the promise.”
McKinnon v. CV Indus., Inc., 213 N.C. App. 328, 338 (2011); see also Trull, 117 N.C.
App. at 225 (“A promissory misrepresentation will not normally support an allegation
of fraud.”). Nowhere does the complaint allege with particularity that REI had no
intention of fulfilling its obligations on time. See Leake, 93 N.C. App. at 205 (“Since
plaintiffs . . . failed to allege defendants’ intent at the time the representations were
made, we affirm that portion of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment
for defendants on the fraudulent misrepresentation of recreational facilities claim.”).
And in any event, Exela’s response brief does not discuss or rely on this alleged
misrepresentation, suggesting that it has been abandoned.
27. In sum, Exela did not plead its fraud claim with the particularity required
by Rule 9(b). As a result, summary judgment as to this claim is appropriate. See,
e.g., Gvest Real Est., LLC v. JS Real Est. Invs., LLC, 2023 NCBC LEXIS 110, at *21
(N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2023) (granting summary judgment because claimant failed
to plead fraud claim with adequate particularity). 28. For similar reasons, REI is entitled to summary judgment as to Exela’s
section 75-1.1 claim. Indeed, this claim is predicated entirely on Exela’s allegations
of fraud and breach of contract. (See Compl. ¶ 21 (stating generally that the
“misconduct alleged herein constitutes unfair and deceptive acts or practices”).) It is
elementary that “a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently
unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.” Post v. Avita Drugs,
LLC, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 95, at *10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2017) (quoting Branch
Banking & Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 107 N.C. App. 53, 62 (1992)). There must be some
additional, aggravating circumstance. Fraud would usually suffice, but Exela has
not adequately alleged fraud. Nor has it alleged any other conduct that could be
considered an aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, the section 75-1.1 claim fails
on its face. See, e.g., Brown v. Roth, 133 N.C. App. 52, 56 n.3 (1999) (“Because we
hold there is no evidence of fraud, it follows the unfair and deceptive trade practices
claim also must fail.”); Whalen v. Tuttle, 2024 NCBC LEXIS 146, at *14–16 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2024) (granting motion to dismiss a “catchall” section 75-1.1 claim
predicated on a deficient fraud claim and related claim for breach of contract).
29. In an attempt to save its section 75-1.1 claim, Exela again belatedly
introduces a new theory, this time based on REI’s supposed bad faith during
settlement negotiations that took place before this litigation began. It is doubtful
whether the asserted conduct—which is bound up with the parties’ perceived
contractual rights and obligations—could support a section 75-1.1 claim even if Exela
had included the allegations in its complaint. Regardless, Exela did not, and it may not revamp its claim at summary judgment. See, e.g., Fund 19-Miller, 2021 N.C. App.
LEXIS 624, at *11.
30. Accordingly, the Court grants REI’s motion for partial summary judgment
as to Exela’s fraud and section 75-1.1 claims. It follows that REI’s motion to strike
and motion to supplement are moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
31. For all these reasons, the Court GRANTS REI’s motion for partial summary
judgment. Exela’s claims for fraud and violations of section 75-1.1 are DISMISSED
with prejudice.
32. The Court also DENIES as moot REI’s motion to strike and motion to
supplement the record.
SO ORDERED, this the 2nd day of April, 2026.
/s/ Adam M. Conrad Adam M. Conrad Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases